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I. Introduction  
 
1. Problem outline 
 
It is today over seventeen years since the demise of communist power in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Since then, much work has been done analysing the process of 
democratic consolidation in the region, taking into account a wide variety of political, 
economical, social and institutional aspects of the transformation process.  What appears 
remarkable, however, is that the role of the media in this transition has been hardly 
discussed. As stated by O´Neil: “Despite the fact that the recent spread of democracy has 
led to a commensurate amount of scholarly work on authoritarian collapse and 
democratization, little attention has been given to the media in this regard” (O´Neil, 1998, 
pg 3). While the importance of the media’s political role has increasingly become subject to 
studies in the longer established democracies, especially the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, with respect to Central- and Eastern Europe, an in depth 
analysis clearly lacks. As argued by Sparks: “The consequence of this lack of attention to 
the scope of recent developments is that the conceptual apparatus that we bring to the 
study of the media and democracy is seriously underdeveloped” (Sparks, 2001, pg 8). As 
a result, no theory exists to explain how the media change during and take effect on 
political transformations in the region.  
 
Generally, Western social scientists agree that democracies depend on free media 
(O´Neil, 1997). “Democracy” in the modern senses of the word, is literally impossible 
without the media. It is a characteristic claim of democratic societies that they are 
democratic exactly due to them having both regular elections and a free media (Sparks , 
1998). The media are considered the principle institutions from which members of the 
public can better understand their own society (McConnell, Becker, 2002). As argued by 
McConnell & Becker, “the media contribute to the public sphere by providing citizens with 
information about their world, by fostering debate about various issues and by encouraging 
informed decisions about available courses of action” (Ibid).  Indeed, the media as the 
medium and as a part of “civil society” represents public opinions, social change, culture 
and politics. Additionally, in the region itself, the role and question of media independence 
has caused extensive dispute, which in several countries still persists. Freedom of speech 
and expression are regarded among the most important achievements of transformation in 
the countries of the region themselves (Tzankoff, 2001). Politicians, parties and societal 
actors during the transformation process had developed different strategies to take 
influence via the media.  
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The general lack of empirical research regarding the mutual relationship between the 
media and the process of democratization in the region of research therefore appears 
surprising and demands further investigation.  
 
Both political scientists and communications researchers agree that the media and its 
journalists play some role in political processes in all societies. In relation to Central and 
Eastern Europe, as suggested by Sükösd, it is generally agreed that the media played a 
role in the breakdown of the Communist regimes in 1989-90 as well as in the far-reaching 
transformation of the region since then (Sükösd, 2000, pg 122). Existing academic 
literature on the subject, however, fundamentally disagrees on what exactly this role of the 
mass media was. There is debate about whether conditions need to be present, before the 
media can take influence, and if so what these conditions are. Obviously, these pre-
conditions alone would already be part of the transformation process.   
 
To be sure, already by definition it is extremely difficult for the media within a repressive 
regime to live up to the ideals of a media system in democratic societies (Randall, 1998). 
Nonetheless, as some general role of the media in the transformation process in Central 
and Eastern European countries is generally suggested, the question arising therefore, is 
what exactly this role was. Has the transformation process influenced free and 
independent media, or has the media influenced the transformation process? As brought 
up by O´Neil, if the media are so vital in consolidated democracies as is generally stated, 
acting as a watchdog and as a “fourth estate”, can one then also assume that they play a 
role in undermining authoritarian rule? (O´Neil, 1998).  While it is generally suggested that 
free media –and therefore free communication – is essential in a democracy, “the issue of 
whether mass media lead or follow change, whether they mirror or mold society, and 
whether they should be conceptualized as agents of change or of the status quo have yet 
to be resolved” (Jakubowicz, 2002, pg 203). It is exactly this unresolved question that this 
dissertation attempts to shed light into. It is a basic hypothesis of this dissertation that the 
media – in the final phase of the authoritarian rule – did indeed play a dominant part in 
undermining the system and in fostering alternative discussion. This hypothesis will be 






2. Level of research  
 
That the media influence society is nothing new. Already in 1963, Pye had argued that the 
media “in providing a new basis for understanding politics and for interpreting the realm of 
government, become involved in the most complex and psychologically intense problems 
of transitional societies” (Pye in Gross, 2002, pg 80). Nevertheless, until recently, literature 
on transformation in the region of research has to a great extent ignored the role of media 
and the media system in democratic transitions and consolidations. This goes for both 
literatures in political science as in communication sciences. With respect to Eastern 
Europe, no theory exists to explain how the media change during and take effect on 
political transformations. As argued by O´Neil, as academic analysis of the media have 
little to say about the role of press in transitional systems, at the same time, those 
academics who study authoritarian transitions and democratization tend not to do 
extensive research on the media as an important political variable (O´Neil, 1997 pg 3).  
 
With regard to Communication science, as stated by Novosel, “communication scientists 
did not attempt to develop any sort of comprehensive theory or model with the specific aim 
of explaining and forecasting the downfall of nondemocratic regimes, that is, a theory that 
would look on these processes from the perspective of the communication variables – in 
interpersonal, group, or mass media channels” (Novosel, 1995, pg 10). In political 
sciences, even where the idea of the media is recognised as an important factor in the 
formation of political discourse, a “civil society” and the consolidation of a post-communist 
society, there is a clear lacking of further, thorough elaboration. Although a free press is 
taken as one of the “key pillars of democracy”, this concept is hardly developed any further 
(O´Neil, 1997).  
 
Transition theory in Western social sciences has been heavily influenced by the four-
volume landmark study “Transitions from Authoritarian rule” by Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe C. Schmitter (1986). Even in this book, however, which has immeasurably 
broadened the understanding of political transitions, although suggesting that:  “Usually, 
artists and intellectuals are the first to manifest public opposition to authoritarian rule, often 
before the transition has been launched” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986, pg 49) the media 
and its journalists as such are never mentioned (O´Neil, 1998). As quoted by Mughan and 
Gunther: “The state of research on media effects is one of the most notable 
embarrassments of modern social science” (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, pg 1). This 
although, as argued by Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, “democratic consolidation is a complex 
process with many dimensions, one of the most crucial being the establishment of 
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widespread popular support. Since citizens´ experience with their political system is to a 
large extent a mediated experience, the mass media that fulfil this function of mediation 
become of decisive importance” (Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2002 pg 2). Additionally, the 
Media –often referred to as the fourth power within the state- has a unique position within 
the democratic self-understanding.  As argued by Mughan and Gunther, “the mass 
communications media are the connective tissue of democracy” (Gunther & Mughan, 
2000, pg 1). Thus, it is fair to say that although the academic research of democratization 
has advanced significantly since regime change began with the simultaneous collapse of 
state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, the role of the 
media in this change was treated with tremendous neglect.  
 
While there exists a general consensus among academics that the media are part of social 
change in Central and Eastern Europe, suggesting that free and independent media are 
necessary for the functioning of democracy, analysis going beyond this basic notion – 
analysing in what ways the media may foster or impede democratization – clearly fails. 
There seems to lack empirical evidence on how fundamentally the media has an impact on 
democracy, especially with respect to Eastern Europe. Research on the relationship 
between the media and democratization disagree on what actually the role of the media 
during the democratization process is.  
Is the media a component of democracy, or is it rather a necessary step towards 
democracy? Do the media lead or follow society? Are the media agents of change or do 
they simply mirror what is happening in society?  
 
Commonly, the literature that does exist on the topic in general, suggests four different 
positions in relation to the role of the media in democratization processes:  
1. The “Media-supremist position”, arguing that free and independent media generate 
democracy.  This position has found its advocates in the work of the “Toronto 
School” (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1962). It stresses the means of communication as 
a force for change. There exist stronger and weaker versions of the “media-
supremist position” (McQuail, 1992). However, generally this position sees media 
as decisive in the struggle for power in all regimes, including non-democratic 
regimes. Accordingly, media of all types are believed to assist the struggle that 
emerges between political movements and the authoritarian state in the process of 
regime change, and continues through the transition stage into the consolidation 
stage, with whatever regime emerges (McConnell & Becker, July 2002).  
2. The “democracy-supremist” position, suggesting that democratic reform determines 
and produces media freedom and independence. It argues the dependence of the 
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media on other forces in society, especially those of politics and money (McQuail, 
1992). Also here some recognise a casual influence to some media in some cases 
for some social institutions, without rejecting a general view of media as ultimately 
being dependent on society (Ibid). 
3. The “media-is-an-element-of-democracy” position (connected to position 2), which 
argues that the media and its freedom are simply an outcome of democracy and, 
as such, have no part in actively fostering democracy (McConnel & Becker, July 
2002). 
4. The “null-effect” position, claiming that there is no relationship between the media 
and democracy (McConnel & Becker, 2002). 
 
Although not often mentioned, further literature presents two alternative positions, namely: 
5. A media-freedom-hinders-democracy position (Ette, 2000). Ette for example 
suggests that in the case of Nigeria, the media undermined democracy, and 
argues:  “it is not even clear the press has a common understanding of how it 
should serve the cause of democracy” (Ibid). 
6. A democratization hinders-media-freedom argument (McConnel & Becker, July 
2002). Here the argument goes, that as democratization takes place, media 
regulation that evolves during this process restrict media freedoms. For example, in 
Serbia, following the collapse of the regime, no real regulation of the broadcast 
media existed. During the process of democratization, regulation concerning media 
licensing became more restrictive and this limited the possibilities of the media 
system to take influence.  
 
Randall argues a “stage-ist” approach, suggesting that it is necessary to consider the role 
of the media under the previous regime, as that will impact the media’s rate of evolution 
toward independence and its ability to act as a credible force during the transition and 
consolidation phases. Additionally, during the different phases the media may have 
different roles. For example, during the immediate phase of transition, the media appear to 
be most supportive of democracy, which often declines thereafter (Randall, 1998, quoted 
in McConnel & Becker, July 2002).   
 
As one can indeed argue some form of co-variation between media and democracy, 
position four usually does not receive much attention. Existing literature, therefore, tends to 
suggest that in all Central and Eastern European countries, there indeed exists at least 
some form of relationship between the media and democratization (Thomas & Tzankoff, 
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2001). This dissertation supports the view that the media do contribute to the 
transformation and subsequent consolidation of democracy.  
 
The level of research in relation to the national media in the GDR is very different to that of 
Hungary. With reference to the GDR, an emphasis is usually put on the role of West 
German media on the formation of political opinions. Indeed, the national media of the 
GDR probably receives the least attention in any analysis of the media in Eastern and 
Central Europe (Dennis & vanden Heuvel, 1990). This mainly results out of two reasons. 
Firstly, the media in the GDR until 1989 was regarded as being one of the most strongly 
controlled by the political elite in all of the soviet bloc countries, as a result of which the 
role of the West German media is regarded as more important. The electronic media of the 
FRG –having the same language and being available in most of the GDR – offered a good 
alternative as an information and entertainment source to the GDR citizens.  
Secondly, the GDR as a country ceased to exist after 1990, when the GDR in comparison 
to other former communist countries of the region underwent an enormous leap, overnight 
becoming part of a consolidated west European democracy.  
 
With respect to the GDR a far-reaching analysis has been published by Arnulf Kutsch (ed) 
“Publizistischer und journalistischer Wandel in der DDR” (1990). Although successfully 
summarizing the developments inside the East-German Media in 1989, suggesting how 
the media reacted to changes inside the system, nevertheless, an in depth analysis on 
how exactly the media influenced the democratization process remains unresolved. The 
publication manages quite well to portray the output of the media during and following the 
collapse of the regime. It manages less, however, in portraying the outcome of the medias 
actions during this collapse for the democratization process.   
 
In the case of Hungary, much more literature on the topic exists (see Dawisha & Parrott, 
1997; Gross, 2002; Gunther & Mughan, 2000; O’Neil, 1997; Price, Rozumilowicz &  
Verhulst, 2002; Thomas & Tzankoff, , 2001). Reference here, however, is usually made to 
the media as an institution analysing how this as such has transformed during the 
democratization process. Overall, analysis of what influence the media had on any political 
and social transformation still clearly lacks. 
 
An extensive attempt to integrate existing literature on the topic has been conducted by 
Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst (2002). The aim of their research was to analyse “the 
impact of political transitions on media structures and the impact of changing media 
structures on political reform” (Price, Rozumilowicz & Verhulst 2002, pg 1). They chose 
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several case studies including Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Poland in order to receive 
empirical evidence on the relationship between the media and democratization. 
Nonetheless, the analysis is successful in bringing evidence about media reform, but much 
less successful in suggesting a link between the media freedom and reform and political 
change (McConnell & Becker, 2002).   
 
Patrick O’Neil, who extensively discusses the relationship between the Media in Eastern 
Europe and democratic transition, has conducted further far-reaching work on the topic. In 
his research, together with American and East European scholars, his works outline how 
the specific influence of the media has led to democratic consolidations in the region. 
While this analysis, however, successfully addresses the topic, the relatively large amount 
of countries studied hinders a deeper analysis of each country on its own. The same goes 
for a publication by Gunther & Mughan (2000). Their book “Democracy and the Media: A 
comparative Perspective” offers a collection of essays by prominent scholars on the 
impacts of politics on the media, and of the media on politics, in authoritarian, transitional, 
and democratic regimes in various countries including Russia, Hungary, Germany and the 
United States. Especially the text by Sükösd offers valuable insight into the position and 
changes within the media from Stalinism to democratization In Hungary. The overall 
conclusion of the publication suggests that media liberalization is a necessary prerequisite 
for successful democratization. The editors, however, stress that “it would be unwarranted 
to jump to the conclusion that the freer the media from government regulation and the 
more they are embedded in a market economy, the stronger their contribution to the 
quality of democracy” (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, pg 402).  
In both works the GDR and the role of its media on the transformation process is barely 
mentioned.  Although both works address the role of the Media in Hungary, empirical 
analysis clearly lacks.  
 
„Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa” by Thomas & Tzankoff, (2001) addresses the 
clear lacking of empirical analysis on the subject. The book identifies several well-known 
books analysing the process of democratic transformations, stating that the role of the 
Media in societal change is neither addressed in country studies nor in theoretical 
analyses. “Die Rolle der Medien bei dem gesellschaftlichen Wandel kommt weder in den 
Länderstudien noch in den theoriegeleiteten Analysen vor” (Tzankoff, 2001 pg 9). While 
arguing, however, that in all countries of central and eastern Europe bar the Czech 
Republic, at different stages of the democratization process the media may indeed be 
regarded as a motor of Transformation (Thomas & Tzankoff, 2001 pg 249), an in depth 
empirical analysis remains out.  
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“Glasnost and after: Media and change in Central and Eastern Europe” edited by Paletz, 
Jakubowicz, & Novosel (1995) is an additional work with in depth analysis of the role of the 
media in Eastern Europe. While the chapter of Robinson “East-Germany” (1995) 
addresses issues of media democratization, discussing how the media as such 
transformed and democratized after 1989, it is less successful in discussing the role and 
influence of the media on the process of democratization. The chapter by Jakubowicz “The 
Media as agents of Change” successfully addresses the issue of media influence on the 
transformation process. Although arguing that it “would be hard to develop a hierarchy of 
agents of change” (Jakubowicz, 1995, pg 42) at the same time, Jakubowicz states that the 
media may to an extent be seen as “central to the process of change in Central and 
Eastern Europe- a crucial catalyst of change, in both a positive and negative sense” 
(Jakubowicz, 1995, pg 43). The chapter attempts to analyse the role of the media in a vast 
number of countries of the region, but lacks in depth analysis.  
  
In sum existing literature often contradicts itself, leaving many unanswered questions as to 
the relationship between the media and democracy in the area of research. As argued by 
O’Neil, “where media systems are emerging from a long period of authoritarianism, as in 
Eastern Europe, what impact media structures in transition have on the new political order, 
and vice versa, requires further investigation”. (O’Neil, 1997, pg3)  
 
Existing literature on the GDR and Hungary suggests a very different traditional picture of 
the national media of the respective countries prior to the systems demise. While in the 
GDR the media were heavily controlled, overwhelmingly regarded as the mouthpiece of 
the communist party, the media in Hungary enjoyed considerable freedom, often openly 
criticising the regime a considerable time before the system was in a state of collapse. This 
opening of the media in Hungary had already begun after the disastrous events of 1956, 
after which János Kádár brought Hungary on the path of “Goulash Communism” (O´Neil, 
1997 pg 83), a term used to describe Hungary’s high degree of reformist pragmatism and 
comparably high liberties given to the people (Ibid). As a result of the comparably honest 
reporting of the media and its at times critical questioning of some regime decisions, while 
in the GDR the people viewed the national media as an instrument of communist 
propaganda, in Hungary the people had a stronger trust in the national media which, 
arguably, gave the media a positive role in fostering political discourse and in creating 
public opinions (Sükosd, 2000).  
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It seems that in Hungary, as opposed to the GDR, the journalists had a stronger self-
standard in what they were writing, only to an extent prepared to follow state propaganda 
no matter how ridiculous it was. In Hungary, as argued by Sükösd, this came as after 1963 
many intellectuals involved in the 1956 uprising became decision makers within the media 
system, slowly beginning to liberalize their respective fields from the inside. The fact that 
these had been active in 1956, gave them considerable credibility in the eyes of many 
Hungarians. Sükösd suggests that by beginning to address previously taboo topics, these 
intellectuals then positively affected the democratization process by actively disseminating 
democratic values and concepts (Ibid).  Bit by bit these journalists managed to increase 
their room to act independently, furthering the limits set by the censor.  
 
Indeed, as argued by Lanczi and O’Neil, in Hungary, the media were less strictly controlled 
than elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe, allowing broader scope for discourse 
(O’Neil, 1997). This situation of relative freedom became even bigger with the process of 
privatization of the print media beginning already in 1988 –bringing the involvement of 
mostly Western European publishers. The literature on the subject suggests that the 
process of privatization positively affected transition by allowing the journalists to engage 
in political debate even more openly, as the media content was influenced by commercial 
thinking. Although the Hungarian journalists often supported communism, many believed 
in the need of political, social and economical reform. This influenced them in addressing 
sometimes long overdue discussions on political reform and thus initiating a debate both 
within society but also among the party elite.  
 
Existing literature on the GDR on the other hand suggests that the system represented the 
traditional Stalinist picture of the media in an East European communist state, where all 
media served as the central organ of communication of the one party-state, attempting to 
use the media in order to reinforce political control. Many in the GDR were therefore 
heavily critical about their own media. Although often attempting to voice critical thoughts, 
the journalists had to do this through indirect words, or “between the lines”. As a result, as 
suggested by Robinson (1995), the people of the GDR came to rely on West German 
media especially since the mid-1980s (particularly TV and Radio in the form of the ARD, 








It has therefore so far been established that although a great deal of literature on 
transformations in the area of research exists, little extensive work has been conducted as 
to the specific role of the media in these transformation processes. Taken this surprising 
lack of research on the topic, this dissertation proceeds from the question of what role 
exactly the media played during the transformation processes of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Here, the main hypothesis of this dissertation is: 
Where the media was able to play a relatively independent role from the outset of the 
democratization process in Central and Eastern Europe, as a result, during the immediate 
phase of change, the media can indeed be seen as a “motor of change”.  
 
Thus: if independent, the media were able to contribute positively to the transformation 
process, acting as a catalyst and exponent of change, offering a platform for discussion 
and thus fostering alternative views and critical debate. The dissertation presumes that 
liberalization of the respective regimes had to be present before the media could act 
independently, and that in Hungary this liberalization occurred before it occurred in the 
GDR. This dissertation, however, presumes that once the grip of the old system began to 
erode, the press also in the GDR began to assume more liberties and in this could foster 
the further process of transformation. Once liberalization began, the press in both Hungary 
and the GDR supported the democratization process in mainly two ways:  
1.  Through the “democratic agenda setting” function (telling the readers not what to think 
but what to think about) (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), the media broke on previously taboo 
topics, defining social and political issues as being important, creating a context that 
supports the readers to order and understand the political world (Sükösd, 2000) as well as 
informing the public on what political and economical alternatives exist.  
 
2.  Building up on the “democratic agenda setting” function, in both the GDR and Hungary 
the press became a platform for societal / opposition groups, in which a variety of 
alternative views could be discussed and critical discourse carried out. By becoming the 
mouthpiece and platform of society, voicing alternative political ideas and fostering critical 
debate by bringing up previously taboo topics, the media positively affected the process of 
democratization.  
Thus:  where more liberties allowed the press to act more freely, the greater the speed and 
success of democratization.  
 
Additionally, this dissertation presumes a differentiation between the role of the media as 
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an institution as well the role of the journalists.  
1. The media as an institution part of the ruling regime could positively affect the 
transformation process by opposing the status quo, and by offering a platform for various 
ideas, politicians and topics to be discussed.  
 
2. The journalists positively affected the democratization process by fostering an internal 
pluralism, by presenting alternative ideas and parties, as well as by critically articulating 
previously taboo topics and informing the public on what alternatives exists. Similar to the 
rest of the ruling regime, the “Media” employees were made up of hard- and softliners.   
 
As to the analysis of what factors influenced the media and its journalists in assuming the 
above-mentioned role, this dissertation presumes twofold reasoning.  
1. As the spirit of Glasnost was influencing events throughout the entire region a great 
number of journalists realized that change also in their country was inevitable, and to a 
great deal wanted a change to come. Being so close to the politburo, especially the 
leading journalists noticed that change was looming long before this became apparent to 
the majority of the citizens. What is important to note, however, is that while this 
dissertation presumes that most Journalists wanted a reform of the current system, it also 
presumes that most did not want to do away with the socialist system per se. Instead, 
many were reform communists, envisioning a socialist style system as Alexander Dubček 
had stood for, and most did not immediately want to foster a process towards a multi-party 
system. 
  
2. The disintegration of the party state system which had fully paid for the media system up 
to then, led to a new economic reality which the journalists and the individual media had to 
adapt to. To this belonged a market orientated thinking, in which the media became a 
product that needed to be sold. This ultimately heavily influenced the choice of topics 
covered by the media. As the media had to make their topics interesting in order that 
people continue to consume their product, it no longer sufficed to simply write what the 
politburo wanted. Thus, it was this beginning of a commercialization of the media that this 
dissertation presumes developed step by step in 1989, which then in turn directly 






4. Methodical approach 
 
This dissertation attempts to further the insight on the role of the media in the 
transformation processes of Central and Eastern Europe. If the hypothesis holds true, then 
the media will have a comparably equal impact on the transformation process of each 
respective country, no matter how these processes are initiated and no matter how 
different the forms of socialism had been prior to the systems demise. In order to analyse 
whether indeed this premises is true, the logical point of departure seemed to analyse two 
countries in the area of research that represented two completely different modes of 
transition and which represented two very different forms of state socialism by 1989. The 
choice of countries therefore fell on the GDR and Hungary, as the systems of these two 
indeed represented different modes of transition and models of state socialism, which also 
reflected the amount of media autonomy in the respective countries by 1989.  Thus, the 
choice of countries follows the model of the  „Most different Systems Design“ 
(Przeworski/Teune 1970). Thus, if it can be portrayed by this dissertation that the media 
did indeed have an impact on the democratization processes in both countries, then - 
through this design - one can also assume that the media in the entire region of research 
played a similar role. This form of analysis also allows a conclusion as to the differences 
on the role of the media as a result of different transition and system preconditions.  
 
Additionally, aim of the choice of newspapers for the content analysis was to chose and 
compare two official, originally stately influenced newspapers with strong circulation in 
each country, one the direct organ of the respective regime, the other more reformist. The 
choice of newspapers to be analysed within both countries of research therefore also 
follows the „Most different Systems Design“. This was done in order to investigate whether 
the positive role of the media – that this dissertation presumes – was evident no matter 
how strictly controlled by the regime the respective newspaper was directly prior to the 
beginning of the transition processes. Furthermore, one premises of this dissertation is that 
shortly before the systems demise, the respective media systems witnessed a growing 
commercialization; and that this in turn led to an increasingly competitive environment 
which directly influenced the various media to assume a more critical and positive role. As 
the direct party organs usually faced less direct economic pressures, if the reform papers 
and these party organs were then both affected by this growing commercialization, then 
the premise seems to hold true generally.  
 
In the case of the GDR the choice fell on “Neue Zeit” and “Neues Deutschland” and in 
Hungary on “Népszabadság” and “Magyar Nemzet”. The names of both “Népszabadság” 
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and “Neues Deutschland” until today stand for the old communist era, both being the 
official newspapers of the communist parties (See Kutsch, 1990 for the GDR; O’Neil, 1997 
for Hungary). In the case of the “Neues Deutschland” it was not only the party newspaper, 
but also more importantly the direct organ and thus mouthpiece of the party central 
committee, as was stated in its header: “Organ des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartie Deutschlands”.   
 
The “Neue Zeit” and “Magyar Nemzet” represented a more reform-orientated coverage 
(Ibid). Before the collapse of communism,  “Magyar Nemzet” was regarded as being the 
mouthpiece for the “Popular Front” groups (“Hazafias Népfront”: sometimes also referred 
to as “Patriotic front” or “National front of patriots”), which were led by the reform 
communist politburo member (and later key player in the democratization process) Imre 
Pozsgay. In 1989 it became the platform for party softliners (in particular the party reform 
circles) demanding reforms towards a democratization of party and state. The “Neue Zeit” 
was regarded as being the mouthpiece of the GDR Block-party CDU. Together with the 
mouthpiece of the Block-party LDPD “Der Morgen”, the “Neue Zeit” in 1989, began to 
demand more autonomy and to oppose the status quo (Kutsch, 1990). This owed to a 
great extent that they belonged to block parties, who once the SED was loosing its control, 
began to position themselves as opposition forces in an increasingly possible multi-party 
system. For example, when the GDR opposition group “Neues Forum” received 
permission to officially register as a political union, these two newspapers offered the 
“Neues Forum” to publish their documents and information, as the group did not yet have a 
publication of its own. With this, these newspapers took the initiative to become a public 
platform for critical discourse.  
 
The “Neues Deutschland” during the time of analysis had a circulation of approximately 1.1 
million copies. Although the “Neue Zeit” only had a circulation of 125.000 in 1989, the 
dissertation will concentrate on this publication nonetheless. This as other newspapers 
with greater circulation, which did not follow the socialist idealism as strongly as did the 
“Neues Deutschland”, such as the “Berliner Zeitung”, nevertheless remained under stricter 
SED dominance until the very end. Thus, a comparative analysis of these newspapers with 
the “Neues Deutschland” might not lead to any meaningful divergence. The “Neue Zeit” 
and “Der Morgen” both represented the strongest national-wide regime critical newspapers 
(within the existing possibilities). This dissertation concentrates on the “Neue Zeit” as it had 
a greater circulation of the two.  
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The “Népszabadság” literally meaning “People’s Freedom”, in 1989 had a circulation of 
460.000 copies (according to “Népszabadság” statements). Today, it remains the largest 
quality daily newspaper with 198.000 copies. The “Magyar Nemzet”, meaning “Hungarian 
Nation”, in 1989 had a circulation of 132.000 copies (according to “Magyar Nemzet” 
statements). Today it stands at 93.000, representing the second largest quality daily 
newspaper. 
 
The concentration of this dissertation therefore lies on the official print media in the region 
of research, leaving out underground media, foreign media as well as electronic media. 
This as electronic media (especially radio and in the case of the GDR also TV) that were 
frequently used in the respective countries were often foreign. This distorts the role of the 
national media and journalists. Additionally, the TV was usually controlled more heavily 
than were newspapers. Although underground media surely had an impact on society, 
these publications simply did not have the means to reach as many readers as did the 
official media.  
 
The problem outline identified that existing literature on the role of the media in the 
transition in Central and Eastern European countries clearly fail in delivering empirical 
evidence on what impact the media had on democratization in the region. In order to 
empirically analyse this research question, and taking into account the problems of the 
electronic and foreign media just mentioned, a comparative analysis of the official national 
press appeared the logical approach. 
 
The emphasis of the methodical approach was: 
1. A content analysis of selected print media in Hungary and the German Democratic 
Republic.  
   
2. A main pillar of research is interviews with contemporary witnesses, especially 
opposition activists of the time, former members of the ruling regime, journalists, as well as 
scholars.  
 
Additionally, the dissertation relies on primary and secondary background literature as well 
as a qualitative analysis of documents. The findings of the comparative analysis of the 
newspapers, the conclusions of the interviews as well as a qualitative analysis of literature 
should give insight into the question of whether indeed a relationship exists between the 
media and democratization. If the journalists in their attitudes and actions opposed the 
status quo, and if these actions proved helpful in fostering the democratization process, 
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then one firstly needs to find out whether indeed the journalists did set out to oppose the 
status quo and to support the transformation process and secondly whether this in turn 
had an effect on the process. 
 
The dissertation therefore divides these two into firstly an “output” (journalists/media intent) 
and secondly an “outcome” (effect on the process) analysis.  For this reason the approach 
was to conduct a content analysis, interviews with contemporary witnesses, a qualitative 
analysis of documents and further literature, and to subsequently compare these with each 
other. This is done as firstly, through the research of the newspapers one can analyse to 
what extent the press were articulating opposition views, alternative ideas, mentioning 
opposition groups and trying to foster critical debate in society. Part of the interviews 
should give additional insight into the agendas of the journalists. However, even if the 
press were adhering to all the just mentioned points, it would alone not suffice to argue 
that the media indeed did have an influence on the democratization process. It does not 
answer the question set in the problem outline of whether the media led or followed 
society. Even if the media did articulate all of these points, it may still be following the 
process instead of influencing it. Out of this reason the findings of the content analysis of 
the newspapers shall be compared to interviews with contemporary witnesses, confirming 
what the journalists said and stating whether and to what extent indeed the “output” of the 
newspapers were useful for the transformation process and the emerging oppositions 
cause. This should also be supported by background information and documents of the 
time.  
 
The hypotheses had identified the “democratic agenda setting” (McCombs and Shaw, 
1972) as an important role of the press. If this argument holds true, then one must be able 
to identify whether what the press wrote about was then subsequently also picked up on 
and discussed in society and the opposition groups. Only if the media began assuming the 
role of opposing the status quo –which the content analysis as well as the interviews 
should give insight to – and at the same time this was reflected in what was being 
discussed in society and demanded by opposition actors/groups, can one argue that the 
media indeed had an influence in terms of “agenda-setting”. The same goes for offering 
oppositional groups and ideas a platform.  
 
The time of analysis for Hungary begins on January 28th 1989, after the statement of the 
politburo member Imre Pozsgay that the events of 1956 had been a popular uprising. In 
the GDR the time of analysis begins in May 1989, after the flawed elections had been 
held. Both cases represent a key point in the demise of the respective regimes.  
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The analysis´ both end in March 1990 with the first free elections in the GDR and in 
Hungary since the communist takeovers of power in the respective countries:  in the GDR 
on March 18th and in Hungary on March 25th, 1990.  
  
The conduction of interviews followed two different approaches, one being personal 
interviews, the second interview by phone or in writing. Where possible a personal 
interview was preferred. This was successful for most interviews; however, certain 
interview partners preferred an interview via telephone or in writing. The choice of 
interview partners for both countries followed the same approach: aim was to conduct 
interviews with journalists working in the respective countries during the time of research; 
members of the forming civil rights groups and opposition groups (in the case of the GDR 
this also includes reform members of the block parties); as well as reform members of the 
former socialist parties (in the GDR the SED as of December 1989 the SED-PDS; and in 
Hungary the MSZMP as of September 1989 the MSZP).  In the case of the GDR the 
dissertation also used two interviews with the former Chief-editor as well as deputy- editor 
of the Neues Deutschland, which were conducted in 2005 (see Interviews Cierpka, 2005).  
The interviews for the GDR were: 
Journalists: 
1. Rainer Höhling. Mr. Höhling worked for the AND during the time of research, and 
is currently deputy-chief editor at the “Deutscher Depeschendienst” (ddp). His 
interview gave valuable insight as to the working mode of the media system during 
the time, the agendas of the media and its journalists as well as the way these 
responded to the unfolding events and the changing economic working mode of the 
entire media system.  
2. Wolfgang Spickermann. As of 1989, Mr. Spickermann became Chief-Editor of the 
“Neues Deutschland”, against the initial will of Egon Krenz and Günter Schabowski. 
His comments help to understand how the media system was built up during the 
GDR, how the journalists witnessed the unfolding changes, when they noticed that 
these were taking place and above all, how they reacted. Additionally, his 
comments shed light into the question of how the changing economic reality 
affected the working of the press. (Interviews Cierpka) 
3. Michael Müller. Mr. Müller was editor in the “Neues Deutschland” in 1989, and 
became deputy Chief-editor under Spickermann. His comments helped to compare 
and support those made by Spickermann and to give further insight into the same 
topics. (Interviews Cierpka) 
4. Dr. Monika Zimmermann. During the time of research, Dr. Zimmermann was one 
of the few accredited west-German journalists inside the GDR. In 1990 she 
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became Chief-editor of the “Neue Zeit”. Dr. Zimmermann is currently the 
government spokeswoman of the state of Saxony-Anhalt. Being inside the GDR as 
a foreign correspondent, Dr. Zimmermann gave significant insight into the GDR's 
media system and journalists, and her observations helped to gain a better 
understanding on how the media system reacted to the changes. Furthermore, 
taking over as Chief-Editor of the “Neue Zeit”, Dr. Zimmermann’s comments helped 
to understand how the transformation took place inside the newspaper and how the 
paper and its journalists reacted to the changing market-orientated working mode.  
 
 
Opposition activists:  
 
5. Elke Bötcher. Ms. Bötcher became a member of the group “Bündniss 90”, which 
later merged with the West-German Greens to form the party “Bündniss 90/ Die 
Grünen”. Her comments give a valuable understanding on how the East-German 
media was perceived by the masses and from where these masses and opposition 
groups took their information (i.e. Western News or News from the GDR), and how 
this changed over time. Additionally, her comments help understand how the media 
supported the work of the emerging opposition. 
6. Siegfried Reiprich. Mr. Reiprich was a founder of the oppositional group 
“Arbeitskreises Literatur und Lyrik” in Jena, which became a dominant group in the 
youth culture movement of the GDR at the end of the 1970s. In 1981, he and his 
wife were forced to leave the GDR and moved to West Berlin. Mr. Reiprich is 
currently deputy-Director of the memorial place “Berlin-Hohenschönhausen”. Apart 
from giving an understanding on the role of the media in the GDR, how this 
supported the emerging opposition groups and how this changed over time, his 
interview is especially helpful in understanding what role the Block parties played 
inside the GDR, and why people joined these groups. Thus, it suggests why these 
Block parties so quickly became opposition parties to the SED in 1989.  
7. Wolfgang Thierse.  Mr. Thierse, who had worked for the Ministry of Cultural affairs 
of the GDR, became a member of the “Neues Forum” in 1989 and a member of the 
East-German SPD in 1990, where he became its Chairman until September 1990. 
Following the elections of March 1990, Mr. Thierse became a member of the 
“Volkskammer” until unification with the FRG. Since October 1990, Mr. Thierse is a 
SPD member of the German Parliament; from 1998 to 2005 President and from 
2005 onwards vice-President of the German Parliament. Mr. Thierse's interview 
gives insight into the role of the media and its journalists during the GDR, and as of 
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when a more critical and independent reporting could be observed from the 
opposition’s perspective.  
8. Arnold Vaatz. In 1989, Mr. Vaatz was a member of the opposition group “Gruppe 
20” and became a member of the “Neues Forum” and later its press-spokesperson. 
Since 1990, Mr. Vaatz is a member of the CDU in Dresden, and since 1998 is a 
CDU member of the German parliament. The interview of Mr. Vaatz gives 
important insight on the way the media had already previously written “between the 
lines” and how some newspapers became an orientation point for the developing 
opposition groups, offering them the possibility to voice their agendas and directly 
supporting their causes. Additionally, his comments help to understand how the 
block-parties used the media to position themselves as opposition groups against 
the SED, but also how the respective media and their journalists at times fostered 




The interviews for Hungary were: 
Journalists: 
1. András Heltai-Hopp. In 1989 Mr. Heltai-Hopp was correspondent of the MTI in the 
USA. He is currently deputy-Chief-editor of the German speaking newspaper 
“Pester Lloyd” in Budapest. His comments help to understand the Hungarian media 
system and its gradual liberalization from the 1960s onwards. Additionally, he 
helped to understand why Samizdat literature had never managed to become so 
popular in Hungary and what effect the privatisations and changing economic 
reality had on the journalistic work and output.  
2. Ivan Lipovecz. Mr. Lipovecz was journalist and editor of the magazine “HVG” in 
1989. Being the editor of one of the magazines that were privatised early on, his 
comments give insight into the way the privatizations took place. Furthermore, his 
interview also helps to understand the liberalization process in Hungary since the 
amnesty of the 1960s, and what affect this had on the media system. Additionally, 
his comments shed light into the perceived agenda of the journalists working at the 
time.  
3. Ferenc Pach. Mr. Pach was correspondent of the MTI in the GDR during the time 
of analysis. Mr. Pach is currently news director of the MTI in Budapest. His 
interview sheds light into the media system of Hungary during the time of analysis. 
Furthermore, he explains the gradual liberalisation of society since the 1960s, and 
what affect this had on the working mode of the media and the journalists. Being 
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inside the GDR in 1989, his comments also support a comparison between the two 
countries as well as specifically what happened inside the GDR.  
 
Reform orientated Regime member: 
4. Dr. Zoltán Szabó. Dr. Szabó was member of the Communist, Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party in 1989. He was a founder of one of the most radical inner party 
reform circles, the “Budapest-Circle”. Since 1990, Dr. Szabó is a Member of 
Parliament for the Socialist party. His comments shed light into how the reform 
forces within the party began to directly instruct the media to begin a more critical 
stance in 1989, how they used the media to make their positions public, and how 
the reform forces eventually lost “control” of the media previously under their 
influence. Additionally, his comments explain how the reform movement within the 
party eventually split up itself during the later part of 1989.  
 
Opposition activists 
5. Dr. Tamás Deutsch-Für. Dr. Deutsch-Für was a founding member of the 
opposition group FIDESZ. He is a Member of the Hungarian Parliament for the 
FIDESZ, and between 1998-2002 he served as Minister for Sports. His comments 
offer valuable insight into the establishment of FIDESZ as a movement as well as 
what strategies the FIDESZ took to gain media coverage. Above all, his comments 
give an understanding on how important media coverage was for the emerging 
opposition groups, and how it helped to make themselves, their programmes and 
people public.  
6. Dr. Jószef Kajdi.  Between April 1986 to May 1990 Dr. Kajdi worked for the 
Hungarian Justice Ministry. Between 1990 to 1994, he was Head of the Prime 
Ministers Office (Under two MDF Prime Ministers) and State-Secretary for pubic 
administration. His interview gives an understanding on the media system in 
Hungary, as well as of when the media began to cover the emerging opposition 
movements and programmes. Additionally, his comments provide valuable insight 
into the consequences of the privatization measures at the end of the 1980s as well 
as the changing economic reality. 
 
Academics:  
7. Dr. Miklos Sükösd. Dr. Sükösd is currently lecturer at the Department of Political 
Sciences, at the Central European University, Budapest. His various publications 
on the position of the media during state socialism as well as on the position of the 
media during the transformation process in Hungary, serve as in depth source for 
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this dissertation; hence, the interview provided the opportunity for further precise 
questions on topics requiring additional elaboration. These topics included the 
amnesty of the 1960s, the position of journalists within the system as well as the 
way in which the media and especially the individual journalists gradually emerged 
as independent actors.  
8. Zoltan Kiszelly. Mr. Kiszelly is lecturer at the Central European University, 
Budapest. Due to his academic studies on the dissertation subject as well as his 
closeness to the MDF, the interview offered helpful insight into the Hungarian 
media system at the end of the 1980s as well as its gradual liberalisation. 
Additionally, his comments offer an understanding of what effects the amnesty of 
the 1960s had on the media system and the role of the media in society, as well as 




5. Dissertation setup 
 
In order to discuss the role of the media during the democratization process, it makes 
sense to look at the political, social and economic conditions in which the media worked 
and could influence the respective countries. Out of this reason the dissertation begins by 
examining the imposition of communism over the region of research after 1945; its 
influence over the working mode of the media, the divergent paths the forms of socialism 
took over the years until 1989, as well as the influence these divergent paths in turn had 
on the respective media systems. This is important if one wants to understand why the 
respective media found different pre-conditions to influence the democratization processes 
and what influence the media indeed had.  
 
In the next step the dissertation analyses how the respective media acted in 1989; did they 
initiate or rather re-act to the unfolding developments? This is done by analysing the 
transition of the media in 1989; by comparing how the respective newspapers changed 
and what they did during the time of research (output) to what was happening socially and 
politically. The next step then is a comparison of the newspapers with each other. This 
comparison is firstly done between the two newspapers of research in each country, and 
then in a second step between the countries of research. The role of the media during the 
democratization process in each country of research as well as in comparison to each 
other is then examined through interview statements and literature findings, in order to 
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investigate whether the “output” did indeed have an “outcome” effect? This in turn leads to 
the conclusions and final remarks.  
 
II. Analytical approach 
 
The wave of democratization that swept across the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of 
the 1980s was remarkable in a number of respects. The most striking appears to be the 
rapidity of events that unfolded, and the fact that it was so little anticipated by observers at 
the time. Considerable political changes had been taking place in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s: beginning with the roundtable negotiations in Poland, in Hungary 
political, social and economic reforms and most notably the changes occurring within the 
Soviet Union itself. As argued by Ekiert, while there had been cases of political instability 
since the forceful imposition of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, which 
represented a crisis in state-socialism, the developments after the late 1970s can best be 
described as a “crisis of state-socialism” (Ekiert, 1991 pg 286). Nonetheless, communist 
elites and western observers alike had not expected that these changes would actually 
lead to the breakdown of the systems of the respective countries in the near future. Rather, 
a slow process of democratization was imagined. In an article investigating whether more 
countries would become democratic, Samuel Huntington in 1984 had concluded that it was 
less likely that democratization would occur in Eastern Europe than elsewhere in the world 
(Huntington, 1984, quoted in Pridham & Vanhanen, 1994, pg 1). As pointed out by 
McSweeney & Tempest, in the mid-1980s even “the agenda of many dissidents within 
Eastern Europe was for liberalization of communist systems rather than their overthrow or 
dismantlement” (McSweeney & Tempest, 1993, pg 412).   
 
With hindsight, it becomes clear that the socialist party states faced demise, but by the end 
of the 1980s this was by no means obvious. As stated by Andrew Walder: “Economic 
inefficiency, consumer deprivation, and housing shortages were well evident in these 
societies for decades. The official ideology of these regimes was long met with public 
indifference and private derision. The party apparatus was for decades operated as a 
collection of local political machines founded upon venality and patronage. Beginning as 
early as the mid-1950s, observers noticed a gradual enlargement of tolerated private 
spheres of independent intellectual and political discourse…..While today we can look 
back upon an inexorable cumulative crisis, a few years ago one could just as easily be 
struck by how little all these deeply rooted problems seemed to shake these stable and 
stagnant regimes” (Walder, 1994, quoted in Sharman, 2003, pg 127).  The sudden and 
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complete changes that then unfolded left political scientists with the challenge to explore 
the reasons and patterns for these events. 
 
The transitions in Central and Eastern Europe all had comparable elements (Dale, 2006, 
pg 8). Each was marked by a rapid disintegration of existing political institutions, by the 
“aggravation of economic dislocations”, by the propagation of political movements that 
entered the political arena and by “the establishment of transitory power arrangements in 
which opposition forces acquired varying degrees of access to the official political 
processes” (Ekiert, 1991, pg 287). Nonetheless, the differences in modes of transition 
cannot be disregarded.  
 
Literature on the topic suggests that the term “democratization” is a relatively loose phrase 
to describe what is happening, although it is generally agreed that the outcome is the 
formation of a liberal or constitutional democracy on the basis of western democratic 
models (Pridham & Vanhanen, 1994). According to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), the 
transformation process can be broken down into three distinctive phases: 1. Liberalization; 
2. Institutionalization of democracy (democratization); and 3. consolidation of democracy. 
Existing literature suggests that the differentiation between these three phases is only an 
ideal model. This as the process of democratization does not always move in a single 
direction. The process starts and stops, with setbacks during some phases of the process. 
The initiation of each phase does not assure the transition to political democracy. Under 
some circumstances, they may foster the process. However, as argued by Linz, the 
liberalization phase for example can also “lead to a crisis involving growing repression and 
perhaps ultimately a violent overthrow that will make democratization more difficult” (Linz, 
1990, pg 148). 
 
As will still be discussed in the subsequent chapter, the liberalization phase usually leads 
to a  “democratization” phase while the regime is still in place, and it is generally regarded 
that this “democratization” phase in turn ends after first free elections have been held. The 
research time of this dissertation for the respective countries of research therefore falls in 
the “liberalization” and  “democratization” phases. This although in the case of Hungary the 
liberalization phase did indeed begin before the time of analysis began; while in the case 
of the GDR the “liberalization” phase only began fairly late during the time of analysis.  
  
This dissertation views that within this setting of the transformation theory, the media as an 
institution as well as the individual journalists were able to influence the transformation 
processes in different ways. On the one hand, one had the media system, which had a 
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central position in the socialist one party system (see chapter: the role of the Media in 
State socialism). In this the media employees – especially the higher ranking 
nomenklatura – members can indeed be seen as being regime members. These 
nomenklatura members experienced an elevated position within the socialist systems, 
often enjoying more authority and claiming higher privileges to the rest of society. A high 
number of media nomeklatura later became politburo members, and nearly all enjoyed 
direct access to the members of the politburo. Any variation in the media “output” would 
immediately signal to society that something was changing politically. On the other hand, 
the individual journalists (often the lower rank and file) although being children of the 
system, wanted to foster a reform of the system at least to some extent. Thus, in this they 
became actors in society demanding greater social and political liberties, creating a public 
platform for critical and above all diverse debate. These ideas are now further elaborated 
in the subsequent two chapters, which analyse firstly how the media as an institution 
comprising of regime elites, could positively influence the transformation processes; and 
secondly how many journalists began to support societal forces taking the lead and 





1. The role of the elites during the democratization process 
 
Overall, the literature on democratization usually includes universal statements either 
describing a single route to democracy, or emphasising common set of factors, of varying 
significance, which have been portrayed as significant to all processes of democratization 
(McSweeney & Tempest, 1993, pg 409). Looking at the set of factors, it is generally 
suggested that some set of factors produce and sustain democracy more than others as 
either causes or vital conditions (McSweeney & Tempest, 1993, pg 410). A great number 
of academics suggest that the behaviour, attitudes and values of the elites of the 
authoritarian regime are a very major critical factor in the success and failure of 
democratization (see Bos, 2004; Burton, Gunther & Higley, 1992; Huntington, 1991; 
Merkel & Puhle, 1999; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Bos (2004) for example argues that 
during the different phases of the transition processes, the political systems are decisively 
influenced by the various actors (both regime and opposition). Huntington argues that 
“Democracies are created not by causes but by causers” (Huntington, 1991, pg 108), 
continuing by stating: “In transformations those in power in the authoritarian regime take 
the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic 
system” (Huntington, 1991, pg 124).  
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Ideally, the elites of the regime and the opposition can be broken down into 2 groups each. 
The ruling elite is usually split between “hardliners” and “softliners”. While the “softliners” 
attempt to give the regime an increasingly democratic legitimacy usually through 
increasing liberalization and reforms (see O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), the “hardliners” 
resist any changes from occurring (Bos, 2004). The oppositional groups, which usually 
form as a consequence of a form of political liberalization, usually consist of moderate and 
extreme actors (ibid). The moderates usually attempt to engage in some form of 
negotiation with the regime, and many do not plan to do away with the existing system 
completely (either as they really aspire to simply modify the existing system, or because 
they do not believe that a complete collapse of the system would be possible). The 
extremists favour a complete break with the old regime and usually highly distrust the 
representatives of the old system. As stated by Linz, those favouring a complete rupture 
with the past want a clear “break with the existing institutional arrangements, a change not 
controlled and even without any participation by those who, to one or another extent, had a 
share in the previous regime” (Linz, 1991, pg151) The “hardliners” as well as oppositional 
extremists usually pursue high-risk strategies, while the “softliners” and moderates usually 
pursue risk-avoiding strategies (Bos, 2004). These strategies, however, do not necessarily 
imply that the end aims of each respective elite diverge. Sometimes the aspired objectives 
are the same, the divergence then is what path should best be taken to achieve this (Ibid). 
Taken that the interests of each actor remains the same, their strategies may change if 
they are confronted with new pre-conditions or their assessment of the possible process 
changes (In the sense of which possibilities may arise). According to Bos, opposition 
forces usually consist of intellectuals, artists, human rights groups and church circles. 
Parties, trade unions and further interest groups may become part of these (Bos, 2004, pg 
33). 
 
The initial liberalization of the authoritarian regime begins with a split in the actions of the 
ruling elite. As argued by O’Donnell and Schmitter “there is no transition whose beginning 
is not the consequence  - direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian 
regime” (O’Donnell/Schmitter, 1986). The reasons for the apparent split in the ruling 
regime are usually diverse. On the one hand economical or external crisis can initiate the 
rupture, sometimes it is precisely in times of economic successes that the “softliners” wish 
to increase the regime legitimacy vis-à-vis the population (Bos, 2004), thus favouring the 
initiation of a liberalization process at a time of relative success for the regime. In the 
Central and Eastern European cases, literature suggests that the economic malice of the 
entire region, together with an increasing doubt in the legitimacy of the one party state, 
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apparent among a vast number of the populace as well as among a considerable amount 
of “softliners”, resulted in this split of the respective elites. As argued by Batt:  “Key groups 
within the East European communist elites were demoralized by the manifest failures of 
their period of rule and showed clear signs of losing the sense of purpose and discipline 
that the ideology had provided” (Batt, 1991, pg 3). Sharman states that the “loss of 
ideological confidence was crucial to the fall of European Communism, which was a top-
down process” (Sharman, 2003, pg 128). This process was greatly influenced by the 
changes initiated inside the Soviet Union by Gorbachev's polices of perestroika and 
glasnost. “Specifically, the erosion of the Soviet Union’s ideological confidence and 
geopolitical will to use coercion gave an unprecedented opportunity to change existing 
power relations” (Ibid).  Irrespective of these factors, the stability of the authoritarian 
regime is always threatened when collective concepts of different political systems appear.  
 
The actual liberalization phase begins when the “softliners” manage to set off some form of 
political reform. Juan J. Linz states that: “transitions from authoritarianism to democracy 
tend to be initiated when leaders in the authoritarian regime start considering the possibility 
of a reform leading to some form of political democracy” (Linz, 1990, pg 150). Huntington 
writes: “The first step was the emergence of a group of leaders or potential leaders within 
the authoritarian regime who believed that movement in the direction of democracy was 
desirable or necessary” (Huntington, 1991, pg 127).   
 
Bos (2004) argues that historical experience suggest that the attempts by the ruling elite to 
implement a controlled form of political liberalization (initiating a controlled opening) are 
doomed to fail. Usually, the introduction of reforms leads to the liberalization process 
receiving an own momentum. Reforms bringing a political and economic liberalization 
usually lead to a dramatic increase in the amount of independent organizations in society, 
and existing organizations tend to assert increasing independence from the states control. 
As suggested by Linz “the process of liberalization reduces in turn the incentives for 
participation in the institutions of the regime and gives increased room to test the limits of 
freedom and power” (Linz, 1991, pg 148). (A notable exception to this is surely the case of 
China, where the controlled political and economical liberalization reforms appear to not 
have significantly threatened the standing of the regime.)  As soon as the protests extend 
to the entire population, leading to public discontent, unrest and demonstrations, the 
liberalization phase ends. (Bos, 2004, pg 33). From this moment onwards two possible 
alternatives arise. The first is that the ruling elite decides to return to the authoritarian 
system (meaning an increase in state repression vis-à-vis the population and the newly 
founded organizations as well as the forcing of all state organizations to follow the regimes 
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directives). The second involves the triggering of further social, political and economic 
freedoms thus initiating a process of democratization (Bos, 2004, pg 34; see also 
Przeworski, 1992).  
 
The initiation of the liberalization phase often comes as a result of misunderstandings and 
wrong interpretations on the side of the actors (Bos, 2004, pg 34; see also Przeworski, 
1992). It is frequently the case that reform minded members of the ruling elite initiate an 
opening of the system, believing that they can control the subsequent events if necessary 
with the use of repressive measures. However, through the mass mobilization (usually 
accompanied by civil unrest) initiated by the liberalization, the actors that had initiated the 
process subsequently begin to doubt the usefulness of further repression given the already 
existent civil instability, or simply come to the conclusion that the costs of further 
repressions would be too high. Sociological and psychological factors also play a role, as 
personal relations between “softliners” and oppositional actors may already have led to 
informal discussion. If a form of dialogue between the “softliners” and the moderate 
opposition actors develops, and the ruling elite recognize that the opposition forces are 
open to reasonable negotiation and compromise, the evaluation on the side of the elites 
may change, insofar as the prospects of democratization no longer seem as threatening 
for their own positions and further repressions seem too excessive (Bos, 2004, pg 34).   
 
Alternatively, it is also possible that the ruling elites in allowing democratization at the 
same time act completely irrational, pursuing a strategy that does not stand any chance of 
success. In this case the liberalizers inside the regime may initiate the process of 
democratization believing that they would succeed during free and fair lections, which they 
usually, however, lose (Przeworski 1990, pg 195). The only exception to this is Turkeys 
transition to democracy in 1947, which occurred without the participation of the opposition 
(Linz, 1991, pg 151), as well as to an extent the transition in Rumania, which with hindsight 
appeared more like a palace coup.  
 
A successful democratization requires the replacement of the old system and regime 
through introduction of democratic institutions and processes. The experience of the 
transitions of the third wave of democratization lead to the conclusion, that both can only 
successfully arise through a settlement between “softliners” and moderate opposition 
members (Bos, 2004; Przeworski, 1992). As argued by Huntington: “Negotiations and 
compromise among political elites were at the heart of the democratization process” 
(Huntington, 1991, pg 165). Ursula J. van Beek argues: “The driving force remains the 
political game, that is the complex negotiations and deal-making between the members of 
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the old regime and the democratic opposition” (van Beek, 2005, pg 66). The results of 
these agreements are usually formulated in formal or informal “pacts” between these two 
elite groups. These “pacts” usually include agreements regarding a redistribution of power, 
whereby both sides recognize the interests of the other side. Mostly, they are negotiated 
and formulated behind closed doors by a small number of elite actors on both sides, who 
do not possess a democratic legitimacy to formulate these transformation agreements. 
Usually these compromises are subject to scrutiny after the transition has occurred, and 
are therefore unstable. Hence, after a democratic system has been installed these pre-
transition agreements may be annulled or changed. Additionally, political developments 
may occur (even before the transition is complete) which may question these negotiated 
“pacts” (Bos, 2004). 
 
In order for a compromise between the “softliners” and moderate opposition actors to 
emerge, several factors need to be present. Firstly, the “softliners” need to be in the 
position to persuade or force the “Hardliners” to agree. Secondly, the moderate opposition 
actors need to outnumber or control the radical opposition actors (Bos, 2004).  In order to 
persuade the “hardliners”, compromise is usually necessary which the moderate 
opposition needs to accept and can be enforced vis-à-vis the extremists. The active actors 
are therefore the “softliners” and the moderates, whereby the “hardliners” and extremists 
are to be regarded as “quasi actors” (quoted in Bos, 2004) acting from the background. 
The latent possibilities by both “hardliners” and extremists to disturb the negotiations 
between “softliners” and moderates make them a relevant player insofar as their interests 
have to be taken into consideration during the negotiations. This as the negotiations 
between the “softliners” and the moderates are constantly in danger to fail through actions 
by both “hardliners” and extremists, including further repressive measures initiated by the 
“hardliners” and excessive demonstrations and strikes by the extremists.  
 
For the successful completion of the liberalization phase it is important that the actors 
involved in the negotiations agree on free and fair elections, with the subsequent 
inauguration of a democratically elected parliament and government. The 
“democratization” phase is usually regarded as being completed after these elections have 
been held (Bos, 2004). Linz and Stepan (1996) however, believe that this alone does not 
suffice to bring the democratization phase to a closing. For them: “A democratic transition 
is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to 
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generate new policies, and when the executive legislative and judicial power generated by 
the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure” (pg 3).  
 
In contrast to the liberalization and democratization phases in authoritarian systems, the 
consolidation phase usually becomes a tedious process, marked by slow progress and 
constant setbacks. Although the consolidation phase is not relevant for the analysis of this 
dissertation, it does make sense to shortly point out that here too, the actors remain an 
important factor. In this phase the number of actors increases as professional politicians, 
parties and interest groups get involved in the decision making process. Predominant 
factors that dominate the agenda during this phase are the successful tackling of severe 
economic problems, the control of all institutions, the questions of how to deal with crimes 
committed by the old regime as well as a successful transition towards a democratic 
political culture (Bos, 2004). As argued by various academics (Bos, 2004; Burton, 1992; 
Diamond, 1997) the development towards a political culture evident both inside the new 
elite but also in the population greatly depends on decisions made by the new leaders. 
Leaders interested in a successful transition with the competence and courage to make 
important decisions at the right time.  
 
As identified previously, the media can indeed be seen as being part of the authoritarian 
regime. If one acknowledges the media being part of the authoritarian regime, then any 
opposition of the media to the status quo of the political system can (according to the actor 
based theories) have a positive effect on fostering the process of democratization. 
Additionally, the attempts by the “softliners” to initiate a controlled opening as identified by 
Bos (2004), are usually conducted by allowing an opening within the media. Thus the 
media nomenklatura usually consisting of a considerable number of “softliners” become 
both the initiators and first beneficiaries of this “controlled” opening.  
 
 
2. The role of societal forces taking the lead during the democratization process 
 
In discussing the role of the media one has to distinguish on one side the role of the media 
as such – with the given role of the media in the socialist state – and on the other the role 
of the individual journalists. Consequently, in analysing the role of the media in 
democratization, one has to analyse these two different aspects. Subsequently, while 
having identified that the media as part of the ruling elite may have a positive influence on 
the transformation process, at the same time, one also has to analyse the role of many 
journalists themselves.  
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Here, this dissertation regards the journalists as being part of both the regime (both 
“Hardliners” and “Softliners”; for this dissertation the importance, however, is placed on the 
“softliners”) but also moderate opposition elites.  The argument of Bos (2004), mentioned 
previously, namely that opposition forces usually consist among others of intellectuals, 
therefore also of writers and journalists, is important in understanding this role. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter argue that societal forces need to be present who recognise the changed 
political situation early on and manage to exploit these for their own goals, placing 
themselves at the head of the transformation process. As argued by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter: “the catalyst in this transformation comes first from gestures by exemplary 
individuals, who begin testing the boundaries of behaviour initially imposed by the 
incumbent regime” (O’Donnell/Schmitter, 1986, pg 49).  
 
While this dissertation does not suppose that the journalists managed to become the head 
actors in this process, it is a point of the dissertation to suggest, that the Journalists were 
one part of and more importantly actively supported these societal forces, creating a public 
platform for them. As the political reality was changing, the journalists – who often 
witnessed this coming of change before it became apparent to the rest of society - 
increasingly began to demand more autonomy, expanding the limits that had been set on 
them. As suggested by O’Donnell and Schmitter: “Usually, artists and intellectuals are the 
first to manifest public opposition to authoritarian rule, often before the transition has been 
launched. Their capacity to express themselves by oblique metaphors no doubt protect 
them, as does their membership in a de facto world system of cultural exchange….those 
individual and artistic expressions have close links with, and strong repercussions within, 
certain collectivities, such as universities, literary journals, scholarly reviews, professional 
associations, and research groups. Through these linkages previously forbidden themes 
are discussed in semi-public forums, and connections are made with analogous 
experiences elsewhere”  (O’Donnell/Schmitter, 1986, pg 49-50).  
 
 
3. Concept of analysis / research design: Content analysis and interviews 
 
The empirical emphasis of this dissertation is a content analysis of the respective 
newspapers on the one hand, and interviews of contemporary witnesses and scholars on 
the other hand, which are subsequently compared with each other. Furthermore, 
background literature research was conducted. 
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3.1. Content analysis 
 
Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing 
many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding 
(Krippendorff, 1980). Singletary writes that content analysis is a descriptive form of 
research that takes a look into media (Singletary, 1994). Holsti defines content analysis as 
any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969).  It is an empirical method in order to 
systematically and objectively elucidate the substance of communication. According to 
Zipf's law, the assumption is that words and phrases mentioned most often are those 
reflecting important concerns in every communication. Therefore, quantitative content 
analysis starts with the setting up of categories and the usage of keyword frequencies. 
According to the Lasswell “Formula” the question addressed in a content analysis is: “Who 
says what in which channel, to whom, with what effect” (Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, 
1989). In this dissertation the first part of the “Formula”: “who says what in which channel” 
is the “output” analysis; the last part: “with what effect” is the “outcome” analysis.  
 
Additionally, one has to differentiate between qualitative and quantitative content analysis. 
While the quantitative approach makes sure that a representative study can be carried out, 
the qualitative approach uses background information in order to explain what is written 
(Mayring, 2000). Thus while methods in quantitative content analysis transform 
observations of found categories into quantitative statistical data, the qualitative content 
analysis focuses more on the intentionality and its implications.  
 
This analysis follows the forms of method mix as suggested by Mayring (2000) and Robert 
Philip Weber (1990), whereby background information is taken in order to explain the 
findings of the data analysis. However, the qualitative analysis received a greater 
weighting, the reasons of which being described underneath.  
 
 
3.2. Content analysis design 
 
The content analysis for this dissertation is set to examine whether -and if at what point – 
the media began to break free from the regimes control, becoming an independent actor in 
the emerging process and beginning to break on previously taboo topics, gradually 
fostering and demanding reform. Thus, it investigates the “output” analysis as previously 
mentioned. It analyses whether an increase in the media’s critical stance vis-à-vis the 
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regime developed after the communists grip on power had already been substantially 
eroded, or whether the media’s actions fostered this erosion of regime power.   
 
The time of analysis for each respective country was: 
1. With respect to the GDR from the 7.5.1989 to the 18.3.1990 
2. With respect to Hungary from the 28.1.1989 to the 25.3.1990 
 
The content analysis in the GDR begins with the election fraud of May 1989. Therefore an 
emphasis was put on the reporting one week following the event by taking daily samples, 
but also through a continual spot check analysis. This mainly as the regime was still too 
firmly in charge in May 1989; any criticism on part of the media on this subject would 
expectedly be weak then, but grow over the period of research. The content analysis ends 
on the day of the first free elections in the GDR.  
 
The content analysis for Hungary begins with the reference by Imre Pozsgay on January 
28th 1989, that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising” and not a counter-revolution, 
as previously stated by the regime. Subsequently, a daily analysis will be made for one 
week following the statement. Here too, the analysis ends on the day of the first free 
elections since the communists had taken over power.  
 
The content analysis is conducted following two different approaches: 
The first approach is a spot check (random sampling) analysis of weekly issues covered 
(always Wednesdays) during this time of analysis.  
The second approach is the selective analysis of issues during important dates of events 
(see below). Here samples are taken for specific questions on the day of the events as 
well as for a case varying daily period after the events had taken place. 
 
Furthermore, daily issues were covered during the 11 days prior to the respective elections 
which both serve as ending dates of the content analysis. Special attention was given to 
the sources of the articles, especially in determining to what extent the respective papers 
became a source for a general public discourse on certain issues.  
 
Next to the respective events that serve as the starting points for the analysis in the GDR 
and in Hungary, the focus is on the reporting of the respective newspapers on 2 further 
issues in the GDR and 2 further issues in Hungary. Both of the countries have one issue in 
common: namely the issue of political scandals of the past and the present, including 
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mismanagement and corruption of party officials. How did the respective newspapers 
cover these issues? 
 
Additionally, one further issue is covered for the respective countries, which although not 
being identical, both relate to the way the newspapers covered questions of how politically 
and constitutionally the respective countries should continue. These issues were: 
 
1. In the case of the GDR, the additional focus is on the way the newspapers began 
addressing questions relating to the political alternatives that then appeared possible 
(particularly the topic of whether the GDR should re-unify with the FRG or whether a third 
way - a socialism with a human face” - might be possible). To what extent did the 
newspapers offer a diverse discussion on the topic? To what extent did the issues raised 
by the respective newspaper mirror in the demands of the demonstrators or in what in 
effect happened in the end? To what extent did the media become a platform for the 
various emerging opposition groups? 
 
2. As for Hungary, the additional focus is on the way the newspapers began covering one 
aspect of the round table negotiations, namely the question of whether the president 
should be elected by the electorate before the parliamentary elections of March 1990, or 
rather by the newly elected parliament, thus the questions of whether Hungary should be a 
presidential or a parliamentary democracy and to what extent the old regime would 
manage to retain power in the new system. (This as it was generally assumed that most 
likely a member of the regime – most probably Imre Pozsgay – would emerge as the 
winner of the election as he was most known).   
 
With respect to the focus question of political scandals of the past and the present, special 
attention was given to 2 issues in the GDR and 2 issues in Hungary. These issues were: 
 
For the GDR:  
1. The storming of the Stasi offices in December 1989, as well as the public demand for 
and subsequent dissolving of the Stasi's successor organisation “Amt für nationale 
Sicherheit” which had been created in November 1989. (The first storming of the Stasi 
offices occurred on December 4th in Erfurt) 
2. The party-exclusion of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke on the 4th of December 1989.  
  
For Hungary:  
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1. The opening of the state archives, especially those of the secret police, following the 
cultural ministers decree of autumn 1989 stating that public access to these archives was 
a human right;  
2. The Dunagate scandal of December 1989.  
 
As to the discussion of which political future would be best for the GDR, this topic is 
analysed exclusively through the spot check analysis, as no direct date can be identified 
for this. (Although one expected to find the discussion on political alternatives to have 
taken place once the wall opened: this was also confirmed by the findings).  
 
As for the round table negotiations in Hungary, in addition to the spot check analysis, daily 
newspaper issues are taken 2 weeks prior to the referendum held on November 25th.  
 
For the GDR the content analysis therefore was: 
Event: Focus form: Date: Content analysis 
method: 
Elections of May 
1989 




that weekly spot 
check analysis  
Daily issues for one 
week. After that spot-
check analysis until 
March 1990.  
Political scandals of 
the past and the 
present (general) 
Focus question Continuous Spot check 
(Random sampling) 
Political scandals of 
the past and the 
present (special 
attention) 
1. Storming of Stasi 
offices 2. Party 
exclusions of 
Honecker & Mielke 
Focus question 
(Special attention) 
December 4th, 1989 
– January 1st, 1990 
Daily specific samples 
Question of which 
political alternative 
exists 
Focus question Continuous Spot check 
(Random sampling) 








For Hungary the content analysis therefore was: 
Event: Focus form: Date: Content analysis 
method: 
Comments by Imre 
Pozsgay  




Daily issues for one 
week. After that 
spot-check analysis 
until March 1990. 
Political scandals of 
the past and the 
present (general) 
Focus question Continuous Spot check 
(Random sampling) 
Political scandals of 
the past and the 
present (special 
attention) 
1. Opening of state 
archives  
2. Dunagate scandal  
Focus question 
(Special attention) 
October 16th to  26th 
1989, and 
December 18th 






Focus question Continuous as of 
June 13th, 1989 and 
specifically 2 weeks 
prior to the 





as well as daily 
specific samples 




14.3-25.3.1990 Daily specific 
samples 
 
Reasons for focus question choice: 
The GDR: 
1. Content analysis starting event: The election fraud of May 1989 – especially its degree 
and boldness – during a time when changes were unfolding throughout the entire socialist 
camp, showed just how distant the regime was from reality and it served as a shocking 
reminder how stringently the regime was holding onto power. The extent of the election 
approval for the government list (98,95 %), came as a surprise to the vast majority of the 
GDR's citizens in general as well as to “Block party” members and even some politburo 
members in particular. For many East Germans the election was seen as a sign of whether 
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finally the wind of change was also coming to the GDR; however, the result was quite the 
opposite. The direct leadership around Honecker ignored the will of the people and 
proceeded, as if indeed, the vast majority of GDR citizens were supportive of the regime. 
For many it sent a signal that despite the changes in the entire region, nothing was going 
to change in the GDR in the near future. This was one dominant point in influencing so 
many people to leave the GDR in the coming months; a reaction which would lead to a 
rather serious refugee problem by October 1989, and thus to a further dramatic symbol of 
the regime’s illegitimacy. Furthermore, the extent of the election fraud as well as the rigid 
fashion in which the regime seemed to impose its right to govern, alienated not only the 
“Block-party” members, but also an increasing number of SED party members. As 
remembered by Manfred Garlach, Chairman of the LDPD from 1967 to 1990, by the end of 
May 1989, especially after the flawed elections, the LDPD members increasingly began to 
demand that the regime begin an open discussion on the problems of the time, especially 
concerning the economic situation and concerning democratic questions (Gerlach, 1991). 
The election of May 1989 therefore represents one dominant event in the downward spiral 
of the SED's monopoly on power, and in this the most outstanding during the first half of 
1989.  
 
2. Political scandals of the past and the present: As the regime was losing its grip on 
power, the initial response of the new leadership around Egon Krenz was to concentrate 
on the mistakes made in the past, and to argue that the new leadership would now erect a 
truly democratic system, and that the mistakes of the past would be corrected. This, 
however, had the consequence that it also led to the mistakes of the present from being 
addressed in society, and that these two (the mistakes of the past and the present) 
dramatically discredited the attempts by the regime to retain any remaining authority, 
support and legitimacy. Above all, in effect it discredited the attempts by the new 
leadership to distance herself from the past. Out of this reason this topic received special 
attention in the content analysis, in order to investigate to what extent the media fostered 
this process.  
 
The storming of the Stasi offices received special attention, as the Stasi most strongly 
stood for the regimes Stalinist surveillance system, which had managed to corrupt and to 
terrorize the entire East-German society for decades. The question of Stasi files, and the 
shock on how many people had been informal informants and who had been spied upon, 
became a dominant theme in the East-German process of coming to terms with the own 




The party exclusions of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke stand for the regimes attempts, 
on the one side, to demonstrate that the mistakes of the past were finally being addressed; 
but on the other side, it demonstrated the frantic situation the party was in. The question of 
how the media began covering these issues, therefore appeared central in understanding 
the transformation of the media towards an independent actor.  
 
In addition, one further scandal was used as a keyword phrase for the content analysis, 
namely that of the housing estate of “Wandlitz”.  Although it did not serve as a focus 
question per se, the quantitative content analysis was set to determine as of when the 
respective newspapers began to cover this topic and the qualitative analysis examined 
what was written about it. This as the “scandal” was one strong factor in discrediting the 
Krenz regime (as will still be discussed).  
 
3. Question of which political alternative exists. In analysing democratization processes, all 
the more so when comparing these with one another, one needs to keep in mind that 
every transition is in a very real sense distinctive. One distinctive topic in the GDR's 
transformation was the question on how to continue politically. While the “softline” fraction 
of the SED and the majority of opposition members present during the round table 
negotiations, clearly favoured a move towards retaining an independent GDR on the basis 
of a “third way” – that was a truly democratic system along the lines of a “socialism with a 
human face” – the majority of the masses on the streets demanded a unification with the 
FRG and a transformation towards a market economy as soon as possible. Indeed, also 
internationally the issue created considerable furore. It thus became a central question in 
the very existence of the GDR, as well as in the question of whether a unified Germany 
would be in the interest of a peaceful Europe. Therefore, it appeared stressing to choose 
this issue as a focus question and to analyse how the media began covering it.  
 
4. Elections of 1990:  With the elections of March 1990, the regime lost its power base and 
the GDR embarked on the process of consolidating her young democracy, ending the 
“democratization” phase. In the GDR, with the unification with the FRG in October of 1990, 
this went somewhat quicker than in other Central and Eastern European countries.  
 
Hungary: 
1. The comments by Imre Pozsgay on the 1956 events: The comments by Pozsgay on the 
events of 1956 had a drastic effect on the entire liberalization process. The comments 
were part of a report that Pozsgay had headed, which investigated the events of 1956. 
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Especially important was that the comments were made by Pozsgay during an interview 
for a news programme without having first consulted the rest of the politburo. As will still be 
discussed, the comments created a political “fait accompli”, and prevented a looming 
military putsch by Károly Grósz and a small amount of “hardliners” in the politburo. With 
this he had forced the entire party to address the central legitimacy dilemma of the Kádar 
era, and greatly strengthened the position of the “softliners” in the public’s perception. Out 
of this reason, this central event during the first half of 1989 was taken as the starting point 
of this content analysis.  
 
2. Political scandals of the past and the present: Similar to the GDR, the question of the 
political scandals of the past but also the present dominated the societal discussions as of 
1989. While initially it seemed that the “softliners” were managing quite successfully to 
distance themselves from the past, enjoying considerable sympathy among the population, 
increasingly the discussion of both former and present scandals also de-legitimated the 
reform forces within the party. Thus the topic became central in fostering an increasing 
democratization both within the communist elite but also within society in general.  
 
The Dunagate scandal (as will still be discussed) was a strong issue in discrediting these 
moderate regime forces, portraying that also these were still receiving sensitive information 
from the secret police on opposition group activities and its members. The scandal 
therefore appeared as a dominant issue and thus received special attention in the content 
analysis.  
 
The issue of the opening of state archives was likewise subject to considerable 
contestation by the population, as many believed that the regime was attempting to hide or 
destroy sensitive files or those compromising “softline” regime members. Additionally, it 
was felt that despite the promise by the regime to make these archives public, it seemed 
that access to these was far from being made possible. Thus, the way in which the media 
began covering this topic appeared important and the subject thus received special 
attention.  
   
3. Round table negotiations: The round table negotiations in Hungary were initiated by the 
regime, believing that it could retain control of the situation in this way and emerge from 
the negotiations as strongest force together with a coalition partner, most likely the MDF. 
At the end one central compromise reached during the round table negotiations, namely 
that Hungary would become a presidential republic and that the first president would be 
elected by popular vote before the parliamentary elections took place, was undone by a 
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referendum initiated by the junior partner in the opposition groups, the SZDSZ. The 
consequence of this referendum was critical: firstly, it inflicted a major blow to the regimes 
attempt of assuring party control in a new system and fostered an erosion of the MSZMP's 
authority; secondly, the referendum had a major influence on party politics, by boosting the 
image of the SZDSZ at the costs of the largest opposition force, the MDF, who appeared 
too cosy with the regime. In turn, the MDF had to distance herself more strongly from the 
regime if it wanted to regain credibility. The way in which the media handled this situation 
therefore appeared important in addressing the research question. 
 
4. Elections of 1990: As was the case in the GDR, with the elections of 1989, the regime 
lost its power base, and Hungary ended the “democratization” phase, embarking on a 
consolidation process of its new democracy, which became synonymous with the quest of  
“returning to Europe”, culminating in the accession of Hungary to the European Union in 
2004. This therefore appeared the logic point to end the time of analysis. 
 
Although special attention was given to these topics, the qualitative content analysis 
revealed and gave insight into the further topics raised by the respective newspaper. 
 
Method for the content analysis was a mix between qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis. In particular the quantitative analysis was conducted according the usage of 
predefined topics. Special attention is given to the Lasswell “Formula”, insofar as a special 
attention is given to commentaries by the respective newspapers or readers, to articles 
written by opposition / societal groups, and sources apart from the official state information 
services (ADN in the case of the GDR; MTI in the case of Hungary).  
 
As the research is set to discuss at what point the respective newspapers began diverging 
from the official line, the logical research path appeared to be to concentrate on articles 
that were not formulated by the regime.  
 
The qualitative analysis, using background information in order to explain what is written, 
supports the quantitative analysis of the focus questions. As the journalists often used 
„hidden language”, writing “between the lines”, in order to express opposition, the 
qualitative analysis attempts to translate and to measure this. For the qualitative analysis, 
special attention was given to the sources that the newspapers use (MTI, ADN or also 
western sources) as well as an analysis of the importance given to events or topics in the 
newspapers (Were the articles in the front page or rather at the back?). Thus, while the 
quantitative analysis gives insight as to whether a topic was mentioned at all, the 
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qualitative analysis attempts to measure what the respective newspaper / journalist wanted 
to convey.  
 
The first part of the content analysis was done by identifying relevant articles through a 
keyword search of predefined words and phrases. These included the topics of the focus 
questions but also further issues that the research had identified as being topics important 
for the transformation process. Therefore, as one question of the dissertation research is 
set to examine at which point the respective newspapers began to mention the emerging 
oppositional groups and parties or as of when the newspapers became a platform for 
these, the predefined words and phrases were to analyse as of when this was indeed the 
case. In a next step these articles were then analysed qualitatively (especially the focus 
questions and the way the media began covering the emerging oppositional forces).  
 
The predefined topics and words for the quantitative content analysis were therefore 
divided into the keywords for 1. The respective beginning and ending events for the 
content analysis; 2. The content analysis focus questions (including the focus question 
scandals at the time as well as further ones); 3. The names of opposition activists, groups 
and events; 4. Issues identified as being important to society during the time of research.  
The first step for the keyword search was to identify the relevant topics, and then to specify 
the relevant “keywords” that were then to be documented during the content analysis. The 
topics and keywords were identified through background reading of literature as well as 
through the reading of the respective newspapers prior to the content analysis conduction. 
 
Below these topics and keywords are outlined: where the reasons for the choice of these 
keywords are not self evident, a short explanation is provided underneath.  
For the GDR:  
 
Focus questions Topics and keywords 
Respective beginning 
and ending events 
 
- Elections of May 1989 
- Election Law 
- Election Fraud 
- Elections of March 1990 




- Stasi Offices 
- Party exclusions: Honecker / Mielke 
- Attacks on the current work of the SED 
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leadership 
- Mistakes of the past (including corruption, 
mismanagement, corruption and the misuse of 
powers) 
- Political alternatives (whereas a differentiation 
was made between positive articles, negative 
articles and neutral articles):  
i) Confederation with the FRG 
ii) Unification with the FRG 
iii) Contractual unity with the FRG 
iv)  “Third way” – instead of the three above and 
instead of socialism in its current form 
v) Socialism – a continuation of the current 
system 
vi) Calls to give the SED a second chance 
Introduction of 
opposition groups / 
parties: either in form of 
references using foreign 
sources, own 
newspaper sources or 
commentaries as well as 
becoming a platform for 
these groups directly 
 
(The names of the parties 
and groups served as 
keywords for the content  
analysis: they were, 
however, not individually 
documented in the 
quantitative analysis, but 
rather as part of the topic). 
- New Forum 
(An anti-communist movement founded in 
September 1989 as the first independent (non-
national front) political movement to be officially 
accepted by the government. In 1990 in combined 
forces with “Democracy now” and the “Initiative for 
peace and human rights” and collectively formed 
the “Alliance 90”).  
- Democracy now 
(A political movement founded in the stir of the 
collapse of the regime; it wanted to maintain a 
human, democratic version of socialism in 
opposition to what they believed as a “western 
consumer society”.)  
- Group 20, Dresden 
(The Group was created when following the 
demonstration on October 8th, 1989, 20 citizens of 
Dresden were elected to discuss the political 
demands with the city government of Dresden. 
These later officially formed a political movement to 
foster democratic change, and were officially 
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registered in October 1989)  
- Democratic awakening 
(Political movement founded in December 1989 in 
Leipzig, including prominent members such as the 
current German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
Priest Rainer Eppelmann. In 1990 it merged with 
the CDU and thereafter ceased to exist) 
- Initiative for peace and human rights 
(Was the oldest opposition group in the GDR, being 
founded in 1986) 
- Church circles 
(The Churches for many years were the only 
places were the state had no direct influence, and 
where at least limited opposition could be voiced. 
They were the place where regime critics met, even 
if they were not religious, thus becoming the 
platform for discussion. Opposition was then voiced 
in the churches through pamphlets officially only for 
inside church use, as well as oppositional concerts 
disguised as church-mass music. In 1989 the 
Churches became the place were many 
demonstrations began, including the notorious 
Monday demonstration in Leipzig, that always took 
place after mass in the St. Nicholas´ Church. As 
stated by Dr. Monika Zimmermann (Interview, 
18.3.2008), the churches were to play a central role 
in the democratization movement). 
 
Issues identified as 
being important to 
society (Important for 
the transformation 
process) 
- Political transformation inside the Soviet bloc 
(whereby a differentiation was made between 
positive and negative articles)  
(The political events that were unfolding across the 
entire region came to have a devastating effect on 
the stability of the GDR's regime as well as for the 
very existence of the GDR. Thus it is interesting to 
observe as of when it became a subject in the GDR 
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press, and as of when the press began covering 
these events positively.) Keywords: Reforms, 
dialogue, Perestroika, Glasnost, Democratization 
- Border closure between the GDR and 
Czechoslovakia 
(Following the massive refugee crisis in 1989, the 
GDR responded by closing its border with 
Czechoslovakia in an attempt to prevent further 
citizens from leaving. It was therefore interesting to 
observe as of when the media began reporting on 
the issue, and whether a positive or negative 
position was taken). 
- Refugee problem (Whereby a differentiation 
was made between the official state view and a 
more balanced view) 
(The refugee problem unfolding in September 1989 
came to have a devastating consequence on the 
moral of both the regime and the people of the 
GDR, and it showed even more strongly how 
illegitimate the regimes claim to power really was. It 
largely exacerbated the coming collapse of the 
regime. The content analysis was therefore set to 
examine at what point a more balanced reporting 
on the issues around the refugee problem evolved 
within the media.) 
- Renewal of society, New realities, Change 
(One dominant trait of the GDR´s regime was to 
ignore all events that were unfolding within the 
entire region but also within the GDR itself. This 
was made most evident when in October 1989, the 
regime went forward with the GDR´s 40th 
anniversary as if everything was under control. 
Cries for reforms were ignored and suppressed in 
society, the bloc parties but even inside the SED. It 
was therefore interesting to see as of when the first 
discussion on the necessity of “change” or of “new 
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realities” first emerged in the official media and with 
what intention and consequence.) 
- New elections 
(As it became increasingly more evident that the 
socialist one party state was loosing its grip on 
power, the call for new truly democratic elections 
became dominant not only from the opposition but 
also from the previous “bloc parties”, and even from 
SED softliners. It was thus interesting to analyse as 
of when the call for new elections became a topic in 
the official media) 
- Demonstrations of 1989 
(One dominant factor that ultimately brought down 
the regime was the spreading of mass protests and 
demonstrations. In analysing the dissertation 
question it is therefore important to identify how the 
media covered these demonstrations and as of 
when a shift towards a more balanced view or even 
open support can be identified) 
- Round table negotiations 
(The round table negotiations that the regime was 
forced to engage in signalled not only the further 
retreat of the regime but also the circumstance that 
change was within reach. The content analysis was 
therefore set to examine to what extent the media 
began writing about this issue) 
- Leading role of the SED 
(Once the possibility of change seemed possible, 
the call for an end of the constitutionally set leading 
role of the SED became apparent not only from the 
opposition but also from the bloc parties and even 
some softline SED members. Indeed, the question 
was central for the successful democratization 
process. It was therefore interesting to observe as 
of when this issue emerged within the respective 
newspapers) 
 49 
- Extraordinary party congress of December 
1989 
(As the hardliners within the regime were 
increasingly being sidelined, the calls for an 
extraordinary party congress emerged that should 
set the course for a new truly democratic SED. The 
party congress that took place in December 1989 
was indeed a tremendous impetus for the 
democratization process of the country and also of 
the SED party itself: agreeing to an end of the 
leading role of the SED, replacing the old guard 
and drawing up a new party programme. Issues 
that were covered during the congress were issues 
relevant for the entire country, therefore to what 
extent the congress was covered by the media and 
how seemed important for the successful 
understanding of dissertation question) 
- Different voices for and about economic 
reform (No ADN release) Including calls for a 
currency union with the West 
(One important factor in the transformation process 
was the transition from a planned economy to a 
western style market economy. Indeed, one of the 
dominant demands of the masses in 1989/90 was 
the call for a quick economic unification with the 
FRG. As it was therefore an important issue for 
society, the content analysis was set to establish 
when this discussed became apparent in the 
respective newspapers) 
- The problem of right-wing tendencies inside 
the GDR 
(The official position of the regime since 1945 was 
that right-wing tendencies were only a problem in 
the FRG, and that no such thing existed inside the 
GDR. In the wake of the unification, however, it 
increasingly became evident that it was indeed a 
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serious problem, which had never been 
successfully addressed and challenged in the 
GDR. As it became a serious issue of discussion 
dominating the reality of the unified Germany until 
the present, it was interesting to analyse as of 
when the newspapers began to identify the 
problem and how) 
- Questions related to GDR expropriation and 
the compensation of former owners 
(The issue of property expropriation dating back to 
the national socialists, the expropriation by the red 
army as well as by the GDR state became subject 
of heavy debate in the newly unified Germany, one 
that leaves unsolved court cases until today. As the 
issue was therefore important for the successful 
transformation, the content analysis was set to 
identify as of when it became an issue in the 
respective media and to what extent a truly diverse 
discussion emerged on the topic.) 
 
 
For Hungary:  
 
Category Keywords / Phrases 
Respective beginning and 
ending events  
 
- Statement by Imre Pozsgay  
- Elections of March 1990 
Content analysis focus 
questions  
- Dunagate 
- Opening of archives 
- Oppositional round table 
- Round table negotiations 
- Referendum initiated by opposition 
- Critical towards the past / reforms had not 
worked, mistakes that happened 
 
Introduction of - MDF 
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opposition groups / 
parties: either in form of 
references using foreign 
sources, own newspaper 
sources or commentaries 
as well as becoming a 
platform for these groups 
directly  
 
(The names of the parties 
and groups served as 
keywords for the content  
analysis: they were, 
however, not individually 
documented in the 
quantitative analysis, but 
rather as part of the topic). 
(The MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum was 
formed in September 1987 in Lakitelek, by 
Hungarian intellectuals with some support of 
communist officials) 
- SZDSZ 
(The SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats was 
founded in November 1988 as an opposition 
party)  
- FIDESZ 
(The FIDESZ: Alliance of young democrats was 
also formed at the end of 1988 as a youthful 
libertarian, anticommunist party, largely as an 
alternative to the communist youth organizations)   
- Independent Smallholders party 
(The Independent Smallholders party (a agrarian 
worker and civic party) had been the dominant 
party following the 1946 democratic elections, but 
had been subsequently sidelined and broken up 
by the communists. It was also re-founded at the 
end of 1988) 
Issues identified as being 
important to society 
(Important for the 
transformation process) 
- Need of economic reforms 
(The need of economic reforms became a 
dominant topic in Hungarian society in 1989: thus 
it was interesting as of when this topic arose in 
the media) 
- Reform of socialist party state system 
 (The issue of reforming the socialist one party 
state system became an issue on the agenda of 
both reform communists and the opposition. It 
was therefore interesting to see when the media 
began covering the topic) 
- Need for constitutional reform / public 
control 
(As the scandals of the past were unfolding, the 
public increasingly came to demand public 
constitutional control over the work of the 
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government and the secret services as the only 
way to ensure that the mistakes of the past 
including corruption and the misuse of power 
would not be repeated. Additionally, as all aspects 
of society and the economy were being 
transformed, it became clear that many reforms 
were simply not possible or difficult without 
changing the constitution before (such as the 
question of private property).  Hence, it was 
interesting to analyse as of when the media 
began covering the issue) 
- Round table discussions in Poland / changes 
and reforms in Poland 
(The events unfolding in Poland had a great 
impact on amplifying the transformation process 
throughout the entire region; it was therefore of 
interest for this content analysis) 
- March 15th celebration   
(Commemorating the 1848 revolution. This 
became the national holiday in 1989 instead of 
the previous national holiday on November 7th, 
Commemorating the October revolution, due to 
popular demand. It greatly signalled the loss of 
power of the regime) 
- The coming of the multi-party system 
(Background research had indicated that the 
media - either through own commentaries or 
articles by reform communists and opposition 
groups - had greatly fostered the cause of 
erecting a truly democratic multi-party system. 
Hence, the content analysis should shed light into 
the question of whether this really was the case).  
- Dismantling the barbed wire border between 
Hungary and Austria 
(The dismantlement of the barbed wire border 
with Austria signalled a further opening and it had 
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a profoundly negative impact for the GDR. The 
articles on this subject were therefore signalled 
out through the key word search and further 
analysed through a qualitative analysis) 
- Opening of border with Austria 
(See above) 
- GDR refugees in FRG embassy in Budapest 
(See above) 
- GDR refugees in FRG embassy in Prague 
(See above) 
- Soviet troops leaving Hungary 
(The issue of the remaining Soviet soldiers in 
Hungary stood as the strongest enduring symbol 
of the 1956 brutal reaffirmation of communist rule 
and it became subject to public detestation in the 
later 1980s. It was therefore interesting to 
observe as of when the issue was covered by the 
respective media)  
- Critical articles towards the party  
(The point was to analyse at which point critical 
articles towards the regime could be identified, 
and how these increased over time) 
- Imre Nagy  
(Imre Nagy had been removed from office and 
executed in 1956 after the Soviets had crushed 
the democratic forces. He remained a hero to the 
Hungarians and a symbol of 1956, the brutal 
reaction of the Soviet Union and the experiment 
of creating a truly democratic socialism with a 
human face. His person, however, became a 
taboo topic and it is therefore interesting to 
observe as of when the media began breaking on 
it) 
- Parcel 301 
(It was widely believed that Imre Nagy was buried 
in a collective grave known as “Parcel 301”. It was 
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interesting to investigate at what point the 
newspapers began to cover this, fuelling public 
debate on the issue and forcing the regime to 
openly state whether indeed Imre Nagy was 
buried in the grave. Additionally, it was the first 
attempt at breaking the taboo on writing on Imre 
Nagy by asking who was in the grave, without 
directly referring to him. ) 
- “Water barrage” “Bös-Nagymaros” 
(The Water barrage became a hated symbol of 
the old communist regime in the later 1980s, and 
in 1989, the government suspended the project 
following widespread public opposition. As it was 
such a dominant topic in Hungarian society, it was 
interesting to observe as of when it was 
mentioned in the media) 
- Questions relating to party assets  
(The questions of the enormous party assets 
which the communists called their own in 1989 as 
well as the question of how oppositional groups 
and parties would gain access to public funding 
became a widespread topic in 1989) 
- Events / reforms inside the GDR 
(The keyword search identified articles on 
important events and reforms inside the GDR. 
This was interesting for the dissertation analysis, 
as it gave insight into changes in the GDR, and 
how this was perceived by more liberal socialist 
“brother states”.  
- Documents on the show court case of László 
Rajk 
(László Rajk was a high-ranking member of the 
Hungarian communist party, who became victim 
of Stalin’s rigorous cleansing of all homegrown 
communists and communists who did not directly 
follow his views. As his show trial became a 
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political taboo, it was interesting to observe as of 
when the media began to break on this taboo.) 
 
 
Furthermore, an emphasis for the qualitative analysis in both countries was put on the way 
the respective newspapers began discussing the imminent economic transformation of the 
country, particular the privatization measures. To what extent did the newspapers hinder or 
support this?  
 
Before the content analysis was carried out, a small amount of samples were taken and a 
pre-test of 10 randomly selected issues carried out. This made sure that the methodical 
framework with the pre-defined words and phrases worked.  
 
Content analysis recordings:  
The rather extensive period of analysis as well the wide-ranging questions to be 
investigated, limited the extent of the quantitative analysis; classical methods such as 
counting the number of words and paragraphs and counting the number of times a topic 
was covered during each issue, and whether this was positive or negative each time, 
seemed beyond the scope of analysis. The logical consequence for the analysis 
conduction therefore appeared to be to divide the analysis time into half-months, and to 
record in this fashion which topics were covered within these two week time frames. As the 
spot check analysis was conducted once a week (Wednesdays) this usually meant 1 to 3 
issues to be covered within the given 15-16 day time frame. The same division went for 
those events and issues – as described previously -, where daily samples were taken for 
case varying time periods. The recordings were then translated and can be found in the 
respective chapters of newspaper comparisons, as well as in the appendix.   
 
For the recording it was important that the respective paper covered the topic at all within 
the given 15-16-day time frame (either as an own article / commentary or by a foreign 
source).  Thus even if only one small article was printed, this was recorded. The 
recordings therefore do not suggest the frequency of the respective topics within each 
sample 15-16 day time period. N.B. the recordings only show topics that occurred following 
the predefined words and phrases: thus, certain further dominant topics existed; however, 
these were not recorded, as they did not match the predefined words set. No importance 
was given to length or prominence in the quantitative analysis, as this was then done in 
the qualitative part.  
 
 56 
Heavy reliance was put on the mix between qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The 
qualitative analysis interpreted to what extent the respective article did indeed have a 
positive “output” intend or to what extent the article had “messages between the lines”. 
Thus, articles that did have an important message were recorded and are used in 
analysing the “output” intend of the respective newspapers.  
 
The qualitative analysis received greater weighting within the overall content analysis.  
This made sense as the first step of the dissertation analysis was to measure the media 
“output”, which in turn led to the more important part for the successful investigation of the 
research question, namely the “outcome” aspect. As argued by Rife, Lacy and Fico  
(1998), in a quantitative content analysis the messages are separate and apart from 
communicators and receivers. This dissertation, however, attempts to analyse what effect 
the communication of the first had on the latter.  Hence, while it was surely important that 
issues were covered at all (measured by the “quantitative” analysis), only a qualitative 
analysis combined with background knowledge could measure the intent of the respective 
article more clearly. It seemed that only in this way could an “output” intent be used to 
identify an “outcome” effect. Additionally, as little room existed for journalists to openly 
criticise the regime, much opposition was voiced through an “in between the line” or 
“indirect” writing. Especially this could only be identified through a “qualitative” analysis.  
 
 
3.3. Interviews  
 
In order to successfully analyse whether the media “output” did indeed have a positive 
influence on the respective democratization process, it had to be investigated what effect 
this media “output” really had on society as well as to what extent it supported the 
emerging oppositional forces: thus the question of whether it indeed had an “outcome” 
effect. The findings of the content analysis were therefore compared to interviews of 
contemporary witnesses in order to find out to what extent the “output” did in reality have 
an “outcome” effect; to journalists working at that time, opposition activists, and members 
of the communist party. Additionally, scholars were used as interview partners to respond 
to specific questions. Furthermore, the content analysis only manages to capture part of 
the media’s “output”, and then only from 2 newspapers. The interviews were therefore also 
intended to give further insight in the general media “output” of the respective countries.  
 
The aim of the interviews was to see to what extent the media - through its reporting- had 
actually initiated political discourse; in society, within the communist party, or even during 
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round table talks, and when changes in the way the newspapers reported can be 
observed. Additionally, the interviews were set to analyse to what extent the output of the 
media did in effect support the opposition groups from these groups´ perspective. Did the 
opposition groups attempt to gain press coverage on themselves as well as on their 
programmes and discussions? If yes with what effect? This should give some suggestion 
as to whether the media did indeed play a role as forerunner or merely as mirror of what 
was happening in society, by showing if and at what point a change in the reporting of the 
media can be observed. Additionally, it should give insight into the question to what extent 
a possible forerunner role did in effect influence something. At what point did the media 
begin reporting on previously taboo topics, or on current scandals discrediting the attempts 
by the regime to portray themselves as reformers and committed to a truly democratic 
system? Did this occur before or after the loss of the communists’ grip on power became 
seemingly irreversible?   
 
Furthermore, the interviews were used to understand further aspects necessary for the 
successful completion of the dissertation.  These included: the form of control exerted by 
the regime on the media in each respective country as remembered by the journalists; 
forms of censorship; the point when the journalists noticed that changes were occurring; 
the intentions of the journalists in 1989, following the regimes demise from their own 
perceptions; the way the regime (“hardliners” and “softliners”) attempted to instrumentalize 
the media for their own goals; the way the opposition groups attempted to gain access to 
media coverage; the effect that the changing economic reality had on the working of the 
journalists and to what extent this influenced the medias “output”. 
 
For this purpose the interviewees were placed into different groups, each answering a 
different aspect necessary for a successful understanding of the role in the 
democratization processes (as mentioned previously).  Thus, journalists were used to 
understand the media system during the time of research, and how it had changed over 
time, if at all, as well as the media’s “output” intent from the journalists point of view; 
regime politicians were used to understand the political events and how these influenced 
the medias “output” from their perceptions; opposition activists were used to articulate the 
media transformation from their awareness, and to what extent they used the media as 
sources of information and news and above all to what extent the media supported their 
cause and with what effect; academics were used to answer specific questions unclear  in 
their own publications on the topic or on continuative questions. Interview guideline 




III. The impact of the Media on transition processes 
1. Setting the scene: paths of State Socialism  
 
Before discussing the role of the Media in state socialism as well as its role in transition 
processes, it is important to describe the formation of state-socialism as such in the region 
of research; its initial imposition as well as the divergent paths each country took as the 
years went by. The understanding of this is crucial in recognizing why different media 
systems had different pre-conditions to influence the democratization processes by 1989. 
 
By the end of the 1940´s the grand wartime alliance was beginning to crumble, and 
Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech of March 5th, 1946, reflected reality. Europe was 
being split up between Western and Soviet spheres of influences.  
 
Although Moscow had promised free and democratic elections in the countries “liberated” 
by the red army, the Soviet Union soon managed to marginalize or “co-ordinate” the major 
democratic parties of the region and imposed communist regimes. The new leaders of 
each country quickly began to fundamentally transform the way society had worked 
previously, embarking on a complete process of socialist transformation. The systems that 
emerged in all countries under Soviet hegemony were all characterized by dictatorship, 
marked by one party monopoly on power, extensive expropriation of private property and a 
complete infiltration of party control in all aspects of life; economical and social. As claimed 
by Batt, “communist ideology was universalist” (Batt, 2003, pg 6), promising an utopia of 
equality, wealth and justice for all and beyond traditional national lines. The regimes 
installed, legitimized their rule through the argument of a universally valid model that would 
ultimately lead to this “utopia”. As argued by Lendvai, what differentiated the Soviet-type 
Communist systems imposed from the ancient despotism and modern dictatorships was 
above all, the ideology (Lendvai, 1981, pg 17). An ideology marked by the assumption of a 
sole and exclusive truth in politics, which was defined and legitimized by Marxist-Leninist 
thinking. Thus, the communist system was an experiment in enforcing conformity to this 
model upon the entire region (Lendvai, 1981). 
 
At Prima facie therefore, at least superficially, it is tempting to view the systems of the 
Soviet Union and its satellite states as identical. However, at closer look, it becomes 
evident that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe among themselves as well as vis-
à-vis the Soviet Union itself were not only marked by different historical legacies – 
economical, cultural and political -, but one also discovers that communism itself took on 
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markedly different forms. As suggested by Stokes: “the entire history of Eastern Europe 
from 1945 to 1989…can be considered one spasmodic imposition of Stalinism followed by 
forty years of adjusting, accommodating, opposing, reinterpreting, and rejecting” (Stokes, 
1997 pg 184). As argued by Batt, (1991, pg 4): “The uniformity of the political and 
economic systems of the East European satellites gave way to increasing diversity as the 
communist regimes struggled to stabilize their power by supplementing the crude coercion 
of the Stalin period with some concessions to `national specifies`”. Sükösd, (2000, pg 131) 
states: “As a result, domestic political and social forces played an ever-growing role in 
shaping national political and media systems as different governing Communist parties 
chose different paths to regime consolidation”.  
 
Ultimately, the communist regimes recognized the problem of implementing uniform Soviet 
style policies; namely that it completely ignored the diverse historical contexts, 
socioeconomic developments, class structures, democratic traditions and experiences, as 
well as cultural traditions that had existed prior to WWII. This mistake resulted in various 
outbreaks of national demonstrations and unrest, first in East-Germany in 1953, in Poland 
in 1956, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 as well as the ”Prague Spring” of 1968. All these 
demonstrated the weakness of the centralized model as imposed by Moscow, its lack of 
authentic roots in the countries of the region, and above all its failure in providing the 
promised superior economy and standard of living to that provided by Western capitalism 
(Batt, 2003). 
 
It became clear, that a uniform form of communism across Central and Eastern Europe 
could not be implemented. Although these revolts were all forcibly crushed, and 
“normalization” as dictated by Moscow quickly re-asserted, the popular uprisings had 
made it clear that some latitude had to be given to the different countries to respond more 
flexibly to national conditions (Batt, 2003). As a result, the extent and possibilities of state 
control over society and implementation of communist policies began to diverge 
significantly throughout Central and Eastern Europe. This process was accompanied by a 
general process of “de-Stalinization” and Khrushchev’s “decade of euphoria” from 1954-64 
led by Moscow, and resulted in domestic political and social forces increasingly influencing 
their own national political systems (Sükösd, 2000). 
 
With hindsight, one can say that the forceful intervention of Moscow in some countries 
proved fruitful in re-imposing restrictive regimes that managed to marginalise opposition 
and to reassert social control, while in others it did not.  Consequently, while some 
countries such as the GDR continued to follow a strict form of barely modified Stalinism 
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until the very end, other countries such as Poland and Hungary were marked by a 
transition to a model of “tolerant repression” early on (Sükösd, 2000).  The aim of this 
“tolerant repression” in the Hungarian case was to construct some form of popularity for 
the communist system, without weakening one party monopoly on power too extensively. 
However, as a consequence, this allowed a comparably independent society to emerge 
that eventually challenged the communist’s exclusive right to rule (Stokes, 1993). 
 
 
2. Setting the scene: the role of the Media in State Socialism 
 
The media of the Soviet bloc were completely reorganised according to the basic ideals of 
Karl Heinrich Marx, Friedrich Engels and especially Vladimir IIyich Lenin.  In applying one-
party control and realizing the party’s domination over all aspects of society, the media 
were regarded as a central tool in articulating communist propaganda and in securing 
mass persuasion, support and mobilization. In this – as formulated by Lenin – the medias 
function was not only that of a collective propaganda machine and collective agitator but 
also that of a collective organizer (Lenin, 1958, quoted from v. Steinsdorff, 1994, pg 85). 
As the socialist societies aspire to become `classless societies` and thus should lack an 
internal class conflict, the media should not be structured along the lines of political conflict 
(McQuail, 1987).  
 
Communist ideology presupposed objective laws of history and thus an objective reality 
that the press must reflect. This greatly reduced the extent of personal interpretation and 
presented a set of constant news values (McQuail, 1987). The entire media system was to 
assist communist ideology as the central information and propaganda organ, controlling 
information and attempting to produce it in such a manner as to secure and strengthen 
political control, communicating the party’s image of reality.  As argued by Lowenthal “The 
monopolistic control of all channels of public communications, from the press and other 
mass media to all forms of education, of literature and arts, with the aim not merely of 
preventing the expression of hostile or undesirable opinions by a kind of censorship, but of 
controlling the formation of opinion at the source by the planned selections of all the 
elements of information” (Cited in Lendvai, 1981, pg 18).  The role of the media was to 
legitimize communist rule, to mobilize public support for government decisions at home, as 
well as Soviet and Warsaw pact decisions and actions in general, and to de-legitimize 
Western democracies.  The medias role was a “political socialization and Sovietization” 
(Sükosd, 2000, pg 126) of the public.  
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Consequently, the communist regimes began to monopolize mass communication; its 
ownership, selection of employees and its reporting. Although some newspapers remained 
de jure independent, de facto independence was limited through close party control. 
Opinions dissenting from official view were repressed by censorship and by severe 
disciplinary measures should journalists depart from party line (Splichal, 1994). No 
genuine public opinion in the sense of “the public expression of agreement or dissent 
concerning institutions” (Bobbio, 1989, pg 26) existed. The sphere of “civil society” was to 
be almost completely absorbed by the state (Splichal, 1994). 
 
Apart from the role as party state propagandist the media was also regarded as a major 
factor in securing the power and control of the party leadership. This role became 
especially evident during party purges throughout all regimes of the soviet block, where 
the media were used to legitimize the purges, to discredit the often well-known victims vis-
à-vis the people and to create support for the leadership. Additionally, the media were 
often used as a central tool in building up personalization cults that existed in various 
regimes, beginning with Joseph Stalin and Nicolae Ceausescu in extreme forms but also 
Mátyás Rákosi and Todor Zhivkov to lesser degrees. 
  
The Journalist was seen as a party functionary. Lenin had argued that articles must 
conform absolutely to the party doctrine (Lendvai, 1981). Party-mindedness (partiinost) the 
most frequently mentioned personal trait required of a Journalist in the Soviet Union and 
later all countries under Soviet hegemony, meant that a Journalist serving the party sate 
must assess every issue from the party point of view, meaning an absolute dedication to 
the party and conformity to its directives (Lendvai, 1981, pg 21). As argued by Aron,  
“Lenin’s fanaticism has become the orthodoxy of an empire” and Marxism-Leninism the 
“camouflage for a satisfied bureaucracy” (Aron, quoted in Lendvai, 1981, pg 22). The role 
of the media was to communicate and create public support and acceptance for decisions 
already taken – by the party elite behind closed doors. Argued by Lendvai “The primary 
task of the media is therefore not to chronicle daily events and to compete through 
credibility for the public’s confidence, but to serve the party”. (Lendvai, 1981, pg 22) 
 
It is important to note that the manner in which the media in State Socialism was 
controlled, exceeded by far forms of state censorship and self-censorship usually seen in 
countries under authoritarian / totalitarian dictatorship. The media in non-communist 
authoritarian / totalitarian systems are generally described as manipulative and subversive 
of individual freedom and political liberties (Neuman, 1991, quoted in Gunther & Mughan, 
2000, pg 4), the defining feature being strict regime control over the media in order to 
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achieve aims set by self-selected, unaccountable political leaders who control the media 
system through “unconstrained and pervasive power” (Ibid). Under State Socialism, 
however, this went considerably further. One important example of this is the ownership 
structure. In the case of Pinochet in Chile or Franco in Spain, the regime closely controlled 
the media, being able to suspend licenses and in theory being able to intervene in the 
appointment and dismissal of newspapers editors. However, especially the print media 
often remained in private hands, which guaranteed at least some form of commercialized 
logic and autonomy. This was not the case in the region of research, where topics were 
chosen solely on the grounds of ideological/propagandist value, not following any 
commercial reason.  In the logic of Soviet style media control, all forms of media channels 
belonged to or were at least directly dependent on the state. The press became an integral 
part of the state and party apparatus. As argued by Lendvai, starting with the printing 
machines, working capital and newsprint, to stationary and typewriters, everything had to 
be given by the party. Apart from having the possibility of simply forbidding the publication, 
the party state could prevent newspaper publications simply by not giving them access to 
the infrastructure needed to print.  Journalists had to closely abide to the decisions taken 
by the politburo and the detailed instructions of the press sections of the Agit-Prop 
(Agitation-Propaganda) departments (Lendvai, 1981).  
 
There existed several means of guaranteeing and enforcing control over the media by the 
party leadership.  The first was the so-called nomeklatura system, whereby the party elite 
controlled leadership positions in all key political, social, economical and cultural 
institutions. Usually a Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the party’s central 
committee effectively controlled the media through nomination and appointment of the 
media nomeklatura, comprising of chief editors and other leading positions (Szakadat, 
1993). These practices were not officially acknowledged or legally fixed, but nonetheless 
represented an integral part of the media systems throughout the region.  As control over 
the media was seen as vital for the communist regimes, the work of the media became 
subject to constant interventions by the party (Sükosd, 2000). Direct telephone lines 
connected editorial offices with leading party officials (Lendvai, 1981). In this way the party 
made sure that events were either not mentioned or reported in a fashion favourable to the 
regime.  By ordering the publication of previously prepared articles they directly influenced 
what was covered by the media and in what way (Sükösd, 2000). A means of control over 
the nomenklatura system was to keep files on every journalist with sensitive personal and 
political information. The information kept in these files directly influenced the choice of 
journalists for leadership positions (Sükösd, 2000). This led to ridiculous situations. As 
remembered by Rainer Höhling (Interview Höhling, 26.2.2008), statements that came 
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directly from politburo members in the GDR, particularly Honecker, were released by the 
ADN no matter if a sentence made no sense or were grammatically incorrect, as the 
editors did not dare change anything.  
 
A further instrument for media control were journalism schools. Usually, access to a 
leading position within the media required the candidate to come from these schools 
(Sükösd, 2000). Here, the journalists were indoctrinated with communist propaganda, and 
following the Leninist philosophy of the press, were taught to be “The party’s sharpest 
weapon” (Lendvai, 1981, pg 17). In order to be able to visit these schools and later to 
succeed in the media, candidates usually had to be members of the communist party, 
required to obey and follow party directives. The case of the GDR represented a slightly 
different picture, as will still be discussed.  
 
Political control over the media was regularly reinforced by political terror and purges of 
leading media individuals. All this created a situation where on the one hand the regime 
directly interfered in the media system, and on the other hand, journalists themselves 
feared not confirming with the official line. Not wanting to give anyone reason to doubt the 
own conformity, the journalists often became overzealous in implementing the party line.  
Thus, centralized, close control over the media was secured by a mixture of direct 
censorship, self censorship, direct appointment, or sacking of media nomeklatura as well 
as political terror (Sükösd, 2000).  
 
The process of divergent paths undertaken by various national regimes as a consequence 
of de-Stalinization, national uprisings and demonstrations in the 1950s and 60s, as 
identified previously, also had an effect on the way the national media systems began to 
function. The media in all countries of the soviet sphere of influence differed enormously 
from their role in any western democracy, institutionally the media belonging tightly under 
the control of the party throughout the entire region. Nevertheless, considerable 
differences considering the extent of control, censorship and self-censorship among 
Central and Eastern European Countries emerged. This is especially the case for the 






3. The position of the Media in transition processes 
 
As has already been established, the role and position of the Media in transition processes 
– especially from State socialism – represents a largely neglected field of research in both 
political and communication sciences. This section of the dissertation shall look at one 
aspect of the medias position in the transition process, namely the new economic reality 
that the journalists and the individual media had to adapt to, following the disintegration of 
the party state system. This is important, as it suggests why the media systems are not 
only different in Communist dictatorships as opposed to Capitalist dictatorships, but it also 
suggests how the media were able to influence the democratization processes.  
 
In his article “Democratization and the Media: A preliminary discussion of experiences in 
Europe and Asia“, Collin Sparks (2001) compares Media systems in Capitalists 
dictatorships to Communist dictatorships. He suggests that as the economic ownership of 
the media in both systems differ - in communism all forms of official media belonging 
directly to the one party-state; while in capitalist dictatorships the media, although being 
subject to censorship, nevertheless belongs to a private individual -, the form of censorship 
in a communist system remains in effect much more strongly totalitarian in terms of 
complete control. (See graph below). Under a communist dictatorship, from the bottom 
journalists, to the top nomeklatura member, everyone is dependent on the party. 
Additionally, while capitalist media systems had to follow a market orientated media 
organisation and content in order to survive, media systems in communist systems 
remained non-commercial. The state provided everything from the journalist’s salaries, to 
office rent and stationary. The media did not need to successfully meet the demands of 
their readers to survive; no matter how many people read their news, they were kept alive 
by the regime. Hence, the media did not have “to compete through credibility for the 
public’s confidence” (Lendvai, 1981, pg 22). It is suggested by the article that this affected 
the output of the media in the respective system, as a commercialised logic would limit the 


















(Sparks, 2001, pg 22) 
 
 
Sparks argues that the effect of regime collapse on the media in a communist dictatorship 
is very different to that of its capitalist counterpart. In the former the end of the regime 
brings a complete vacuum, as the level which was responsible for hiring and firing as well 
as for censoring and for providing the economic structure no longer exists; while in the 
latter, although the political restrictions are no longer in place, the restrictions placed on 
the journalists and editors by the owners still are largely in place (see graph below).  
Sparks argues that in the former, when the respective system enters crisis “both the 
internal and external mechanisms of control vanishes, and there is a vacuum of 
ownership….. The media workers suddenly find themselves free to express themselves, to 
pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it, or to propagandise for their idea 
of the future – for a short period of time, there is no one to tell them what to do” (Sparks, 
2001, pg 22) It is important to highlight, however, that in the view of this dissertation the 
freedom of media workers to “pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it, or 
to propagandise for their idea of the future” only exist for a short period of time and ends 
while the existing regime is still in place, albeit extensively weakened, before the new 
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(Sparks, 2001, pg 23) 
 
It is in the above-pictured environment that the media and its journalists can position 
themselves as independent actors in the reform process taking place. This dissertation 
presumes that by 1989, the economic logic (existing in capitalist systems), which 
increasingly became part and parcel of the new medias logic in communist states, 
increasingly placed the pre-conditions of the medias work more in line with the situation of 
the media in a capitalist dictatorship during regime collapse. As the media began facing 
economic constraints and in the case of Hungary underwent privatization or self-
privatization (in which the editors create an own publishing house) and in the case of the 
GDR  –with the exception of the ND which remained part of the SED-PDS – were placed in 
a trust to be sold during this period, media workers faced similar economic restrictions, as 
was the case in capitalist dictatorships.  
 
Sparks argues in his paper that both post-communist regimes as well as post-capitalist 
dictatorships demonstrate extraordinary similarities in that they are both highly 
commercialised and highly politicised (Sparks, 2001, pg 24). Different to Sparks, however, 
this dissertation presumes that this commercialization began already before the new 
system was created. Therefore, while acknowledging the short window of opportunity in 
which the journalists can act freely, at the same time, this dissertation presumes that this 
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but still at the end of the communist system.  Thus, as the economic conditions were 
changing – bringing a shift away from an economically virtually unrestricted standing, to a 
situation of competition and economic restrictions – the newspapers and journalists 
realized that they needed public acceptance and consequently interesting, new topics if 
they wanted any chance of economic survival. They were suddenly faced with the need to 
compete “through credibility for the public’s confidence” (Lendvai, 1981, pg 22). The 
dissertation therefore presumes that the media and its journalists firstly began influencing 
the democratization process in a way as “to tell the truth as they see it, or to propagandise 
for their idea of the future”, but then this quickly changed to influencing the democratization 
process out of an economic logic.  
 
If this is confirmed by the dissertation research findings, it will be interesting to see which 
influence was more beneficial to the transformation process. Assuming that the medias 
influence on the democratization process arises partly out of a competitive market 
orientated reality, and if it holds true that the media began to follow this market orientation 
already before a new democratic system emerged, then this dissertation presumes that 
this commercialised and politicised media will be a driving force in the content output of the 
respective media in the transformation process.  
 
Gulyás (2003)(see graph below) argues that commercialization of the print media occurred 
quickly in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of system change. She describes 
commercialization of the press as “a process whereby the emphasis on market share and 
profitability in media production becomes predominant potentially at the expense of other 
media functions such as political, social and cultural roles (Gulyás, 2003, pg 84). The 
graph depicts differences in the working mode of Post-communist media in comparison to 
Communist media. If one assumes that these changes occurred due to a 
commercialization and one further assumes that this already took place before the new 
system was constituted, then one would expect to find parts of the depicted “Post-
Communist” working mode already present in the media system during the liberalization 
phase of the party state. Due to the chaotic state in which many regimes found themselves 
in at the end of the 1980s, one would expect that the party’s capability to assert the 
political interest is enormously limited.  
 




Dominance of political and educational 
functions of media over entertainment 
and commercial aims 
Dominance of market and 
commercial aims generally, but in 
certain sectors political and social 
functions are more important 
Main forces Dominance of political forces, Dominance of market forces, but in 
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bureaucratic coordination and central 
planning 
some sectors political and social 
forces are significant 
State 
involvement 
Extensive; including state ownership, 
overseeing the operation, production and 
distribution of all print media products, 
providing substantial subsidies, carrying 
out media control 
Limited to certain areas, including 
involvement in politically, socially or 
culturally important areas, some 
state support to those areas: 






Main aims are recognition of the 
authorities and to fulfil central orders and 
plans; budget limits are soft, usually 
receives subsidies; price of its product is 
decided by the authorities; demand is 
certain for the company 
Main aims are commercial and/ or 
some social/political aims; budget 
limits are hard, usually has to cover 
costs; usually do not receive 
substantial external support; price 
of its products decided by the 
company subject to market 
condition; demand is uncertain for 




Extensive, including control of content, 
production and distribution of print media 
products; formal and informal control 
mechanisms; no diversity, no press 
freedom 
Within limits of pluralistic systems; 
mainly formal mechanisms; usually 
written in legislation; typically 
involving control of content for 
social and security reasons, and of 
production for economic reasons; 
freedom of the press is largely 
respected 







4. The role of the Media in democratic systems 
 
When at the end of the 1980s, the communist grip on power throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe began eroding, increasingly the respective regimes embarked on a 
process of liberalization. To this process belonged the attempt by young, softline regime 
members, to distance themselves from the previous leadership and what had happened 
before. In the GDR people like Egon Krenz, Günter Schabowski and Gregor Gysi, in 
Hungary Imre Pozsgay, Miklós Nemeth and Rezsö Nyers all attempted to portray 
themselves as reformers in line with Mikhail Gorbachev, claiming to build a truly 
democratic socialist system on the ideals of people such as Alexander Dubček and Imre 
Nagy. This notion of striving to create a “truly democratic socialist state” went hand in hand 
with the notion of a free press. Consequently, although reluctant, each respective regime 
had to give in to both the opposition’s demands to stop media censorship and the 
journalists’ actions in beginning to take more liberties, if they wanted to appear to follow 
the ideals of a truly democratic socialist state. Additionally, in Hungary (as will still be 
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discussed) some regime members pushed for media freedom in the hope that this would 
outmanoeuvre the hard-line regime members, would speed up the liberalization process 
they began as well as portray them as true reformers. In the GDR the regime members of 
the “bloc-parties” did the same, positioning themselves for a possible end to the 
dominance of the SED. Additionally, the journalists of both the “bloc-parties” as well as the 
SED media, began to foster an internal party liberalization process.  
 
Hence, although this was a long process that sometimes lasts until today, the media in the 
countries of the region more and more acquired the role of the media in established 
democracies. If one acknowledges that a part of this occurred while the regime was still in 
place, before democratic elections took place, then one needs to analyse the role of the 
media in democratic systems if one wants to understand the role the media could play in 
the final phase of the communists regimes.  
 
“Mass Media” are repeatedly referred to as the “fourth power” or “fourth estate”1 in 
democratic systems due to the power they exert, the supervisory function they exercise 
and the forum and source for public debate and information they offer. As such, they have 
become “ the connective tissue of democracy” (Gunther & Mughan, 2000, pg 1), linking the 
sovereign (the people) with each other as well as with the elected representatives and 
offering a watchdog function for the people on decisions made by those in power by 
popular will.  In many respects, a free press makes sure that accountable government can 
indeed be controlled and made accountable. As argued by Holmes, free press is “an 
essential instrument of self-rule, providing voters with indispensable information about 
candidates and issues” (Holmes, 1990, pg 35). As a consequence, Thomas Jefferson 
famously declared: “Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government 
without newspapers or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate to prefer the 
latter” (Quoted in Krimsky, 1997, page 1). Abraham Lincoln stated: “Let the people know 
the facts, and the country will be safe” (Quoted in Cornyn, 2004, page 1). Additionally, the 
media are seen as a mirror of what is important for society at that time. This in a twofold 
way: firstly, they should become a platform for discussion on issues important to people of 
society and which these want discussed. Secondly, to return to the “agenda-setting 
function”, the media serve as a filter on discussions in society and should in theory take 
the most important up, convey them to their readers thus defining the most important 
social and political issues. 
                                                
1 A term coined by Lord Macaulay in 1832, to describe the emergence of the press to rival the 
power of the other three great estates, that was the Lords, both temporal and spiritual, and the 
Commons (Quoted in Randall, 1998). Today it refers to the press, both in its explicit capability of 
advocacy and in its implicity to frame political issues. 
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Modern-day democracies are witnessing criticisms of the media regarding a growing 
commercialization (the media increasingly adapting to market demands), sensationalism 
and superficiality bringing a growing amount of “poli-tainment” instead of non-biased, 
important information.  Increasingly, scholars tend to criticise its perceived influence on 
the political system, especially on election campaigns. According to some critics, the 
media have changed the political process by turning politics into a market like game 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999) (See also, Entman, 1989; Jamieson, 1992). Subsequently, 
political subjects are often reported on according to the amount of consumer interest they 
can bring. Additionally, as the main preferences of the audiences clearly goes towards 
entertainment, one can observe a change towards the “entertainization” (Meyer, 2001) of 
information transmitted through the media. 
 
This increasing commercialization of the media also occurred in the area of research, and 
it is a point of this dissertation to suggest that this occurred already before the respective 
regime collapsed. Indeed, today Central and Eastern Europe belongs to the most 
commercialized media landscapes, critics increasingly pointing to a deteriorated 
journalistic standard as sensationalism and “instinct-entertainment” (Interview József Kajdi, 
01.04.2008) dominate the amount of “news” communicated. When analysing the role of 
the media in the area of research, if one accepts that this process of commercialization 
already set in during the last phases of the communist regimes, one therefore also needs 
to keep in mind the negative aspects brought by the media in following sensational 
aspects. Nevertheless, these surely gradually developed and were not as present in 1989 
– 1990, and are not as such the topic of research of this dissertation that looks more at the 














IV. The GDR 
 
Already prior to the end of WWII, the Allies had agreed during talks at Teheran (1943) and 
Yalta (1945) that following defeat, Germany should be divided into four zones of 
occupation. By April 1945, divergences quickly became apparent between the Western 
powers and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Zone the licensing of political parties was 
quickly permitted, to a great extent in order to legitimize the formation and activities of the 
German Communist party (KPD) (Fulbrook, 1990). The Soviet military administration 
actively advanced control of the KPD over political affairs in the Soviet zone, the KPD thus 
effectively exerting influence out of proportion of their actual support and strength in the 
population (Ibid). After it became apparent that the KPD could not attract enough support 
on their own, a forced merger between the Social Democrats (SPD) in the Soviet Zone and 
the KPD took place, forming the so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED). By 1948, the other 
parties in the Soviet Zone including the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDPD) and the Peasants´ Party (DBD) had effectively been brought 
under control of the SED. In the meantime, the grand wartime alliance was further 
crumbling, culminating in the Berlin Blockade and subsequent airlift of 1948-49, as a result 
of which the division of Germany was formalised by 1949; In May 1949 with the creation of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and in October 1949 with the creation of the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR).  
 
The East-German dictatorship relied strongly on widespread participation at lower levels, 
right down to organizational strategies in the workplace and residential areas, to bring 
across its messages and realize its policies. This reliance on the grass-roots participation 
needed a considerable interpenetration of `state` and `civil society` (Fulbrook, 1995). Here 
the block parties and mass organizations were to play an important role, intended to reach 
parts of society that the SED could not reach. As argued by Fulbrook: “The East German 
dictatorship was sustained by an open edifice of affiliated bloc parties and mass 
organizations, which co-operated with SED and the Stasi to seek to incorporate every last 
citizen in the organized life of state and society. There was to be no area of `civil society`, 
no `public sphere` beyond the reach of state control: every aspect of life, work, and leisure 
in East-Germany was to be under control, ultimately, of the communist state” (Fulbrook, 
1995, pg 58).  
 
The continuation of these “block-parties” as junior-partners in the government with 
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specified number of seats allocated to them in parliament, represents a strange 
development, and stands out in comparison to other socialist states were other parties 
were banned. On the one hand these parties were largely marginalised, cooperation 
forced on their leaders in the Soviet later Stasi prison of Hohenschönausen, and in effect 
they were no more than “puppet parties” strictly following the SED´s policies. As argued by 
Elke Bötcher, the majority of opposition activists did not really trust the “bloc-parties”, as 
they represented the position of the regime. They were not really a junior-partner in the 
government, as they had nothing to say in reality, representing a “pseudo demokratische 
Veranstaltung” (Interview Bötcher, 19.3.2008).2  On the other hand, however, they did 
nevertheless represent a different spirit to that of the SED. Reiprich (Interview Reiprich, 
20.5.2008) here talks of a “middle-class hibernation-niche” (Restbürgerliche 
Überwinterungsnische”), where a “different spirit existed” and in which people entered if 
they could not withdraw from the pressure to confirm to the state and the system 
completely. Membership in these parties was a weak but nevertheless possible way to 
express opposition to the SED, while at the same time being prepared to be part of the 
system as long as no alternative appeared possible. As argued by Fulbrook “Membership 
of these parties was extremely useful for those East Germans who could not bring 
themselves to join an avowedly communist party, but who nonetheless wished to show 
their commitment to building a better, anti-fascist German state” (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 59).  
It was a way to demonstrate conformity, while at the same time showing a minimum of 
opposition.  
 
From the very beginning, these block parties were allowed, or even initiated, by the SED 
leadership in an attempt to reach all segments of society. These parties were then 
instrumentalized as “transmission belts” between the SED and different subsections of the 
population (Fulbrook, 1990) in order to translate the SED language intelligibly to distinctive 
segments who were sceptical of anything with an openly communist stamp on it (Fulbrook, 
1995).  
 
While the CDU and the LDPD were intended to incorporate the middle-class and liberal 
segments of society, the SED directly founded the nationalist NDPD and the peasants´ 
DBD in order to incorporate former Nazis (in the case of the NDPD) and to create an SED 
loyal alternative to the CDU and LDPD for entrepreneurial farmers in rural areas (in the 
case of the DBD). The benefit of creating another alternative to the CDU and the LDPD, 
                                                
2 Indeed, the only time that there was ever a vote against a government decision prior to 
1989 was in 1972, when fourteen CDU members of parliament voted against the proposed 
abortion measures (Fulbrook, 1990, pg 226) 
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was that it further fragmentised these two and it incorporated even more parts of the 
population in the system. As suggested by Fulbrook, these parties had been founded 
“precisely in order to encompass and contain segments of the population to which 
communist ideas could not be expected to appeal” (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 58). A leaflet 
circulated by the NDPD in 1952, for example, with the title “Ruf an die deutsche 
Frontgeneration des zweiten Weltkrieges”, used evocative language to appeal to the 
sense of “Love for and allegiance to our common fatherland”, listing among its signatories 
such former devoted Nazis as a former district leader of the NSDAP and a former member 
of the NS-women’s organization and war widow (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 58). Such attempts 
promised political salvation for ordinary former Nazis if they were prepared to put their love 
for the fatherland to the shared new purpose.  
 
As long as the SED power looked here to stay, as long as no political alternative looked 
reachable, these block parties effectively remained the instruments and mouthpieces for 
the SED. However, due to very fact that these parties did attract people who did not 
support the SED dominance completely and where as Reiprich argued a “different spirit 
existed”, it was these parties who quickly came to oppose the regime once the first cracks 
in the absolute power of the SED became visible. Thus, these parties and their respective 
media would later play an important role in the democratization process, as they had the 
infrastructure, the organisation and the personnel to effectively oppose the system.  
Indeed, it was the block party CDU which emerged as dominant force after the first free 
elections in 1990, albeit with considerable support from the West-German sister party. It 
appears surprising that (with some small exceptions such as the group 20 in Dresden) it 
was these “block-parties” and not the new opposition groups who emerged as leading 
figures directly following the 1990 elections. The group 20 managed to provide Lord 
Mayors in Dresden and to influence the politics of the state of Saxony in the 15 years 
following unification. Today, however, they too seem to have disappeared. This stands in 
contrast to the Hungarian example, where the political landscape today is dominated by 
the post-communists on the one hand, but on the other the conservative FIDESZ and MDF 
as well as the liberal SZDSZ, who all formed in 1988/89 as opposition groups.  
 
 
1. The Media in the GDR 
 
In the GDR as in all countries under Soviet hegemony, the centralized communist regime 
under Walter Ulbricht began with the monopolization of the press almost immediately. The 
political elite understood the value of the newspaper as a means of schooling the public in 
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the basics of Marxist ideology and more practically, of casting in a favourable light on 
selected government policies. The responsibilities of the journalists clearly lay in educating 
the public in the „right“ way. Therefore, until the very end, whoever wanted to receive a 
slightly higher position in most occupational fields, needed to subscribe to one of the big 
newspapers. This should make sure that these individuals received the state propaganda. 
In certain businesses, reading hours were introduced where the employees had to read 
the GDR newspapers.  Licenses for media were only given to parties and mass-
organisations favourable to the communist regime. Ownership of previously active 
newspapers, or publishing houses were expropriated.  
 
From the very beginning the GDR was faced with a major obstacle in controlling the flow of 
information to its citizens, namely the GDR´s geographical proximity to West Germany. 
Apart from the Island of Rügen or the region of Dresden (referred to as the “Tal der 
Ahnungslosen”), West German radio and TV could be received all over the GDR. 
Additionally, West Germany made an active effort through strong transmitters to broadcast 
both TV and Radio to East Germany. The GDR authorities at first attempted to prevent 
citizens from using West-German media, either through police controls or by trying to 
make GDR programmes more interesting. By the 1970s, however, this policy was no 
longer implemented as rigorously, in part because the new leadership under Honecker 
(Gerlach, 1991) noticed how futile it was, as it created enormous animosities to the people, 
and as through the creation of the Berlin wall the regime believed that it had stabilised the 
socialist system in the country (Kaase, 2000). As a result, as argued by Stiehler (1990), 
people in the GDR used more West German than East German Radio and TV. 
Consequently, East Germans were exposed to a lot of manifest and latent counter system 
information long before unification (Kaase, 2000). As aptly argued by Kasse, in Germany 
every night, electronic reunification happened through the TV (Ibid).   
 
On the long run, there is no doubt that this played a dominant role in accelerating the 
process of regime de-legitimization, at least in so far as it constantly gave a different 
interpretation to the propaganda released by the regime.  This was also remembered by 
Dr. Monika Zimmermann (Interview Dr. Zimmermann, 18.3.2008), one of the few 
accredited western journalists inside the GDR between 1987-90. She suggests that in 
comparison to other communist states, the press landscape inside the GDR was never 
independent from the press landscape of West-Germany. Especially the west-German 
electronic media constantly reverberated into the GDR.  
 
This also had an effect on the relatively little amount of Samizdat literature, especially in 
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comparison to neighbouring Poland. The need for this was simply not as present, as one 
free media system was already constantly bombarding the East Germans with alternative 
news, news especially relevant for the GDR’s citizen and where East-German dissidents 
themselves published articles or news coverage’s.  
 
The workers uprising in the GDR in 1953 did not have the same effect in terms of bringing 
a liberalization in society through the regime, as did the revolution in 1956 in the case of 
Hungary (as will still be discussed). Quite on the contrary, once the soviets re-asserted 
their power, the GDR regime continued to stick firmly to Stalinist orthodoxy until late into 
1989. This also had an effect on the media.  Although in 1968, the GDR witnessed a 
revision of the constitution, which de jure gave the press the same rights as in the FRG, 
the constitutional practice looked very different. De facto, until 1989, the media in the GDR 
represented the traditional picture of the media in an East European Communist State, 
following Stalinist principles, where all media served as the central organ of 
communication of the SED party-state, attempting to use the media in order to reinforce 
political control. There existed little easing of control over the Media, which remained 
strictly controlled by “hardliners” until the fall of Honecker in October 1989. As a result, 
many people inside the GDR simply withdrew from following the newspaper coverage. The 
fact that there existed an other German media landscape in West Germany, which 
constantly provided critical information, greatly facilitated this retreat.  
 
For the outside world, even in socialist “brother states”, the GDR’s media system 
represented a shocking form of severe control and censorship, in which the journalists until 
the very end appeared to follow the official stance.  As argued by András Heltai-Hopp, for 
the journalists of the other socialist states, the submission of the entire media system in 
the GDR appeared unexplainable, especially after what had happened in Germany under 
Nazi dictatorship (Interview, Heltai-Hopp, 2008). As argued by Wolfgang Thierse, most 
journalists were perceived as being cowards and dishonest, thus portrayed the required 
system-traits for their careers: „Die meisten DDR-Journalisten waren feige und verlogen, 
hatten also die erforderlichen System-Eigenschaften für ihre Karriere.“ (Interview Wolfgang 
Thierse, 14.4.2008).   
 
For the majority of observers, this could only be explained by the situation that the entire 
media system was run and operated by fervent communist hardliners. However, at closer 
look, one sees that this was not the case. Although the entire party state was obviously 
dominated by the SED (and here undoubtedly by SED hardliners until October 1989), the 
individual “block-parties” controlled their own newspapers, as was the case with the “Neue 
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Zeit”. This was different to the other socialist states, where all media effectively belonged 
to the state or the party. Even in Hungary, were the Magyar Nemzet belonged to the 
collective “Popular front” organisations, in 1989 in effect it was controlled by the reform-
minded politburo member Imre Pozsgay, in his position of head of the popular front 
organisations.  
 
Thus, while SED-party membership might have been beneficial for a career inside the 
SED-party media and state owned media, such as the „Neues Deutschland“ or the ADN, in 
the media of the “block-parties”, the higher ranking nomeklatura were mostly members of 
the respective parties. These journalists, although surely by no means being over-critical 
towards the regime and the system, were at the same time no over-enthusiastic 
communists. Obviously, the SED could intervene and controlled the appointment of these 
leading figures. As stated by Manfred Gerlach, Chairman of the LDPD between 1967 and 
1990, and Chairman of the Council of State and thus de jure head of state between 
December 6th 1989, to April 5th 1990, all personnel or structural decisions within the block 
party media (including decisions concerning the media nomeklatura) needed to be 
approved by the SED. As argued by Vaatz, in the end all personnel decisions of the 
“block-parties” had to receive green light from the Central Committee. Responsible for this 
was Horst Dohlus (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008).  The “block-parties” were controlled by the 
department “friendly parties“ of the SED; “”Befreundete Parteien”. There the leaders of the 
block parties were regularly “guests”, during which the decisions of the politburo were 
communicated,  “recommendations” for the work of the respective block parties were made 
and speeches and media releases of the block parties were approved. In this department 
each “block-party” had one specific contact person, and important decisions were sent to 
them beforehand for approval (Gerlach, 1991, pg 79). If an important political decision was 
to be made, the leaders of the block parties were instructed to write supportive 
commentaries in their respective media. Gerlach (Gerlach, 1991, pg 125) remembers that, 
when in 1971, Honecker took over the leadership from Walter Ulbricht, Gerlach was 
instructed to write a positive article on Honecker in the CDU’s newspapers, as the two had 
known each other for several years. Honecker had always appeared to be in the shadow 
of Ulbricht, an apparatchik nobody really knew. If he wanted to retain control, Honecker 
needed to quickly change this and the block party leaders were instructed to support the 
cause.  
 
The above-described situation was the case for the block party leadership. As to the media 
nomeklatura of the block party media, a similar procedure took place with the department 
agitation and propaganda. The Chief-editors of the Block party media received detailed 
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„recommendations“ by the Agitation and Propaganda department weekly. (This 
department remained strictly controlled by hardliners until October 1989). Should the 
editors then ignore the department’s „recommendations“ – even if this occurred through an 
obvious mistake – the respective editor faced tough disciplinary measures, even leading to 
a so called „Berufsverbot“ after which the respective journalist was barred from a further 
job in the media, or merely received a position in the archives. Additionally, the SED was 
responsible for dictating how much resources (financial but also working essentials such 
as paper and printing machines) each newspaper received. In this way, the SED could 
directly dictate the circulation number of the newspapers. If a newspaper became too 
liberal, then the circulation was reduced thus fostering a system of self-censorship if one 
did not want to loose access to resources.  
 
Generally, the “Neues Deutschland“ was to act as guide on what the block party media 
were allowed to write. This is suggested by a paper instructing the CDU-papers on how to 
comment on the visit of Honecker to West-Germany in August 1989:  
„Es wird empfohlen, über die Pressekonferenz auf Seite 1 zu 
berichten. Das ND (Neues Deutschland sdw) wird das Dokument im 
Wortlaut veröffentlichen. Wir sollten Auszüge aus dem Dokument im 
Wortlaut in gebührender Länge bringen (keine ganze Zeitungsseite)! 
ND bringt zu dem Thema am 29.8. einen Kommentar. Auf der 
Grundlage dieses Kommentars sollte man anschließend selber 
kommentieren“ (Holzweißig, 1997, pg 78) 
 
In effect, as argued by Müller, concerning the “Neues Deutschland“, the real Chief-Editor 
was Honecker (Interview Müller, 2005, page 2). And indeed, as the above situation 
portrays, this argument holds true for the entire media system. The SED de facto 
controlled the media landscape from the outside. 
 
Additionally, secret Stasi agents were placed in these newspapers by the regime. 
Sometimes people guessed who these agents were, but as would later be uncovered, 
mostly these agents remained unnoticed. Although not officially stated, all journalists knew 
of the presence of these agents, which increased the system of self-censorship as one 
never knew who would report what.  
 
To conclude, the media nomenklatura of the block party media were thus controlled on the 
one hand by their own party leadership (who were in return controlled by the SED 
department “friendly parties”) and on the other directly by the SED department Agitation 
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and Propaganda. It is important to mention at this point again, that the journalists who 
worked for these block newspapers often explicitly chose to become a member of these 
“block-parties” as oppose to the SED, as it was a weak but nevertheless possible way to 
express opposition to the SED, while at the same time being prepared to be part of the 
system as long as no alternative appeared possible. This situation would become 
important during the transition phase, when these parties increasingly began to position 
themselves against the SED. (See the subsequent chapter). As long as the party state 
system worked, the SED could control these parties and their media by influencing who 
would become party chief of the respective party, who in turn decided on personnel 
decisions in cooperation with the responsible SED department.  
 
While the “Neue Zeit” was a CDU block-party newspaper, the „Neues Deutschland“ was 
directly founded in order to create an organ for the party. As argued by Benning, its focus 
lay in providing the masses of the party members arguments and prove of the correctness 
of the GDR politics every day. “…die Masse der Parteimitgliedertäglich aufs neue mit 
Argumenten und Beweisen für die Richtigkeit er Politik auszurüsten” (Benning, 1997, pg 
149).  By 1989, although officially belonging to the party, in effect it was the direct 
mouthpiece of the central committee. This was clearly portrayed by the header of the 
Newspaper stating “Neues Deutschland - Organ des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands”.  As remembered by Spickermann, in reality it was not even 
the organ of the central committee, but instead the organ of the politburo group around 
Honecker. Namely: Erich Mielke, Erich Honecker, Günter Mittag and Joachim Herrmann. 
“…eigentlich war es zum Schluss nur noch ein Organ der Politbürogruppe um Honecker. 
Und das Waren Mielke, Honecker, Mittag und Herrmann. Das war der engere Zirkel, deren 
Organ war es zum Schluss” (Interview Spickermann, pg 5).  
 
 
2. Towards transition 
 
In 1989, the GDR represented one of the last bastions of Conservative Stalinism in 
Eastern Europe. The regime (especially the hardliners) it seemed, strictly controlled all 
aspects of society, opposition -in comparison to other socialist states - appeared negligible 
(Clay Large, 2001) and any drastic changes in direction of increasing liberties seemed 
highly unlikely. The regime believed it could withstand any calls for reform. Economically, 
the system was upheld through continued crucial financial support from West Germany, in 
form of loans, subsidies and so called “buyouts” of political prisoners (Clay Large, 2001, pg 
519). Additionally, as argued by Baylis: “The SED appeared to have a more effective 
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repressive apparatus at its command than its neighbours, and did not suffer the open 
cleavages visible in the Soviet, Polish, or Hungarian parties; dissident movements 
appeared to be correspondingly weaker” (Baylis, 1999, pg 136). Furthermore, with most 
opposition dissidents having fled or forced to depart, who should lead a popular uprising 
against the regime? 
 
However, the changes initiated inside the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of 
Perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), which ultimately came to affect the 
entire region, came to have drastic consequences on the very existence of the GDR. 
Despite these extraordinary events taking place within the Soviet Union (marked among 
others by the declaration of Lithuanian sovereignty on May 18th 1989) as well as within 
several communist bloc countries, Erich Honecker’s regime failed to adapt. The SED’s 
opposition towards Gorbachev’s reform plans were articulated clearly by politburo member 
Kurt Hager in an interview for the German magazine Stern, by stating that if one neighbour 
changed his wallpaper, one does not necessarily feel obliged to do the same (Otto, 1997, 
quoted in Grieder, 2006, pg 164). This opposition towards any change within the system 
became most strongly evident during the May 7th, 1989, elections. While the Soviet Union 
itself had already held its first semi-open elections and Poland was about to do the same, 
after an increasing amount of opposition to the regime had been voiced advising the public 
on how to vote negatively, and while even “block-parties” such as the CDU had 
participated in the election organisation, witnessing negative outcomes for the regime, 
Egon Krenz nevertheless announced that 98.95 per cent of votes supported the 
government list (Stokes, 1993). Even reform minded politburo members such as 
Schabowski were surprised by the crude extent of this election fraud (Sieren & Koehne, 
1991).  
 
When one month later the Chinese regime forcefully crushed the demonstrations on 
Tiananmen Square, East German TV repeatedly showed a Chinese documentary praising 
the response of the army and police to the “perfidious inhumanity of the student 
demonstrations” (Quoted in Stokes, 1993, pg 138). On June 4th, the “Neues Deutschland” 
defended the decisions taken by the Chinese leadership. The extent of the election fraud 
and disregard of the public discontent following it, as well as the reaction of the GDR 
regime to the events in China, confirmed the people’s fears that for the SED elite the time 
of change had not yet come. Many believed that the regime would see itself legitimized to 
react by force against any such events inside the GDR.  
 
The regime did not want to publicly oppose Moscow’s reform process, however, they did 
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everything to prevent reform influences from reaching the East-German public. In 1987, 
the politburo passed a resolution specifying that speeches of reform communists within the 
Soviet bloc, including Gorbachev’s, should be censored before they be published in the 
DDR media (Grieder, 2006). Additionally, liberal newspapers and magazines from friendly 
“brother states” such as the Soviet German journal “Sputnik” or some issues of the 
Hungarian Magazine “Magyarorszag”, were banned. Furthermore, Erich Honecker wanted 
to prevent a societal discussion on Stalinism, as he did not want a discussion on the 
GDR’s own repressive history (Grieder, 2006). In 1988, Honecker informed the Soviet 
ambassador to East Berlin, that the term Perestroika would no longer be included in official 
documents released from Moscow and published in the GDR (Ibid).   
 
Several factors were working against the political stability of the GDR. One of the foremost 
factors was surely the change in Moscow’s policies towards its satellite states, shifting 
from the “Brezhnev doctrine” to the “Sinatra doctrine”, implying that the Soviet Union would 
no longer interfere in the policies of its satellite states, which would henceforth be free to 
do it “their way”. As argued by Pallack, “the Soviet Union's refusal to guarantee the GDR's 
existence played a pivotal role in its destabilization” (Pallack, 2002, pg 309). No matter 
how strong the GDR leadership attempted to shield its population from Moscow’s reform 
plans, in the end it failed and the new realities emerging within the Soviet bloc had 
devastating consequences for the East German system. Increasingly, seeing the changes 
occurring in other socialist states (such as the victory of the Solidarity trade Union during 
the partially free elections in Poland of June 1989), and acknowledging Moscow’s new 
policy of non-interference, people inside the GDR began demanding similar changes as 
were taking place elsewhere in the region. This together with a general dissatisfaction with 
the GDR's system evident even among party members, as well as a looming economic 
crisis, laid the foundations for the sudden but complete breakdown of the GDR state.  
 
With the increasing gap in the standard of living between eastern and western Europe, the 
west increasingly became an over idealized alternative. With over 1 million East Germans 
visiting West Germany annually, as well as the images of the western life entering the 
living rooms of East Germany via television daily, dissatisfaction with the GDR grew 
drastically. Additionally, while the GDR leadership had always argued that among the 
Soviet bloc countries the GDR was leading especially in economic terms, by 1989, it had 
to realize that through the political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union, Hungary and 
Poland, it was becoming one of the most backward (Pallack, 2002). Furthermore, the 
economic outlook of the GDR was in reality more than bleak. The heavy debt servicing 
costs which the GDR faced as a result of its heavy borrowing, the rise in oil prices and the 
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falling away of western markets, by the 1980s left the GDR in a state of economic 
implosion, marked most evidently by the billion mark loan –effectively a state bailout - 
given to the GDR by the FRG in 1983 and 1984. Even high party officials began 
complaining of consumer goods shortages (Baylis, 1999, pg 130).  
 
Indeed, increasingly the SED leadership was faced with a growing party discontent against 
its hardline policies. A growing number of high SED members recognized that drastic 
reforms had become inevitable. In May 1988, Gerhard Schürer, head of the State Planning 
commission and a candidate member of the politburo, drafted a paper outlining drastic 
measures in order to prevent a financial breakdown of the GDR economy. These 
measures included slashing subsidies, cutting spending and raising prices (Baylis, 1999, 
pg 134). Fearing that these measures would lead to a drastic fall in the already low living 
standards, bringing mass public discontent, Honecker and his hardline economic advisor, 
Günter Mittag, criticised these ideas, and ignored them. Certainly, as argued by Kopstein, 
in 1989 Reforms “seemed to be both necessary and unimaginable” (Kopstein, 1997, pg 
104).   
 
The direct spark of the 1989 revolution in East Germany arguably came as a result of the 
regime decisions in Hungary and developments in the West German Embassies in Prague 
and Warsaw, leading to a rather unexpected refugee problem. In March 1989, the 
Hungarian reformist government announced it was acceding unconditionally to the 1951 
United Nations’ Convention on Refugees (Stokes, 1993). This partly came as a step to 
give the Hungarian minority in Rumania that were fleeing Ceausescu’s regime at the 
thousands, a legitimate status in Hungary. But at the same time, having accepted these 
international norms, it would eventually have to recognise people wanting to flee East 
Germany as refugees as well. On May 2nd, the reformist Hungarian government 
dismantled the barbed-wire fence with Austria. Although still not being able to cross the 
“official” border crossings, many East-Germans simply abandoned their cars in the woods 
and walked over into Austria (Clay Large, 2001, pg 521). Others dissatisfied that they 
could not cross the border headed towards the Embassy of the FRG in Budapest. On 
September 10th, 1989, having been promised financial support from the West, and 
unwilling to uphold the GDR´s travel restrictions on its own citizens, Hungarian Foreign 
Minister Gyula Horn announced that East Germans may cross the border between 
Hungary and Austria to go to West Germany. The Hungarian regime declared that they 
were following internationally accepted principles of human rights.  This was a novum, as 
all soviet bloc countries had guaranteed that they would only allow citizens of other 
“socialist brother states” to make for the west with valid permission. The “Neues 
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Deutschland” quickly condemned the Hungarian action, stating that this only came as a 
consequence of the Hungarian regime being “bought” by western direct financial aid. The 
ADN released statements speaking of a “organised human trafficking”.  
 
The East German regime addressed Moscow for help, but Gorbachev made it clear that 
the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was once and for all abandoned, and that the Soviet Union would 
not intervene in this case. Gorbachev told his ambassador to East-Germany: “We support 
the GDR, but not at the cost of our interests in West Germany and Europe as a whole” 
(Quoted in Clay Large, 2001, pg 522). Eleven thousand people immediately took the 
opportunity to leave. Soon masses of East Germans followed: some left for Hungary via 
Czechoslovakia, whilst others headed for West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw 
(Fulbrook, 1990).  By the end of September 1989, the situation in the embassies reached 
crisis proportions. As Stokes argues: “Climbing over walls, sitting shoulder to shoulder in 
the garden, almost falling out of the windows, some thirty-five hundred of them had 
gathered by the end of the month”(Stokes, 1993, pg 137). Desperate to get rid of the 
problem, Honecker agreed to allow the refugees held up in the embassies to leave for 
West Germany, however, as an assertion of the GDR’s sovereignty, under the condition 
that they leave through East Germany on sealed trains where they would then be 
“expelled” for humanitarian reasons. Although the regime could temporarily restrain the 
continual wave of emigration by closing off its eastern borders on October 3rd, on the long 
run this mass flight initiated the downward spiral that led to the eventual collapse of the 
GDR. It had a profoundly negative psychological impact on the moral of both citizens and 
regime. It showed even more strongly that the wall was basically a symbol for a system 
that could only exist if it was closed off (Jarausch, 1994).  Societal organizations inside the 
GDR began to mushroom. The civic platform “Demokratie jetzt” began publicly demanding 
reform. On October 1st, the opposition group “Demokratischer Aufbruch” was formed, and 
the “Neues Forum” had applied to be officially registered as a public association. First 
divisions in the SED-leadership also became apparent. On September 12th, Günter 
Schabowski had demanded a public declaration of the party leadership in which the 
political and social problems be addressed. His demands were declined on the basis that 
such decisions could only be made while the First Secretary was present.  Erich Honecker 
to this time had been in the Hospital, and Egon Krenz on vacation (Sieren & Koehne, 
1991).  
 
These events which were unfolding in the summer months of 1989, resulted in a growing 
excitement of ever more open societal discussion and debate about the sense of crisis in 
the GDR (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 248). People were leaving the country daily, and people 
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showed up to work not knowing which of their colleagues had fled in the meantime or they 
were contemplating with their families whether they too should leave. As suggested by 
Fulbrook, this discussion on whether to leave or to stay prompted questions of what they 
could do to make the GDR a place in which people would be willing to stay, instead of 
simply leaving. Hence, there was no longer any possibility of containing public debate; of 
retaining the complicity of the niche society. Fulbrook argues that this was perhaps the 
crucial mobilizing factor (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 248). 
 
In the Meantime, ignoring the problems of his country, Honecker proceeded with plans to 
celebrate the GDR’s fortieth anniversary in October 1989. As argued by Stokes: “Of all the 
public celebrations that modern authoritarian states have forced on its people, none were 
as surrealistic as this fortieth anniversary. With his countrymen fleeing by the tens of 
thousands, the question of German unification peeking out from behind the rostrum, and 
political opposition swelling, the ailing Honecker paraded around East Berlin with a Soviet 
leader who told him ‘life punishes those who come too late”(Stokes, 1993, pg 139). This 
statement directly implied that if the GDR would not initiate instant reforms they would 
suffer the consequences. Additionally, Gorbachev told East Germans: “If you want 
democracy, take it and it will be yours” (Grieder, 2006, pg 167). For many demonstrators 
already shouting “Gorbi, Gorbi”, this was the final signal that the Soviet leadership was 
actually supporting a direct confrontation with the SED regime.  
 
On the streets the numbers of people demonstrating increased dramatically. On Monday 
October 9th, a mass demonstration of over 50,000 people was announced in Leipzig. Many 
feared that should the state attempt to intervene, the demonstration would become violent. 
That night, leaving the notorious Church of St. Nicholai in Leipzig, protestors met no 
resistance from the security services. No one was arrested, and the police allowed the 
marchers to pass. At this point it seems that the regime lost any remaining authority. 
Stokes suggests that it was the moment that the SED lost control of East Germany 
(Stokes, 1993). Argued by Clay Large (2001, pg 525) “at this point, their victory in the 
battle for Leipzig was a victory in the war for the future of Germany.” The events in Leipzig 
had shown to many that the security forces would not intervene, that the people were free 
to voice their opposition. As a result, no longer fearing state reprisals, crowds began 
gathering across more GDR cities.  
 
The consequence was revolution, not by an opposition but instead by “an entire people” 
(Stokes, 1993, pg 140). From this moment onwards one could also observe a change in 
the demands of the people. Fulbrook suggests that at the beginning, a growing number of 
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groups inside the GDR, the largest of which was Neues Forum, wanted to confront directly 
and overtly the problem of why so many East Germans wanted to leave, instead of simply 
attempting to prevent them from leaving. A main aspect of these early voices for reform 
was the rejection of the West German system, and the demand to create some form of 
“humane, non-Stalinist, truly democratic socialism” (Fulbrook, 1990, pg 242). The Neues 
Forum claimed it had no intention of becoming a political opposition. It simply wanted “a 
democratic dialogue about the tasks of the constitutional state, the economy, and of 
culture” (Quoted in Stokes, 1993, pg 139). After Gorbachev’s visit, however, and after the 
demonstrations of October 9th, the demands of the people seemed to change and no 
longer corresponded with the aims of the forming oppositional groups. Instead of chanting: 
“We are the people”, the slogan changed to “We are one people”, ultimately aiming at 
economical and political unification with the FRG, which meant the destruction of the very 
existence of the GDR. Additionally, the people increasingly made it clear that they did not 
simply desire to leave; instead they wanted to stay, engage in a dialogue with the regime 
and initiate change. Instead of chanting “Wir wollen raus” (“We want out”) the people 
increasingly chanted “Wir bleiben drin” (“We are staying here”). Other slogans included 
“Gorbi!... Neues Forum zulassen! Reiht euch ein!” (Gorbi!...Legal recognition for New 
Forum! Join with us!) (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 251). Additionally, a change in the demands of 
the emerging opposition groups could from that moment onwards be observed, now 
demanding an active role in the political process (Clay Large, 2001, pg 526). 
 
This meant that, different to the majority of intellectuals inside the GDR (predominately part 
of the moderate opposition members), which made up a vast number of opposition 
leaders, the majority of people on the streets did not simply want a truly democratic GDR 
on the basis of a socialist style market economy, which would eventually lead to prosperity. 
Instead, it seems, the majority of demonstrators wanted instant unification with the FRG, in 
the hope to receive instant prosperity. Slogans of the demonstrators including “Freie 
Wahlen – vereintes Deutschland” (Free elections – unified Germany) made this all the 
more evident. This lay in stark contrast to the appeal by the Neues Forum on November 
12th 1989:   
“Laßt euch nicht von den Forderungen nach einem politischen Neuaufbau der 
Gesellschaft ablenken! Ihr wurdet weder zum Bau der Mauer noch zu ihrer Öffnung 
befragt, laßt euch jetzt kein Sanierungskonzept aufdrängen, das uns zum Hinterhof 
und zur Billiglohnquelle des Westens macht! Laßt das Land nicht verhökern und 
euch nicht als Mietsklaven verdingen! 
Wir werden für längere Zeit arm bleiben, aber wir wollen keine Gesellschaft haben, 
in der Schieber und Ellenbogentypen den Rahm abschöpfen. Ihr seid die Helden 
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einer politischen Revolution, laßt euch jetzt nicht ruhigstellen durch Reisen und 
schuldenerhöhende Konsumspritzen!” (Aufruf Neues Forum 12 November 1989 
nach dem Mauerfall)  
 
It is therefore fair to conclude that while a majority of opposition elite (that is those present 
at the round table negotiations, but not the “block-parties”) were moderate opposition 
members, mostly even supporting the regimes desire to keep the GDR as a socialist state, 
the demonstrators on the streets were more extreme opposition members, wanting to do 
away with the SED, socialism and the very existence of the GDR. This became even more 
strongly apparent when in the beginning of 1990, a widespread demand of the 
demonstrators emerged which stated that either the West German D-Mark would come to 
them (meaning an economical unification with the FRG before a full unification took place), 
or that they would go to the D-Mark. It was clear to everyone that economic unification not 
only limited the GDR´s capability to find and implement a “third way” economy, but that in 
effect, it was only a small step away from full political unification. To be sure, these 
demands were enormously cultivated by remarks made by West-German politicians, most 
notably by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who promised “blühende Landschaften” (“blooming 
landscapes”) in the East.  
 
Overwhelmingly, the younger softline generation inside the SED, recognised that in order 
to prevent a complete loss of control, reforms had become inescapable. On October 18th, 
at a meeting of the Central Committee of the SED, Erich Honecker was replaced by Egon 
Krenz, who promised immediate reforms and thus initiated the “liberalization” phase. “In a 
frantic fortyfour days in office he fired Stalinists, visited Gorbachev, reshuffled both the 
Council of Ministers and his politburo, opened the Czech border, and generally beat a 
rapid retreat in a disorderly effort to stave off complete collapse” (Stokes, 1993, pg 140). 
The change in leadership, however, did not convince the majority of East Germans that the 
new SED regime would introduce meaningful reforms (Clay Large, 2001). For many, Krenz 
was not seen as a softline reformer, but instead as a continuation of the hardline fraction.  
 
Indeed, the change of government did not prevent an escalation of protest against the 
SED regime. The largest demonstration of the 1989 revolution occurred on November 4th 
at the “Alexanderplatz” in East Berlin, during which over 700,000 people participated, 
including a prominent amount of SED members. The demonstrations on the streets in 
November 1989 were also a turning point, as the unrest now swept through the entire 
country, even to the East German capital which up to then had remained relatively calm, 
under close control of the state’s security services.  
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It is important to note that the split in the elite (attributed to being one of the preconditions 
for a successful political transition as identified earlier) in the GDR apparently only came 
after the 40th anniversary of the GDR, which had been accompanied and followed by 
widespread popular unrest. Although there had been attempts by softline members within 
the politburo (by people such as Günter Schabowski) to soften the standpoint of the 
regime, these had largely been unsuccessful. So had the signs of discontent by regional 
softline party leaders, such as by the SED leader of Dresden and later GDR Prime Minister 
Hans Modrow, who had advocated an opening on the lines of Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and 
“perestroika”. Nonetheless, when the split became evident, it did have an influence on the 
inner and outer stability of the regime. Important was that the split became apparent to 
those close to the regime (therefore the block party nomeklatura as well as the media 
nomenklatura) before it became apparent to the ordinary citizens and the outside world.  
By October, however, by the latest with the replacement of Honecker, this then also 
became apparent to everyone. 
  
This split occurred in two ways: 
Firstly, it occurred within the SED-leadership. There existed widespread frustration at Erich 
Honecker’s resistance to reforms, his growing distance from – and unwillingness even to 
recognize – the mounting problems faced by the country, and his evident inability to deal 
with the refugee crisis. As argued by Fulbrook, this led to the internal coup against 
Honecker in October 1989 (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 259). Increasingly, Krenz and the group 
around him including Schabowski managed to take over control and they viewed 
themselves as a GDR-version of Gorbachev, believing that they could position themselves 
as reformers thus gaining public legitimacy. This strongly undermined the position of the 
hardline regime elite, and cultivated the process of the party’s loss of control.  For 
example, while Erich Honecker had instructed the security forces to act vigorously against 
the demonstrators, Manfred Gerlach argues that it was the “Appell der 6” (the plea of the 
6) on October 9th, which prevented the demonstrations from becoming violent (Gerlach, 
1991, pg 281). In this plea, leading softline SED politicians and moderate opposition 
leaders called for the demonstrations to remain peaceful. While the opposition leaders 
managed to keep the demonstrators at bay, Gerlach argues that it was the appeal of the 
SED members (which Krenz also supported) that influenced the security forces to remain 
calm. The statement of these clearly contradicted that of Honecker, and suggested the first 
public divisions within the party leadership.  The statement by party softliners facilitated the 
non-interference on the side of the security forces. This was also strengthened by a 
general demoralization among many SED-members. As argued by Batt “Key groups within 
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the East European communist elites were demoralized by the manifest failures of their 
period of rule and showed clear signs of losing the sense of purpose and discipline that the 
ideology had provided” (Batt, 1991, pg 4). Although not as strongly evident than in other 
Central and Eastern European countries, research for this dissertation suggests that the 
argument of Batt also became evident in parts of the East-German elite (especially the 
lower rank and file).  
 
Secondly, this split came as the Block parties increasingly stated their independence vis-à-
vis the SED doctrine. This began already before October 1989, but with growing pressure 
on the regime, marked most evidently by the replacement of Honecker, these open 
disagreements became increasingly intense. While until 1989, the “block-parties” 
completely followed the SED-line (bringing them the nickname “Blockflöte” (Flute), hinting 
that these “Block-parties” were playing in tune and under direction of the SED), as of 
October 1989, however, these parties began to assert their own positions and views. This 
became apparent for example, when while Krenz was still opposing the legalisation of the 
Neues Forum, the CDU leadership sent an open letter to the interior ministry demanding 
that the decision to prevent the formation of the group be revised, as this decision lacked 
legal reasons. This letter was also printed in the “Neue Zeit” (Neue Zeit, November 1st, 
1989, pg 1).  
 
For the majority of the people Egon Krenz did not really represent a credible alternative to 
the old system. Krenz, however, appeared to be the best compromise for the ailing SED-
leadership, especially between “hard”- and “softliners”. Other Politburo members, 
particularly Günter Schabowski, for the hardliners were far too reform orientated. On the 
other hand, someone like Mittag would have been far too “hardline” and close to Honecker 
to be an alternative for the “softliners” and the majority of the SED rank and file. Although 
Krenz agreed to the necessity of dialogue with the people in principle, his statements and 
actions appeared to be half-hearted at best. As argued by Pollack: “Krenz attempted to 
meet the demands of the population but at the same time to keep the reform process at 
bay” (Pollack, 2002, pg 319). Krenz wanted to create an image of change; thus while 
moving out of the comparably comfortable housing estate for the regime leadership at 
“Wandlitz”, together with the entire Politburo, he did nothing to seriously address why so 
many East-Germans were attempting to leave their country. Likewise, while articulating his 
willingness to enter a phase of democratic reforms, at the same time, he was not prepared 
to legitimize the Neues Forum. According to him, enough “democratic platforms” for 
societal discussion already existed in the state, therefore there was no need for a further 
one.   
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The biggest problem with the new leadership lay in the circumstance that they completely 
misread the demands of the people. Instead of addressing the problems inside the 
country, the regime believed that the removal of Erich Honecker as well as an introduction 
of limited reforms would be enough to bring the people away from the streets. However, 
this not only misread the mood on the streets, but the frantic actions of the regime, as 
shown by the replacement of Honecker, in many ways sent a wrong signal. As argued by 
Pollack, the removal of Honecker was a clear sign of weakness. “The protests did not 
spread until the system had shown its own vulnerability. New hopes concerning the 
reformability of the GDR were raised” (Pollack, 2002, pg 319).  
 
Increasingly, the Krenz leadership circle stood with its back to the wall.  Additionally, 
undoubtedly as a result of the apparent SED weakness, the opposition of the “Block-
parties” as mentioned above was becoming increasingly tougher in tone. Furthermore, 
while the palace coup intended to secure the power of the SED, the new leadership 
seemed to face increasing difficulty to retain this power within the party itself. As 
suggested by Fulbrook, certain political leaders in the provinces appeared to be in doubt 
on how best to continue (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 258). Thus, while the Krenz regime appeared 
to be allowing only a limited liberalization, there are indications that on local level there 
were more genuine SED impulses in the direction of real, tangible reforms. Thus, also for 
many SED regional leaders, the new SED leadership in Berlin was not softline enough. 
This was especially the case for the SED leadership in Leipzig but also in Dresden, where 
the SED leadership began discussion with the Group 20 (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 258). 
Although some of the aims behind this willingness to engage in dialogue may be 
questionable with hindsight, there seems to have been a clear effect on the snowballing 
process of mass mobilization. With the seemingly lowering of the risk, which this 
liberalization by the SED regime brought, ever more people found the courage to come out 
and demonstrate (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 258). This undoubtedly also had an effect on the 
previously state controlled societal organizations and block parties previously under SED 
control (including the media). As the central SED leadership was loosing its control over its 
own nomenklatura, and these were giving increasing liberties – for whatever combination 
of cynical or genuine motives – these organizations and parties could use the resulting rift 
within the ruling elite and pursue their own objectives.  
 
In an uncoordinated attempt to hold onto power, the SED introduced a number of 
emergency reforms.  On November 9th, the Krenz government drafted new travel 
regulations, which allowing East Germans to leave temporarily, was intended to prevent 
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them from leaving for good. The new draft regulations stated that all GDR citizens with 
valid passports could exit the country through any border. The wall, would temporarily stay 
in being. Considering that only around 4 million East Germans had a passport, these 
regulations looked better then they were. It could take months until one received a 
passport after applying.  That evening, the SED spokesman, Günter Schabowski, held a 
press conference announcing the new program. As Schabowski had not been present 
when the plan was drafted, he was uncertain about the exact details of the new 
regulations. This apparently led to him to making two important mistakes. The first one was 
that he stated that every citizen could cross, not mentioning the necessity of a passport. 
Secondly, when a journalist asked him as of when these new regulations came into effect, 
he replied Ab sofort - “immediately” (Carr, 1991, pg 397). When he was asked whether 
these new regulations would include East Berlin’s border with West Berlin, Schabowski 
replied “Exits can occur at all GDR/BRD border crossings, including Berlin-West” (Clay 
Large, 2001, pg 528). Egon Krenz had never intended the regulations to take effect 
immediately, however, now that it had been announced the regime had to follow through.  
 
As soon as these remarks were released, thousands of East Berliners began gathering at 
the checkpoints to West Berlin.  Initially, lacking clear instructions, the guards kept the 
border closed. Angry and confident that the government would not intervene by force, the 
people began chanting “Open the Gate! The wall must Go!” (Clay Large, 2001, pg 528). At 
a little after 20:00, the gates swung open, first at Bornholmer Strasse, then Sonnenallee, 
Invalidenstrasse and Check point Charlie. By midnight people began dancing on the Wall.  
 
The subsequent events seemed to receive an own momentum, and the SED now sought 
desperately not only to retain as much power as possible, but also the very existence of 
the GDR itself. The regime also increasingly lost any remaining illusions that they could 
still rely on the Soviet Union for support, even on the sensitive issue of upholding the 
GDR´s sovereignty (Gorbachev had previously always articulated that the question of the 
GDR sovereignty was not negotiable. As events in the GDR but also in the entire region 
were receiving an ever-greater impetus, it was becoming increasingly more obvious that 
he would not impose this issue at all cost).   
 
Additionally, as suggested by Stokes, the fall of the Berlin Wall came at a moment of 
internal uncertainty and further division within the SED. Immediately before the events of 
November 9-10th, the government of Willy Stolph had resigned as well as the entire 
politburo (Stokes, 1993). The central committee on November 10th stated: “a revolutionary 
movement has set in motion a process of serious upheaval” (Stokes, 1993, pg 181), and 
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the SED leadership now attempted to save the situation by introducing an “action 
programme” aimed at bringing democratization (with new democratic elections) and the 
erection of a market orientated socialist economy. A new cabinet was formed under the 
reform minded previous SED leader of Dresden, Hans Modrow, on November 13th. Egon 
Krenz resigned as chairman of the council of state (Staatsrat der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik) and the council on national defence. Manfred Gerlach, leader 
of the “Liberal democratic party” (LDPD), one of the block parties, took over as chairman of 
the council of state, thus becoming acting head of state. (In some respect this broke the 
leading role of the party before it was actually removed from the constitution in December). 
Krenz himself in theory retained control by remaining chairman of the SED. However, as 
the legitimacy of the old hardline guard was increasingly being questioned by the majority 
of the party members, and the position of head of state had no real power, Modrow de 
facto took over control in his constitutional role as Prime Minister.  
 
Faced with an imminent economic implosion, a massively growing erosion of party 
credibility, increasing social unrest and a continued emigration of its citizens (Clay Large, 
2001) the new government was faced with a situation where further, genuinely far reaching 
reforms (both political and economical) had become inevitable. Hans Modrow immediately 
promised free elections in the near future, and to prevent a clear mutiny, the “block-parties” 
as well as organizations previously strictly controlled by the SED, received permission to 
act independently. At this point, the regime formalised a process that had already been 
taking place. By giving the organisations the freedom to act independently before the 
regime lost all control, however, they at least managed to appear as acting instead of 
reacting, which though in reality they were. This step also affected the media’s 
independence and actions.   
 
Parliament, using secret ballots for the first time in its history, expelled Erich Honecker and 
the former Staatssicherheitsdienst (Stasi) Chief Erich Mielke, and state prosecutors began 
investigating whether to press charges against high ranking SED officials for corruption 
and miss-management. Honecker himself was under investigation for ordering border 
guards to kill people attempting to flee. In the hope to prevent further people leaving for 
good, the government stated that the new travel regulations would not be taken back 
(trying to counter fears in the population), and invited the opposition forces including 
“Neues Forum” and “Democracy now” to Round Table negotiations regarding the question 
of how to embark on the transition to a new multi-party system. It is important to highlight 
again, that although the participants of the Round Table began discussing the possibility of 
a “third way” –“socialism with a human face” - instead of the current system of the GDR or 
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re-unification with West Germany, the majority of East Germans on the streets increasingly 
demanded re-unification as soon as possible.  
 
As the weeks passed, it became clear that if the SED wanted to regain any support it had 
to break with the past more evidently. The Volkskammer on December 1st, agreed to 
remove the leading role of the party in the constitution and promised pluralism. In 
December 1989, during an extra-ordinary party congress, Egon Krenz was replaced as 
party Chairman by a relatively young charismatic SED member, Gregor Gysi, who 
transformed the party into the “Party of Democratic Socialism” (Partei des demokratischen 
Sozialismus or PDS).  Modrow, however, retained the dominant position as head of 
government and chief-negotiator with the opposition groups. For the majority of East 
Germans, however, the new leadership was nonetheless not able to or sufficiently 
prepared to distance themselves from the previous leadership.  
 
This for many was evident through the simple fact that although the leadership of the Stasi 
had been replaced and its name changed to the “Amt für nationale Sicherheit” in 
November 1989, its work and structures as such remained intact. The Stasi, though, stood 
directly for the old system and thus remained subject of considerable odium by the 
population. As suggested by Stokes  “The most direct target of public hatred was the Stasi” 
(Stokes, 1993, pg 182), as it was the most telling symbol of the regimes surveillance 
system, which had managed to corrupt and to terrorize the entire East-German society for 
decades. As a result, in December 1989, several incidences occurred where 
demonstrators stormed various Stasi offices. The first incident occurred on the night of 
December 4th, when the Stasi headquarters in Leipzig were stormed. It is today unclear 
whether these stormings were actually initiated by Stasi employees in order to facilitate the 
destruction of documents. Nonetheless, as a result of these public demonstrations of 
discontent against both the old Stasi and its successor organisation, the round table in 
December decided to dissolve it completely. The government placed the Stasi 
headquarters under strict surveillance, promising that no documents would be destroyed or 
carried away.  At the same time, state attorneys began securing and analysing the 
remaining documents.  
 
By February 1990, the government agreed to enter a coalition government with 8 
representatives of the opposition round table groups. Although these opposition members 
became “ministers without portfolio”, it was nevertheless an important step in the process 
of dissolving the party state. It was agreed that parliamentary elections were to be held in 
March 1990 (Thus completing the “liberalization” phase and initiating the Institutionalization 
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of democracy (democratization) phase). Although initially comprising over twenty political 
parties, five main parties emerged competing in the elections, which were largely polarized 
on either the centre-right or on the left.  For these the election was to be seen as “a 
referendum on unification” (Stokes, 1993, pg 184), the centre-right favouring quick 
unification while the left did not.  
 
The successful completion of the elections marked the end of the “democratization” phase 
as argued by Bos (2004). The result of the elections was a significant victory for the 
Christian democrats (CDU), receiving 44 per cent of the votes, while the Social democrats  
(SPD) received only 22 per cent and the Communists 16 per cent. For the CDU this 
outcome was a clear mandate for bringing unification, as the CDU had advocated 
unification, while the SPD and SED-PDS had opposed it (at least instant unification as to 
the position of the SPD). Initially, not wanting to support the CDU’s drive towards instant 
unification, after two month of negotiation, the SPD nevertheless agreed to enter a grand 
coalition favouring unification - representing a total of 75 per cent of votes - under the 
leadership of CDU Prime Minister Lothar de Maziere. The new government stated its goal 
was “to achieve the unity of Germany swiftly and responsibly for the whole of the German 
Democratic Republic….on the basis of Article 23 of the Basic Law” (Quoted in Stokes, 
1993, pg 185). 
 
Regime change in the GDR was therefore initiated by “revolution” or what von Beyme 
refers to as the “implosion of the communist regime” involving mass mobilization (von 
Beyme, 1996). Conditions for a “negotiated revolution” were simply not present in 1989, 
and the regime was forced by popular unrest to initiate reforms and to negotiate with the 
opposition forces. As argued by Batt, in the case of the GDR, the inflexible ruling elite was 
unprepared for negotiation, and collapsed facing the spontaneous mobilization of the 
population (Batt, 1991). 
 
 
3. The Media in transition 
 
Shortly before the beginning of the “Wende”, a GDR economist, Jürgen Kuczynski, stated:    
“Was das geistige Leben betrifft, so ist zu sagen: Vor allen Dingen fehlen der 
Meinungsstreit und die Kritik. Die öffentliche Diskussion von Widersprüchen ist 
aber die Voraussetzung darüber, sie zu lösen. Wenn wir uns unsere Presse von 
vor 40 Jahren ansehen, so war sie damals entschieden lebhafter und lebendiger 
als heute. Die Briefe, die gegenwärtig bei ganz seltenen Gelegenheiten abgedruckt 
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werden, sind langweilige Zustimmungen ohne eigene Überlegungen zum Problem” 
(Quoted in Holzweißig, 1990, pg 15).  
 
Holzweißig, however, argues that the situation described by Kuczynski changed in the 
middle of October 1989, when the GDR-Press began to undergo a state of transformation 
(Holzweißig, 1990, pg 15). This is also confirmed by the interview with Wolfgang Thierse 
While arguing that the GDR newspapers, especially the SED newspapers, until the end of 
the GDR were an insult for the intelligence and the need of truthfulness of even only 
slightly critical people, by the autumn of 1989 –albeit far too late – Thierse states that this 
changed. “Die Tageszeitungen, vor allem die SED-Zeitungen (z.B. “Neues Deutschland”, 
“Berliner Zeitung”) waren eine Beleidigung für die Intelligenz und das 
Wahrhaftigkeitsbedürfnis von auch nur einigermaßen kritischen Menschen. Das war bis 
zum Schluss der DDR so. Erst im Herbst 1989, also viel zu spät, begann sich etwas zu 
ändern.” (Interview Thierse, 14.4.2008). If these arguments holds true – which the 
research of this dissertation confirms - how then, did this transformation occur? 
 
Following the mass exodus of GDR citizens via Hungary and the FRG embassies in 
Prague and Warsaw as well as the tumultuous events on the streets in October of 1989, it 
became obvious that the regime was no longer in control of the events and could no longer 
exert as much influence on the institutions and organisations up to then strictly under party 
control. These included the “block-parties”, but also the various media. Kutsch (1990) for 
example points to the fact that the “recommendations” of the Central Committee’s 
“Agitation and Propaganda” department, which had always been sent to the chief editors 
office, no longer existed even during the final days of Honecker.  
 
This is confirmed by the interview with Michael Müller, deputy- editor of the “Neues 
Deutschland” in 1989 (Interview, Müller, 2005, pg 4). According to him, these clear 
“instructions” or “recommendations” by the politburo stopped after October 7th, 1989.  
Every Thursday a meeting took place in the Central Committee in the department 
“Agitation and Propaganda” which stood under the leadership of Joachim Herrmann. There 
the journalists were told what had been decided during the politburo meetings on 
Tuesdays and during the General-secretary meetings on Wednesdays, and were told what 
to write. On the first two meetings following the October 7th demonstrations - therefore on 
Thursday October 12th and October 19th - as a consequence of the pressure on the regime 
resulting from the events on the streets, no “clear instructions” were issued anymore as the 
leadership recognized that a change in regime actions had become necessary. As 
remembered by Müller: “Da war deutlich festzustellen, dass es unter dem Druck der 
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Ereignisse keine Anweisungen in diesem Sinne mehr gab, sondern dass man schon 
gemerkt hat, wir müssen ganz anders regieren, wir müssen aufgeschlossen den Leuten 
gegenüber sein. Ich kann mich nicht erinnern, dass bei solchen Zusammenkünften 
Diskussionen aufkamen. Die Beteiligten dort haben sich das angehört und kaum eine 
Frage gestellt. Kurzum, ich glaube, das ist schon in diesen 14 Tagen danach so erodiert” 
(Interview, Müller, 1995, pg 4) He continues by arguing that the conclusion that the regime 
was eroding was obvious to the entire media nomenklatura by that time: “Wir kannten uns 
ja alle, die Leitungskader damals, durch Telefonate. Also da war schon deutlich zu spüren, 
dass das System einen Knacks bekommen hat, und dass das offensichtlich auch nicht 
mehr zu kippen gewesen ist in alter Weise” (Interview, Müller, 1995, pg 4).  
 
Initially, in the early summer months of 1989, the media faced the problem that on the one 
hand, officially the demonstrations did not exist. How could they write on something that 
did not exist? On the other hand, the developments and especially the mass exodus of 
GDR citizens brought a growing ferment of open discussion, and there was no longer any 
possibility of repressing public debate. This in many ways forced the media to openly say 
the obvious. As suggested by Fulbrook: “the binding spell of mutual complicity in mass 
deceit began to be broken” (Fulbrook, 1995, pg 247). This was also suggested when in the 
middle of October 1989, before the replacement of Erich Honecker, even the state owned 
and closely controlled ADN news agency finally began to cover the protest marches 
(Kutsch, 1990, pg 9).  
 
After the fall of Honecker, the independence of the Media became even more fervent, as 
remembered by Wolfgang Spickermann, who became Chief-Editor of the “Neues 
Deutschland” in November 1989.  Spickermann argues that after the fall of Honecker, 
when he suddenly became acting chief-editor, he also suddenly no longer had to ask 
permission for anything from the party leadership any more (something his predecessor 
still had to): “Ich habe als Chefredakteur nie einen gefragt. Schlagartig” (Interview 
Spickermann, 1995, pg 3).  The SED leadership was in a state of turmoil and therefore 
simply no longer able to concentrate efforts on these processes. The consequence, as 
remembered by Spickermann, was a time of vacuity “Vakuumzeit” (Interview Spickermann, 
1995, pg 3). Müller remembers that in the newspaper the same happened as in the state. 
When the leadership began to loose control, the people began organising themselves new 
in the state. This was also the case for newspapers as such, where no more dialogue 
partners were present: “…Es trat eigentlich der gleiche Effekt ein wie im Staat. Als das 
plötzlich oben wegbrach, passierte das gleiche beim ND. So wie die Leute angefangen 
haben, sich im Staat neu zu organisieren lief es auch beim ND – es fehlten ja 
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Ansprechpartner” (Interview Müller, 1995, pg 3).  
 
These developments had an enormous influence on the media. The editors and journalists 
felt that something was about to change even before this came home to the majority of the 
GDR´s citizens. This created a certain vacuity that enabled journalists to act more freely. 
Especially the younger rank and file journalists of the socialist media system while mostly 
being “socialists” (predominately softline members), nevertheless believed in a more 
humane form of socialism than had been implemented under Erich Honecker and was 
surely also visible in the person and actions of Egon Krenz. Additionally, the journalists of 
the block-party’s media, who - as previously identified - had never been fervent 
communists to begin with, also sensing that the system was changing, began to openly 
change their alliance with the SED.  While they had remained in tune with the SED stance 
until now, believing that the system was here to stay for a considerable time, once this was 
no longer the case, these journalists began to act in the way in which they had seemingly 
always wanted to. While some did not oppose the socialist system per se, others wanted a 
system similar to the one of the FRG or even unification, but most opposed the current 
socialist system and the SED leadership.  
 
As a result, the individual journalists began scratching on the limits imposed. As 
remembered by Rainer Höhling, the journalists began testing how far they could go, what 
would still be published: “Es war schon so, dass man anfing auszutesten wie weit konnte 
man gehen, was wurde noch abgedruckt”. (Interview Höhling, 26.2.2006).   An increase in 
regime critical reporting could subsequently be noticed in the official block party media. On 
October 11th for example, the newspaper “Neue Zeit” shortened an ADN-release 
containing a Statement by the SED leadership about the demonstrations during the GDR´s 
anniversary celebration.  With this step the newspaper clearly broke on a previous taboo, 
as the newspapers –as a form of self-censorship- up to then had never cut or changed any 
ADN-release.  The original text stated: “Wahr ist, dass Randalierer, aufgeputschte Störer 
und kriminelle Elemente staatsfeindliche Parolen riefen und die im Ordnungseinsatz 
befindlichen Volkspolizisten tätlich angriffen. Sie warfen mit Steinen, Flaschen und 
Brandsätzen, schlugen brutal und rücksichtslos mit Stahlstangen und anderen 
Schlaggegenständen auf die Ordnungskräfte”  (Neues Deutschland, October 11th 1989). 
The “Neue Zeit” changed this to: “Die im Ordnungseinsatz befindlichen Volkspolizisten 
seien tätlich angegriffen, mit Steinen, Flaschen und Brandsätzen beworfen worden” (Neue 
Zeit, October 11th 1989). In comparison, it is important to note, that the “Neues 
Deutschland” printed the complete ADN release on October 11th, on page 2.  
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Overwhelmingly, a change began to become visible among all journalists. Even the ADN- 
employees, overwhelmingly pro-socialist, SED members, could no longer identify with the 
statements made by the SED leadership. They made clear that they would no longer 
release statements in which the demonstrators would be referred to as  “Randalierer” – 
“rioters” (Kutsch, 1990), and as mentioned even began covering the demonstrations. It is 
not to be forgotten that this took place while the old guard was still in place, while for the 
majority of the citizens it was by no way clear that the moment of change had indeed finally 
come.  
 
It is important to note that not only were the journalists the first to notice that something 
was changing inside the regime, but they were also the first to notice changes around the 
soviet bloc. The GDR had an extensive network of correspondents around the socialist 
states, and these communicated events and processes back to their colleagues. Even the 
smallest events or reforms – even those not communicated by the Western Press – were 
subsequently reverberated into the editorial offices of the GDR’s media.   
 
The overall policy of the new SED regime under Krenz followed the position of allowing a 
limited media liberalization. While on the one hand, the new elite wanted to appear as a 
modernizing power, in which the mistakes of the past should be addressed and the people 
responsible for these wrongdoings punished, on the other hand, this process should not go 
too far. The institutionalized leadership of the SED in the GDR as well as the existence of 
the GDR as a socialist state should remain unquestioned. Through an increase in 
transparency and a more open information flow about previously secret politburo and 
central committee meetings, the lower party rank and file as well as the citizens should be 
appeased (Kutsch, 1990). With hindsight, these liberalization measures in turn set free 
further mobilization effects on the entire media system. 
 
Although the Krenz leadership and later the de facto leader Modrow promised to allow 
media independence, the SED was in reality reluctant to give up its control over 
communication means, wanting to retain party priority (Robinson, 1995). This is also 
suggested by a speech in which Schabowski, while stating that the time of the SED giving 
detailed instructions to the media and in effect administrating them was over, at the same 
time, he continues to place them within the SED party system by stating that instead, these 
comrade communists must now act independently on the basis of the party decisions:  “An 
die Stelle des Anweisens, des Administrierens, des detaillierten Vorkauens, wann, wo, in 
welcher Schrifttype und mit welcher Stimmlage Meldungen zu bringen sind, tritt das 
eigenschöpferische, selbstverantwortliche Handeln der Genossen Kommunisten auf der 
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Grundlage der Parteibeschlüsse” (Neues Deutschland, November 11/12th 1989, quoted in 
Holzweißig, 1990, pg 33).  
 
However, under pressure by the “Round Table” talks, and from the increasingly 
autonomous “block-parties”, democratization of the print Media occurred in reluctant 
stages between October 1989 and the March 1990 elections. Additionally, questions of 
party ownership and the heavy financial burden of having to subsidise such a vast amount 
of newspapers enhanced this process (it is estimated that in 1989, the number of 
employees dependent on state salaries in the print media exceeded 35 000)(Knabe, 2008, 
pg 64).  Party control over the media had always been ensured through financial control. 
This financial control, however, proved an enormous burden and by the end of 1989 one 
that the state could simply no longer take.  
 
Generally, the media system witnessed an overall liberalization and was subject to reform 
as of October 1989, as hardline decision makers were increasingly replaced with softline 
members. At institutional level the top “nomeklatura” members were replaced. Together 
with Honecker the Central Committee’s secretary for “Agitation and Propaganda”, Joachim 
Herrmann, was replaced by the former journalist Günter Schabowski, member of the 
politburo and SED leader of Berlin. Schabowski had already once replaced Herrmann, 
namely in 1978 when he took over the position as Chief-editor of the “Neues Deutschland”. 
During the Central Committee meeting at the beginning of November, Schabowski 
criticised the strict control of the media by his predecessor. Additionally, he replaced the 
head of the “Presseamtes des Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates” with Wolfgang Meyer, and 
changed the name of the department itself to “Presse- und Informationsdienstes der 
Regierung der DDR”. At the End of November, Meyer publicly declared that Radio, TV and 
the ADN were no longer bound to the SED (Holzweißig, 1990, pg 18). A report put 
together by Members and Secretaries of the politburo of the former Central Committee in 
December 1989, strongly criticised the media policies of Honecker and Hermann. It labels 
Hermann a compliant executer of Honecker’s instructions, stating that the creativity of 
journalists was prevented and that through the “press-office” of the government – which in 
reality was the extended arm of the department agitation and propaganda – the block party 
media were directly controlled (Holzweißig, 1990, pg 34). All Chief-editors of the 17 SED-
newspapers left their positions between November 1989 to the middle of January 1990 
(Holzweißig, 1990).  
 
In the “Neues Deutschland”, this change occurred as following the replacement of 
Honecker, the Chief Editor of the newspaper, Herbert Naumann, simply no longer showed 
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up. Initially, Schabowski wanted to make the former assistant of Naumann, Harald Wessel, 
Chief-Editor. After heavy debate and open confrontation with the employees of the “Neues 
Deutschland” he was forced to agree to let them decide themselves who new Chief-Editor 
should be, who in turn decided on Spickermann. Schabowski and Krenz then reluctantly 
accepted this. This not only made a reform orientated person head of the paper, but also 
suggested just how much more self-confident and independent the journalists were acting 
towards the SED, which still remained the paper owner.   
 
Before Spickermann was officially made the Chief-editor, it seems that the “Neues 
Deutschland” was split between hardliners and softliners, although the majority of the 
media employees seem to have supported a softline position. Both, however, fought for 
their articles to be printed. The interviews suggest that once the position of the regime’s 
old guard was being increasingly eroded, the position also of the hardline fraction within 
the SED media were being increasingly eroded. This was then formalised when 
Spickermann formally became Chief-Editor, who clearly supported the reform elements 
within the party (indeed, he was apparently even too reform minded for Schabowski). The 
paper (as will be described later) then enormously supported the internal democratization 
process of the SED, calling for a more detailed investigation of corruption incidences and 
the misuse of powers of high-ranking party members.  Additionally, the paper (as of the 
end of November / beginning of December) increasingly came to foster a replacement of 
Egon Krenz.  
 
In the Organs of the “block-parties”, much was changing as well. The Chief-Editor of the 
“Neue Zeit” left and the paper no longer appeared as the central organ of the CDU but 
rather as the daily newspaper of the CDU “Tageszeitung der Christlich-Demokratischen 
Union Deutschlands”, as of February 8th, 1990. As the interview with the CDU-
parliamentarian Arnold Vaatz suggests (Interview 7.5.2008), inside the CDU party paper of 
Dresden, “Die Union”, an internal putsch of the editors against the Chief-Editor was taking 
place in an attempt to bring an internal liberalisation. These editors were very regime 
critical and had already supported the publication of the “Victor Klemperer” diaries.  
 
The end of the leading role of the SED in the constitution as well as the personnel changes 
within the party increased the medias possibility to break free from SED influence. The 
new party leader Gregor Gysi in December advocated more pluralism and brought forward 
recommendations for the creation of a  “Media Control Commission (Kutsch, 1990). 
Indeed, the creation of this commission consisting of 24 Experts, made up of the “Round 
Table” participants (Robinson, 1990), was an important step in allowing a greater media 
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pluralism.  This Commission subsequently set the rules for “Media autonomy” and for a 
balanced election campaign and media access for all parties participating in the elections 
(Kutsch, 1990). The content analysis of this dissertation, however, suggests that this was 
not picked up by the respective newspapers. The election as such was barely visible in the 
“Neues Deutschland” (only indirectly advocating the position of the SED-PDS, but not in 
form of political ads) and the “Neue Zeit” appeared to follow the CDU’s stance of 
unification. 
 
The influence of the block parties over their own media – as established previously – came 
to have a strong effect in the way the media bean reporting.  Especially the CDU 
“Christlich-Demokratische Union” and the LDPD “Liberaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands“, represented a middle class thinking, and in 1989 soon came to position 
themselves for a post-socialist, truly multi-party system. The media of these respective 
parties were – although at the beggining cautious – nevertheles instructed directly to begin 
a critical stance vis-à-vis not only the past (as was the case for the SED newspapers) but 
also on the system as such, and to break on previous taboo topics. Manfred Gerlach, head 
of the LDPD, argues that he encouraged his Chief-editors to print critical articles and 
commentaries and to refer to him should the SED regime complain or attempt to intervene 
(Gerlach, 1991, pg 167-170).  Additionally, these party leaders used their media as a 
platform to make the own views public, often through commentaries or with the publication 
of open letters.  
 
At the same time, the journalists working for these respective newspapers finally felt 
liberated to act freely. Many, although being children of the system and not necessarily 
wanting to do away with a socialist state as such, at the same time believed that reform of 
the system was necessary. The media of the block parties were thus split into two groups, 
as were the block parties as such: Hardliners (supporting the SED) and softliners (indeed, 
this was also the case in the SED papers). As suggested by Vaatz (Interview, Vaatz, 
7.5.2008), as the events were unfolding within the GDR, the journalists were left with a 
dilemma: the events that were occurring were an absolute novelty, and the initial response 
of the regime was to publicly ignore them and to say nothing was happening. Therefore, as 
argued before, how could the media report on something that was not happening? The 
editorial offices of the block parties were left perplexed and did not really know how to 
respond. They witnessed what was happening, spoke to demonstrators and some 
journalists supported their demands, however, the politburo told them to ignore the events.  
 
At the same time, a certain vacuity was evolving as the regime was too distracted to 
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continue its mechanisms of media control. Vaatz argues that out of this perplexity and the 
increasing vacuity existing, some critical journalists became the mouthpiece of the 
opposition against the SED, while others remained on track with the SED-stance. Vaatz 
argues that inside the newspaper “Die Union” in Dresden, this led to supporters as well as 
opposition voices to be heard, as the editorial office was in disagreement. The newspaper 
therefore began reporting on something, which according to the regime, did not exist. This 
was largely the case for most “block-party” media. More and more, however, as the 
hardline media nomeklatura inside the block party media were being replaced with 
journalists favouring some form of change, the tone of the newspapers became 
progressively more critical, increasingly becoming the platform of the opposition groups.  
 
As suggested by the interviews for this dissertation, a two-way relationship between the 
media and the “block-party” leadership emerged. On the one hand, it was in the interest of 
the increasingly independent block parties to have their media de-legitimise the SED-
regime, and thus they began to instruct their media to report more critically or used the 
media to make their own messages public. On the other hand, as argued by Vaatz 
(Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008), it was the critical journalists of the Block parties who at times 
fostered change within the respective block parties, and thus initiated or at least supported 
an internal party democratization process. As suggested by Vaatz, “Die Union” for 
example, increasingly became the mouthpiece of the emancipation of the party vis-à-vis 
the SED, directly supporting those within the party who wanted to break free from the SED 
dominance as well as demanding change. Additionally, the increasing demands by the 
“block-party” media as well as the demands by the emerging opposition groups that could 
use the “block-party” media (especially those of the LDPD and the CDU) as a platform, put 
further pressure on the regime. As argued by Arnold Vaatz, it gave the opposition a 
logistical power to organize and mobilize against the regime and for their aims (Interview 
Vaatz, 7.5.2008).  
 
 
4. From state financing to market environment: the consequences of the new 
economic working reality  
 
A dominating theme of the period 1989/1990 was a change in the working mode of the 
East-German newspapers. As the party-system was falling apart, so was the way the 
newspapers worked economically. The party-state could simply no longer finance this vast 
media-empire, especially as the legitimacy of their own assets were being questioned. As 
a result, very soon the first employees either resigned or were laid off. This occurred in 
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various stages between 1989-1990. The first stage was that several journalists left their 
jobs starting (often as freelancers) for West-German publishing houses, believing that 
East-German newspapers soon would no longer have an economic foundation with which 
they could survive (Interview Bötcher, 19.3.2008). This came as the circulation of the 
newspapers were beginning to decline, and as the state subsidies were dropping. In 1989, 
the “Neues Deutschland” had a circulation of approx. 1,1 million copies. By April 1990, 
when the official subsidies for the paper were completely scraped (the subsidies were 
gradually declining since 1989), the paper had a remaining circulation of 400,000. (By the 
autumn of 1990 this fell to 130.000) (Interview Spickermann, 1995, pg 7). In May 1990, the 
state subsidies stopped as all newspapers (with the exception of a few SED-papers) were 
placed in a trust, which henceforth managed the newspapers. It was originally the plan that 
the good going papers should be sold, and that these earnings would then be used to 
restructure those papers that were less attractive.  
 
Although the majority of papers were sold to West-German publishing houses, not enough 
money was made in order to save the especially smaller GDR newspapers. As argued by 
Höhling (Interview, 26.02.2008), there existed a general feeling that everything in the GDR 
was of bad quality and worthless, as a result of which most newspapers were sold for 
symbolic prices. Although surely much was outdated and needed to be renewed, with 
hindsight, not everything was as bad as then argued.  The West-German publishing 
houses bought the GDR press with the idea of keeping the traditional readers and 
structures. These publishing houses invested a great amount of money, especially in order 
to strengthen the infrastructure and did not immediately demand that the papers become 
profitable (Interview Dr. Zimmermann, 18.3.2008).  
 
Nonetheless, a certain degree of fear unfolded among the journalists, seeing the closure of 
the first newspapers, as well as an initial albeit small layoff of several journalists. 
Additionally, by the beginning of 1990 it was not yet clear which newspapers could be sold 
off, and what the intentions of the investors were.  Thus, step-by-step a commercial 
thinking was unfolding across the GDR’s media-landscape, one which increased the 
reporting on political scandals, in the hope that this would boost sales. As remembered by 
Elke Bötcher, a commercialization in the GDR´s press landscape unfolded very quickly 
following the fall of the wall. As soon as the first western newspapers were for sale in East-
Germany, the circulation of the GDR newspapers drastically fell (Interview, Bötcher, 
18.3.2008). This was only somewhat held at pace by the circumstance that many East-
German readers held subscriptions of GDR newspapers, which could not be cancelled 
immediately.  This commercial thinking was, however, further strengthened once the 
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newspapers were sold off, as most Chief-editors and managers installed by the West-
German buyers came from the west and brought in the western economic logic. This was 
also remembered by Wolfgang Thierse, who argues that with the acquisition of the GDR 
press by western investors, a commercialization of the press immediately became 
apparent (Interview, Thierse 14.4.2008). This commercialization began to follow the logic 
of writing what sells, and this thinking thus influenced the topic selection of the 
newspapers.  
 
It therefore seems fair to conclude, that the presumption of this dissertation mentioned 
previously, namely that the changing economic realities influenced the media output of the 
newspapers, therefore indeed holds true for the GDR.  
 
 
5. Comparing the respective GDR newspapers of research 
 
The comparison between the “Neues Deutschland” and the “Neue Zeit” suggests that the 
East-German media remained the mouthpiece of the regime until fairly late during the time 
of analysis, namely until the replacement of Honecker in October 1989.  
 
This chapter will begin by portraying the results of the quantitative analysis, as described in 
the chapter “Content analysis design”. It portrays which topics were identified by the key 
word search as topics being discussed by the respective newspapers during which time of 
the research period. In a second stage the qualitative findings (the qualitative analysis 
representing a greater focus in comparison to the quantitative analysis) will be presented.  
 
It seems important to highlight again, that as the content analysis did not analyse all 
printed newspaper issues, it could be that the respective newspapers did indeed cover 
topics relevant for the content analysis questions, but that these were therefore not 
identified. The findings presented underneath are the findings of the analysis as conducted 
according to the weekly random sampling as well as specific analysis during dates of the 
events as well as for a case varying daily period after the events had taken place, as 






5.1. Quantitative analysis 
 
As already stated, the research time (May 1989 until March 1990) was divided into half-
months (15-16 day time frame). For the recording of the quantitative analysis, it was 
important that the respective paper covered the topic (as selected and identified in the 
chapter “Content analysis design”) at all within the given 15-16-day time frame (either as 
an own article / commentary or by a foreign source). Thus, even if only one small article 
was printed, this was recorded. The recording was made through an “x” for the respective 
newspaper in the particular timeframe; a red “X” indicating that the respective topic was 
covered by the “Neues Deutschland”, a blue “X” indicating that it was covered by the 
“Neue Zeit”. This went for the random weekly sample search (always Wednesdays), as 
well as for those topics, where daily samples were taken during case varying time periods 
(as described in the chapter “Content analysis design”). The recordings therefore do not 
suggest the frequency of the respective topics within each sample 15-16 day time period. 
N.B. the recordings only show topics that occurred following the predefined words and 
phrases: thus, certain further dominant topics existed; however, these were not recorded, 
as they did not match the predefined words set. No importance was given to length or 
prominence in the quantitative analysis, as this was then done in the qualitative part.  
 
 
5.1.1. Quantitative analysis findings 
 
The recordings of the pre-selected topics of the quantitative content analysis for the 
“Neues Deutschland” and the “Neue Zeit” as identified during the keyword sample search 
can be found in Appendix 1. Below, a comparison between the findings in form of a bar 
graph can be found. This bar graph directly compares the number of times each specific 









5.1.2. Quantitative analysis comparisons 
 
The election of May 1989 is subject to considerable coverage in both newspapers during 
the first half of May; the quantitative analysis found no more articles on the topic thereafter, 
during the sample time of research. As to the topic concerning negative reporting on the 
May 1989 election (questioning the correctness of the results, or even referring to an 
election fraud), the content analysis found diverging results as to the two newspapers: in 
the “Neue Zeit” articles dealing with the elections critically could be identified twice within 
the given time frame: namely articles during the first and the second half of November 
1989. No articles to this topic could be identified in the “Neues Deutschland” within the 
entire timeframe. As to the topic of calling for new elections, the first example in the “Neue 
Zeit” was identified as of the first half of November 1989 and the last during the first half of 
December; in the “Neues Deutschland” the topic was only covered during the first half of 
December 1989.  
 
As to the question of addressing scandals of the past, the “Neues Deutschland” begins 
covering these before the “Neue Zeit” does so: during the second half of October in the 
former, and as of the second half of November in the latter. Both papers, however, cover 
the issue of the “Wandlitz” housing estate during the second half of November and the first 
half of December 1989. The issue of the misuse of powers by prominent SED members is 
covered in the “Neues Deutschland” more often than in the “Neue Zeit”. In the former the 
topic is covered as of the second half of November and continues to do so until the second 
half of December 1989.  In the “Neue Zeit” examples on this topic could also be found 
during the second half of November 1989, but then only again during the first half of 
January 1990.  
 
As to the issue of the party exclusions of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke, both 
newspapers of research cover the topic during the first half of December 1989: thereafter 
no more articles on the topic were found in the “Neue Zeit”, while the “Neues Deutschland” 
addresses the issue again during the first half of January 1990. 
 
Nonetheless, although the “Neue Zeit” begins addressing scandals and mistakes of the 
past fairly late in comparison to the “Neues Deutschland”, on the other hand, the paper 
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begins addressing important issues of the present more strongly. For example, it begins a 
balanced reporting on the demonstrations inside the GDR before this is the case in the 
“Neues Deutschland”; as of the first half of October 1989 in the “Neue Zeit”, and as of the 
second half of October in the “Neues Deutschland”. In the “Neue Zeit” further examples of 
balanced reporting on the demonstrations could additionally be identified during the 
second half of October as well as the second half of November 1989; in the Neues 
Deutschland” in comparison a balanced reporting was limited to the sample time period of 
the second half of October.  
 
Furthermore, the “Neue Zeit” begins to attack the current work of the SED as of the second 
half of October, as well as during the second half of November, the first half of December 
1989 as well as during the first half of January 1990. Therefore, the issue receives 
attention well before this is addressed in the “Neues Deutschland”. In the “Neues 
Deutschland” this is only addressed in one sample time period, namely during the first half 
of December.  This suggests, that while the “Neues Deutschland” was concentrating on 
mistakes of the past, the “Neue Zeit” was addressing issues for a de-legitimation of the 
current SED leadership: thus confirming the findings of the background research and 
interviews. Both newspapers, however, begin to discuss the issue of the leading role of the 
SED as of the first half of November 1989.  
 
All in all the “Neue Zeit” seems to address critical issues before this is done so in the 
“Neues Deutschland”. However, the quantitative content analysis also suggests that the 
paper remained on the SED-stance until the first half of October 1989. The paper only 
began to oppose the status quo, to begin a more balanced reporting, once the regime was 
increasingly standing with its back to the wall. This then increased in tone once the 
regime’s grip on power eroded even further.  For example, when the GDR closed its 
borders with Czechoslovakia on October 3rd 1989 in order to prevent further citizens from 
fleeing the country, both papers covered the issue remaining on party line.  
 
This is suggested further in relation to offering a positive picture of political transformation 
in the Soviet bloc (where it is already a topic as of the second half of May in the “Neues 
Deutschland”, while it is only addressed in the “Neue Zeit” as of the first half of July), as 
well as the issue of addressing the need of a renewal of society / new realities / reforms / 
the need of dialogue (where it is already addressed as of the first half of August 1989, 
while in the “Neue Zeit” the topic is only identified as of the second half of October 1989.) 
This therefore confirms the findings of the interviews as well as those of the qualitative 
analysis (see below), namely that the “Neue Zeit” remained the mouthpiece of the regime 
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until October 1989, but then quickly changed, beginning to address critical and relevant 
issues for the transformation process. In this, the “Neue Zeit” becomes a platform for the 
introduction of opposition groups, parties and people as of the second half of October and 
remains so steadily unit the first half of March 1990 (during eight sample time periods in 
the “Neue Zeit”). The “Neues Deutschland” on the other hand, seldom becomes a platform 
for oppositional groups; during only two sample time periods, namely during the second 
half of December 1989 as well as during the second half of February 1990.  
 
Additionally it seems, that this platform examples in the “Neues Deutschland” only come in 
combination with negative voices concerning the question of unification with the FRG. As 
to direct negative articles dealing with a possible political unification with the West, the first 
article could be identified in the “Neue Deutschland” during the second half of December 
1989; while the first article on the same topic was only found during the first half of January 
1990. Although the “Neue Zeit” does have more sample time periods that write negatively 
about a possible political unification with the West (during three sample times periods in 
the “Neue Zeit” compared to two sample time periods in the “Neues Deutschland), the 
overall picture seems to be more balanced in comparison to the “Neues Deutschland”. For 
example, this content analysis found no neutral or positive articles as to a possible 
unification in the “Neues Deutschland”, while in the “Neue Zeit” these topics were covered 
often: from the first half of January 1990 until the first half of March 1990 continuously on 
neutral articles on unification, as well as from the second half of January until the first half 
of March 1990 continuously on positive articles on the topic. The same goes for articles 
relating to the possibility of a currency unification. While the “Neues Deutschland” has 
negative articles on this issue continuously from the second half of January  until the first 
half of March 1990, the “Neue Zeit” has no negative articles on this topic at all. Rather, the 
latter has neutral articles on the topic during the identical sample time periods, whereas 
the “Neues Deutschland” has no neutral articles.  
 
Indeed, while the “Neue Zeit” comes to articulate issues relevant for the imminent 
transformation process, the “Neues Deutschland” appears to cover issues relevant for the 
securing of power of the SED. When articles appear criticising the current work of the party 
leadership, these usually come with articles asking to give the reformed SED a second 
chance in the same issue, or to argue in favour of a “third way” rather than unification with 
the west. While the “Neues Deutschland” argues to give a reformed SED as second 
chance during the second half of November 1989, the first half of December 1989 as well 
as during the first half of March 1990, no such example could be identified in the “Neue 
Zeit”. As to the issue of a “third way”, although the “Neue Zeit” does argue for the cause 
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during the first half of December 1989 as well as during the first half of January 1990, 
examples in the “Neues Deutschland” could be identified more often; namely, from the 
second half of November until the second half of December 1989, as well as from the 
second half of January until the first half of February 1990. This again supports the picture 
of a more balanced reporting on part of the “Neue Zeit”. 
 
Similar goes for the issue of economic reform. While the “Neue Zeit” begins to publish 
different voices for and about economic reform (no ADN or government releases) already 
as of the second half of October 1989, this is done so in the “Neues Deutschland” only as 
of the second half of November. And again these articles in the latter seem to come in 
combination with articles opposing a currency unification with the FRG, or arguing for a 
“third way”.   
 
As to the issue of addressing the leading role of the SED, this is addressed by both during 
the first half of November 1989, lasting continuously until the first half of December 1989 in 
the “Neue Zeit”; and until the second half of November in the “Neues Deutschland”. 
Additionally, the former criticises during the first half of January 1990 that steps to limit this 
leading role - as agreed to during the round table negotiations - were not being sufficiently 
implemented.  
 
As to setting an agenda for issues important to society, the “Neue Zeit” also appears to 
have a stronger role according to this content analysis findings. An example here is the 
problem of right-wing tendencies inside the GDR, something that the “Neue Zeit” already 
addresses during the first half of November 1989, while the “Neues Deutschland” only 
comes to address the issue as of the first half of December. Overall, the former addresses 
the issue during four sample time periods, while the latter does so only in three. 
 
The only exception to this appears to be the issue of addressing the issue of property 
expropriations in the GDR and compensation for current and former owners. Here, this 
analysis found that the “Neues Deutschland” began to address the issue during the first 








5.2. Qualitative analysis 
 
The interviews as well as the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analysis suggest 
that a clear change occurred in the GDR´s media landscape after the demonstrations of 
October 1989, and especially following the resignation of Erich Honecker in the same 
month. It therefore makes sense to divide the analysis in what was covered before and 
after the resignation of Honecker in October 1989.  
 
The only content analysis focus question before the replacement of Honecker is the 
question of the elections of May 1989. In both newspapers this was covered completely 
favourable to the regime. There is not even a suggestion that anyone doubted the high 
result or claimed any election-fraud. This although a number of activists – including pastor 
Rainer Eppelmann in Berlin – handed in a criminal complaint regarding election fraud, 
knowing that the public attorney would most likely take no action.  It was, however, publicly 
known, and the fact that the newspapers did not mention the charges suggests that they 
were still strictly under SED control.  
 
Additionally, the further topics identified for the keyword search will also be divided into the 
time before and after the resignation of Honecker. 
 
 
5.2.1. The “Neues Deutschland” before the resignation of Erich Honecker 
 
Not only does the “Neues Deutschland” not mention the opposition to the election results, 
but it also praises the circumstance that for the first time in the GDR´s history, additionally 
to the nominees of the “Block parties”, societal organisations and unions could nominate 
their members. In the issue of May 6/7 of 1989 on page 1 the “Neues Deutschland” wrote: 
- “Wahlaufruf des Nationalrats fand tatkräftige 
Zustimmung”…….”Langjährigen Traditionen entsprechend 
wurden auf der Grundlage des Wahlgesetzes nahezu ein 
Drittel mehr Kandidaten in die Wahlvorschläge aufgenommen, 
als Abgeordnetenmandate zur Verfügung stehen. Wie bisher 
haben die im Demokratischen Block vertretenen Parteien und 
Massenorganisationen Kandidaten nominiert. Zugleich 
konnten erstmalig auch andere Organisationen und 
Vereinigungen aktive Mitglieder aus ihren Reihen den 
Mandatsträgern vorschlagen.“.........“Am Vorabend der Wahl 
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wurden in verschiedenen Städten und Gemeinden weitere 
Objekte übergeben“......“Rund eine Million Wahlhelfer der 
Nationalen Front trugen bis zum Wahltag mit dafür sorge, dass 
die wahlberechtigten Bürger am 7. Mai ihre demokratischen 
Grundrechte verwirklichen und in freier Entscheidung sowie 
Wahrnehmung ihrer staatsbürgerlichen Verantwortung 
bestimmen können, wer als Abgeordneter in ihrem Auftrag an 
der Ausübung der Staatsmacht durch die Volksvertretungen 
teilnehmen soll.“ 
 
The newspaper quotes an ADN release concerning the election results as a 
“Eindruckvolles Bekenntnis zu unserer Politik des Friedens und des Sozialismus” (Neues 
Deutschland, 8. May 1989, pg 1). This positive reporting on the elections can be witnessed 
through the entire period of the first half of May. By quoting the other members of the 
“block-parties”, who apparently view positively the outcome of the elections, the 
newspaper clearly fosters the picture that the system is working perfectly. Additionally, 
during the period of the May 1989 elections, the “Neues Deutschland” looks back at the 
achievements of the last 40 years with praise. It comes to the conclusion that much has 
been achieved, despite the fact that the Class-enemy – the “Klassenfeind” - has 
consistently laid stones on the road of the socialist project.  
 
In August of 1989, with the sudden dramatic increase of GDR-refugees in the FRG´s 
embassies in Prague and Budapest, the newspapers stuck to the official line, and 
portrayed the events as a situation created by the FRG in order to discredit the GDR. In 
this the paper writes of organised “human trafficking” and quotes foreign countries 
condemning the FRG for destabilizing the European interests and acting against 
international law. An example is an article on September 13th with the title: “Erklärung von 
CTK”, in which the Czechoslovak news agency CTK condemns the actions of the FRG but 
also those of the Hungarian reformist government, for allowing the Visa free crossing of 
GDR citizens into Austria despite contracts between both states not to do so.  
 
On October 4th on page 2, the paper quotes the “Prawda”, which argues that it was no 
coincidence that the FRG was initiating this situation shortly before the fortieth anniversary 
of the GDR. It concludes that, no matter how much the FRG wants to destabilize the GDR, 
it will not succeed in depreciating the great historical successes of the GDR. In the same 
issue the paper quotes the Czechoslovak government stating that the FRG was acting 
completely irresponsible: “Sprecher der CSSR-Regierung: Verantwortungslose Haltung 
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der BRD”  (Neues Deutschland, October 4th, 1989, pg 2).  Other examples include the 
article also on September 13th (pg 5): “Die Obhutspflicht der BRD und ihr Drang nach den 
Grenzen von 1937”, arguing that the so called “Obhutspflicht”, with which the FRG 
legitimized the possibility for all GDR citizens to automatically become citizens of the FRG, 
was nothing more than a revanchist idée. By assuming this position, the FRG does nothing 
more than argue that the German “Reich” which was born in Versailles in 1871, continued 
until today, namely in the borders of 1937, ignoring the fact that Nazi Germany destroyed 
itself in 1945 as a consequence of its aggressive policies. Another article on the same day 
“Wie die BRD das Völkerrecht verletzt” (pg 5) argues that the FRG´s “Obhutspflicht” policy 
clearly violates the UN-Charta, and by giving travel documents in its embassies to citizens 
of the GDR it also violates the agreements regarding consulate rights signed during the 
Vienna convention of April 1963. By referring to the citizens law of 1913 of the German 
“Reich” in extending its citizenship to the people of the GDR, this article too argues that the 
FRG was following a revanchist policy. 
 
On September 21st 1989 on page 2, the paper prints an article claiming that a “Mitropa” 
cook had been dazed by a manipulated cigarette and kidnapped into the FRG. This article 
follows the stance of the paper as well as the regime, namely that the FRG is following a 
position of organised human trafficking, even kidnapping East-German citizens in an 
attempt to destabilise and discredit the 40th anniversary of the GDR. With this article the 
paper, however, went too far. Nobody, not even the most stringent SED-Hardliners, 
believed the story, which greatly de-legitimised the paper. Therefore, on November 3rd 
1989, on page 2, the paper printed an article stating that it would investigate the story of 
the cook in detail and would clarify what really happened. It does this on January 1st 1990, 
on page 2, concluding that the kidnapping had not taken place, and that the cook had 
been forced to tell the story to the newspaper by Stasi-agents.  
 
Regarding the demonstrations in October 1989, during and following the 40th anniversary 
of the republic, the paper remains completely on the line of the regime. As already 
mentioned previously, on October 11th , the paper prints an ADN release which de-
legitimises the demonstrators and completely backs the security forces. It also attacks the 
western press, which the paper argues instigated the aggressive protests by the people:  
- “….Es ist nachgewiesen, daß westliche Korrespondenten die 
Volkspolizei nicht nur verleumden, sondern daß sie zu den 
Organisatoren und Aufwieglern gehörten. So viele “Zufälle”, immer 
gerade dann vor Ort zu sein, wenn sich Randalierer 
zusammenrotten, kann es gar nicht geben………Was westliche 
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Medien auch immer gegen die Deutsche Volkspolizei an 
Verleumdungen übelster Art vorbringen, wird diese nicht daran 
hindern, den Dienst zum Schutz der Bürger, für den 
Sozialistischen Staat jederzeit standhaft zu erfüllen” (Neues 




5.2.2. The “Neue Zeit” before the resignation of Erich Honecker 
 
The “Neue Zeit” does also not mention any opposition to the election results of May, and 
instead also follows the SED stance of approving the “Impressive vote for the candidates 
of the national front” (“Eindruckvolles Votum für die Kandidaten der National Front”) (Neue 
Zeit, May 9th, 1989, pg 2). It concludes by praising the “superiority of the ideas of 
socialism” (Neue Zeit, May 9th, 1989, pg 3).  
 
Nonetheless, a divergence to the “Neues Deutschland” in the way the “Neue Zeit” began to 
cover the issue of GDR refugees can be identified early on. On the one side, the paper 
follows the official GDR stance, arguing that the FRG is following a completely 
irresponsible strategy in the handling of human destinies. On September 20th, for example, 
the newspaper writes on page 2: 
- “Unter Anwendung aller Methoden der Versprechungen, des 
psychologischen Drucks und unverhüllter Abwerbung werden 
Bürger der DDR dazu gebracht, über dritte Länder ihre Heimat zu 
verlassen. Verbunden ist der Menschenhandel mit einer 
zügellosen Verleumdungskampagne gegen die DDR. All dies 
geschieht unter Mißachtung der Staatsbürgerschaft der DDR, 
unter der Anmaßung einer sogenannten “Obhutspflicht für alle 
Deutschen”. Die Aktionen der BRD sind generalstabsmäßig 
vorbereitet, sie werden skrupellos durchgeführt: so wie es dem 
Charakter der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft entspricht.”  
 
On September 13th 1989, on page 2, under the headline “Medienrummel und die 
Realitäten” the paper raises the question what would happen to the refugees in the FRG 
once the media interest had left? The paper quotes various FRG sources posing just this 
question. ZDF reporter Hirsch says: “Nach der abenteuerlichen Reise wird manchem erst 
bewusst, auf was er sich da eingelassen hat.” The Süddeustche Zeitung: “Aber wer 
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kümmert sich in einigen Wochen um sie, wenn die ganze Aufregung wieder vergessen 
und der Alltag eingekehrt ist?”.  
It concludes by stating that refugees would not receive concrete promises concerning 
housing and work. Additionally, they cannot choose freely where to live inside the FRG, 
and they face missing kindergarten spaces. Additionally, the question is raised how much 
the FRG paid to whom so that Hungary (illegally) allowed the GDR citizens to cross its 
border with Austria.  
 
On the other hand, however, by October, the newspaper also begins addressing the 
question of why so many people are leaving; this is a stark difference to the way the 
“Neues Deutschland” handles the situation, in the end of September still arguing that one 
would not waste one tear on the leaving refugees. On October 4th, although quoting the 
CSSR- government about the irresponsible attitude of the FRG concerning the refugee 
situation on page 1, in the same issue on page 3, it prints an article by Wolfgang Hesse 
with the title: “In Sorge um das Haus, in dem wir wohnen”. In it, Hesse compares the GDR 
to a house, argueing that It was very hard to build up this house and that much of the 
outside needs repairing. But also from the inside much went wrong. That is why many 
inhabitants of the house are leaving. But we (the GDR) need all inhabitants. He argues 
that jouranlists have a special role in this. They need to make an inventory in order to 
address issues that went wrong. He concludes that a democratic discussion-process has 
begun. 
 
On October 12, on page 1, the paper prints a cautious comment by the CDU head Gerald 
Götting, who calls for a more balanced and honest reporting of the media. He argues that 
the more realistic the media portray life, the more credible they become, and the more they 
can thus influence the thinking and action of the readers and listeners.  
 
 
5.2.3. The replacement of Erich Honecker 
 
Subsequent to the replacement of Honecker, the initial response of both the “Neues 
Deutschland” and the “Neue Zeit” was to legitimize Krenz's succession of power, 
attempting to portray him as a figure of reform and dialogue. In both newspapers of 
research there is no discussion articulating the opposition’s unhappiness about this 
replacement. This despite the fact that various opposition groups publicly circulated 




Nonetheless, both the content analysis and the interviews suggest that within several days 
this began to change, after which the work of the press began to differ, the press of the 
“block-parties” becoming more critical in comparison to the SED-newspapers. The 
qualitative comparison too suggests that the respective media of research reacted to the 
events and the subsequent developments within the party in two different ways. On the 
one hand, the “Neues Deutschland” concentrated on discussing mistakes from the past as 
well as “scandals” involving corruption and mismanagement of previously high ranking 
party officials, including Honecker and his wife. The “Neue Zeit” on the other hand, 
although also addressing mistakes from the past, more strongly began addressing issues 
of how the political, social and economic transition should best be tackled, which problems 
will arise as a consequence of the democratization process as well as from the looming 
unification question. Even more importantly, it began to act as a platform for the newly 
emerging opposition. With this the newspaper not only increased the public awareness on 
the people and programmes of the opposition groups such as “Neues Forum” or 
„Demokratie jetzt“, but the newspaper also supported a necessary discussion on issues 
relating to the problems, possibilities and chances of transition. 
 
 
5.2.4. The “Neues Deutschland” after the resignation Erich Honecker 
 
As to the focus questions, the expulsion of Erich Honecker and Erich Mielke in December 
1989, all belonged to scandals of the past, and the paper attempted to portray a “party-
cleanup”. On December 7th 1989, on page 7, for example the paper comes to the 
conclusion that Erich Mielke was the man responsible for the aggressive approach against 
the demonstrators in Berlin during the anniversary of the GDR. By expelling him from the 
party, the paper advances the view, that now these wrongdoings are finally cleaned up 
with and that one now needs to look forward. Overall, rather than covering this in depth, 
the paper in December begins to cover the extra-ordinary party congress, fostering an 
image of inner-party change, and discussing how the party as such should proceed. (As 
will still be elaborated on below).  
 
As to the storming of the Stasi offices, the paper simply appears to inform its readers about 
these. In connection to these, however, there existed a growing fear that demonstrations 
would become more aggressive. Here the “Neues Deutschland” began calling on the 
people to remain calm and sober-minded, also becoming a platform for a wide range of 
societal forces appealing to the people with the same intent.  
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Additionally, to these “scandals” of the past which were mentioned, belonged the 
comparably luxurious residences of the politburo members in the “Wandlitz” housing 
estates as well their private hunting areas across the GDR. On November 24th, the “Neues 
Deutschland” brought an article addressing the luxurious estates at “Wandlitz” with the 
headline:  
- „Wie Komfortabel lebte das Politbüro in Wandlitz?“ (Neues 
Deutschland, November 24th,1989 pg 2).  
Further examples of the newspaper revealing “scandals of the past” include: 
- “Mitteilung über die Sitzung des Politbüros….Die Sitzung 
beschäftigte sich unter anderem mit Privilegien, die von 
ehemaligen Mitgliedern des Politbüros in Anspruch genommen 
wurden. Entsprechende Beschlüsse wurden gefasst, damit solche 
Ereignisse sich nicht wiederholen könnten. Alle bekannt 
gewordenen Fälle von Gesetzesverstöße sollen von der Justiz 
aufgeklärt werden. (Neues Deutschland, November 29th, 1989, pg 
1).  
This form of reporting suggests that the newspaper followed the stance of Krenz, it being 
while allowing a certain freedom of discussion, this should not go too far, and should be 
limited to addressing mistakes of the past, not what challenges lay ahead and how best to 
tackle them. These issues should remain in the hands of the politburo. Additionally, the 
new politburo was to be shown as handling the situation and finally bringing a truly 
democratic socialism. Especially the article of November 29th suggests that the paper 
followed this, in effect portraying the new leadership as doing everything to reveal the 
mistakes of the past.  
 
The politburo allowed more transparency, which was to be portrayed by the “Neues 
Deutschland”, however, at the same time, how best to continue was still the decision to be 
made by the regimes elite. The attempt, which is apparently made, is to portray a break 
with the past through Krenz. This form of reporting on mistakes of the past, while 
uncritically covering the Krenz regime, remained until November 1989, after which a 
change can be identified. This change follows the closed resignation of the “Ministerrat der 
DDR” on November 7th, as well as the decision to call an early, extraordinary party 
conference in the middle of December 1989.  Although still suggesting giving Krenz the 
benefit of the doubt in uncovering previous scandals and in bringing justice, the newspaper 
also suggests that currently not enough has been done. An example of this is the following 
article, where the newspaper clearly suggests that the current politburo was not entirely 
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open in giving information to the press, and that action now was only taken as a result of 
press articles demanding further investigation: 
- „Wandlitzer „Sortiment“ jetzt in Bohnsdorf: Verladene Ware – 
verladene Journalisten“.....„Hochwertige Importwaren aus den 
Beständen der ehemaligen Sonderverkaufsstelle der 
„Waldsiedlung“ Wandlitz wurden mit sechs W 50 Lastzügen in das 
Zweiglager Bohnsdorf der Forum-Handelsgesellschaft gebracht. 
Unser Foto zeigt ein Teil der Rundfunk- und Videotechnik, die in 
Wandlitz ständig zum „Sortiment“ gehörte. Den vergangene 
Woche in die „Waldsiedlung“ eingeladenen Journalisten waren 
aber wichtige Tatsachen vorenthalten worden. Auf Anfrage zu 
entsprechenden Presseberichten teilte das Konsultations- und 
Informationszentrum der ZK der SED mit: Das Politbüro hatte am 
7. November 1989 alle seit 1960 gefassten Beschlüsse über die 
Wohnsiedlung Wandlitz aufgehoben. Damit wurde auch die 
ungerechtfertigte Versorgung der Bewohner der Siedlung Wandlitz 
eingestellt. Die bis dahin angebotenen Import-Waren, die über das 
normale Niveau hinausgingen, wurden entsprechenden 
Einrichtungen des außenhandels zurückgeführt.“ (Neues 
Deutschland, November 29th, 1989, pg 1) 
- „Staatsanwälte sichern Alle Beweise.........Wegen den 
Presseberichten wurden die Staatsanwälte auf die Manipulation 
von waren aus der Waldsiedlung aufmerksam. Eine Untersuchung 
werde eingeleitet, die Öffentlichkeit informiert“.(Neues 
Deutschland, November 29th, 1989, pg 1) 
 
On December 16th/17th the ND brings an article with the title “In Sachen Jagd” demanding 
a quick investigation concerning allegations of corruption and misuse of privileges of 
former high-ranking SED members concerning their hunting estates. (Neues Deutschland, 
December 16th/17th, pg 2)   
 
A Standpunkt article of the Neues Deutschland by one of its editors, Reimer Oschmann, 
brings the above mentioned position –namely suggesting that not enough has been 
undertaken by the new regime-  forward. It clearly states that „Much is foul in the state 
GDR“, and that if the party wants to survive, then the mistakes, and especially corruption 
of the past need to be followed up vigorously, regardless of the current or former position 
of the respective SED functionaries. What appears surprising, is that the paper clearly 
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begins to demand real, tangible democratic control mechanisms, not simply party control, 
demanding “Öffentliches Amt, braucht öffentliche Kontrolle”:  
- Das etwas faul ist im Staate DDR, darauf werden wir mit Macht 
gestoßen: Amtsmissbrauch, Korruption und Verschleuderung von 
Volksvermögen durch Lügner, Schmarotzer und Bankrotteure.“ 
Greift die Männer der alten Garde an........“ND ist vor allem dafür, 
die Ursachen zu enthüllen, die die DDR in diese tiefe politisch-
gesellschaftliche Krise gestoßen haben. Das muss rasch, 
einschneidend und ohne Ansehen der Person geschehen, wenn 
das Ansehen der Partei nicht weiter beschädigt , die Einheit der 
Partei und der außerordentliche Parteitag nicht gefährdet werden 
sollen........“........“Bloßgelegt werden müssen: die Wurzeln 
langfristigen Amtsmissbrauchs, die Pervertierung von Privilegien 
(die kein Parteitag je beschlossen hat) und das Fehlen 
funktionierender, demokratischer Kontrollmechanismen, die den 
großen und kleinen Mittags hätten in den Arm fallen können. 
Bloßzulegen sind die stalinistischen Denk- und Verhaltensweisen 
einzelner, die sich selbstherrlich von Volk entfernen, um sich in 
goldenen Käfigen und Elfenbeintürmen ein Volk nach ihrem Bilde 
zu „formen“.“...............“Öffentliches Amt braucht öffentliche 
Kontrolle“.......“Die Wurzelbehandlung muss offen und gründlich 
erfolgen, und die Zentrale Parteikontrollkommission muss dazu 
bohrende Fragen stellen und keine Streicheleinheiten verteilen. 
Nur so wird sich der gesunde Körper der Partei an Haupt und 
Gliedern erneuern können, werden die vielen hunderttausend 
Arbeiter, Wissenschaftler und Lehrer, Künstler, Bauern und 
Studenten, vor weiterer Schwächung und Vergiftung bewahrt 
bleiben können. Die Zeit drängt“.(Neues Deutschland, November 
29th, 1989, pg 1)  
 
 
Nonetheless, the paper still concentrates more efforts in revealing mistakes from the past, 
than in addressing current economic, political and social issues which would seem more 
pressing in an atmosphere where the GDR was breaking apart.  
 
As the extraordinary party congress was being prepared, and as it was becoming 
increasingly more evident that for the population Krenz and the entire old guard are not an 
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option, the underlining position of the paper begins to change, now suggesting that 
although Krenz might not be the best alternative, that does not mean that the SED as such 
was not the best alternative to rule the country. On December 4th on page 3, this position is 
outlined directly in the paper, by writing that although the old leadership was not able to 
renew the party successfully, the party desperately needs to be reformed. Without a 
reformed SED, more socialism and more democracy are unthinkable in the GDR. The 
paper sees a “Revolution” being underway inside the GDR, one against a small fraction of 
corrupt SED members, with the aim of creating a truly democratic socialist society, headed 
by a renewed SED. Generally, the paper begins to convey the message to give the party 
another chance. Former high ranking SED members who previously lost their positions but 
still believe in the SED receive a platform inside the paper. An example of this is Johannes 
Döhler, former Central Committee member of the SED, who lost his position because he 
opposed the agricultural policy of the regime. He writes that he is not happy that he was 
proved right, but will help the honest comrades of the SED as well as the other parties and 
even the “Neues Forum”, who all want a good socialist German Democratic republic: 
- „Keine Freude darüber, dass ich damals recht hatte.....Ich 
verspüre keine Freude darüber, dass ich damals recht hatte. Aber 
mithelfen werde ich, an der Seite der ehrlichen Genossen der 
SED, der Mitglieder der anderen Parteien, der Christen, des 
neuen Forums und all der anderen, die eine gute sozialistische 
Deutsche Demokratische Republik wollen.“ (Neues Deutschland, 
November 29th, 1989, pg 3) 
-  
This change in attitude towards the old guard and especially the politburo under Krenz 
owed a lot to the changing atmosphere within the party members, to the increasing 
autonomy of SED organizations vis-à-vis the politburo, as well as the growing public 
discontent against the leadership. This becomes strongly evident on December 4th, when 
the paper replaced its header from being the organ of the central committee to being the 
organ of the SED-party: “Neues Deutschland - Organ des Zentralkomitees der 
Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands” to “Neues Deutschland - Zentralorgan der 
Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands”. This Step, which followed the resignation of 
the politburo, clearly indicated that the paper was in favour of a reform within the party. 
Furthermore, it supports the conclusion of the background research and the interviews 
namely that the hardliners in the paper were increasingly being sidelined as Spickermann 




The first direct negative article, which this analysis found against Krenz, also came on 
December 4th, with a commentary by one of the papers editors, Gerd Prokot. In it Prokot 
argues that the doubts of the people that the Central Committee – who clearly lacked the 
support of the grass roots - were both willing and able to renew both party and state, were 
growing daily. According to him, the leadership clearly did not have the ability to bring 
forward credible initiatives and failed in bringing to justice former high ranking officials who 
clearly committed acts of mismanagement and misuse of privileges. As a consequence, he 
openly demands that the central committee and the entire politburo resign:  
- : “Arbeit, Arbeit und noch einmal arbeit“, das waren Egon Krenz´ 
erste Worte, als er vor rund 40 Tagen nach seiner Wahl zum 
Generalsekretär des ZK der SED vor die Mikrophone trat. Das war 
eine gute Absicht, aber noch kein Programm. Die Basis der Partei 
war, obgleich bitter enttäuscht und tief frustriert, zum großen Teil 
bereit der erneuerten Führung Vertrauensvorschuss einzuräumen, 
um aus der Absicht ein Programm zu machen..... Diese 
Hoffnungen haben sich nicht erfüllt. Die Zweifel, dass das alte ZK 
und das neugebildete Politbüro, die nicht mehr das Vertrauen der 
Basis besaßen, zur Erneuerung willens und fähig seien, nahmen 
von Tag zu Tag zu. Wo die Genossen in den Betrieben und 
Institutionen entschlossenes Handeln, rückhaltlose Aufklärung der 
Ursachen der Krise und Bestrafung der Schuldigen forderten, 
lavierte die Führung. Statt der Revolution Impulse und 
Orientierung zu geben, hechelte sie hinter der Entwicklung her, 
vollzog meist nur noch nach, was das Volk  schon entschieden 
hatte. Halbherzig und inkonsequent wurde die schmerzhafte, 
gleichwohl unerlässliche Selbstreinigung der Partei, die Entlarvung 
und Bestrafung jener Mitglieder angegangen, die ihr und dem 
Staat unermesslichen Schaden zugefügt haben. Von der 
Parteiführung ging keine wirkliche Initiative aus, um die 
beschämenden Vorgänge ohne Ansehen der Person 
aufzudecken......Um die Partei in dieser Situation zu retten und ihr 
die Möglichkeit zum Neubeginn zu geben, blieb nur noch eine 
Möglichkeit: das Zentralkomitee und das Politbüro zum Rücktritt 
zu zwingen. Die Verantwortung des ehemaligen Zentralkomitees 
besteht jetzt darin, Rechenschaft über die Ursachen der Krise der 
SED und der Gesellschaft abzulegen. Spät aber hoffentlich nicht 
zu spät, ist das Feld für einen Arbeitsauschuss geräumt worden, in 
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dessen Händen nunmehr die Vorbereitungen des Parteitages 
Mitte Dezember liegen, dem schicksalhafte Bedeutung zukommt. 
........“(Neues Deutschland, December 4th, 1989, pg 2) 
 
The content analysis suggests that this increasingly independent stance of the paper vis-à-
vis the party leadership - as identified previously in the chapter “The Media in transition” - 
intensifies continuously until the elections in 1990. On January 10th for example, the paper 
prints an article “In eigener Sache”, demanding that the previous chief of agitation and 
propaganda under Honecker , Joachim Herrmann, be excluded from the party as he 
played a fatal role in the GDR´s media past. This is also reflected in the renewed change 
of name. As of January, the paper changed its name from “Neues Deutschland - 
Zentralorgan der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands” to “Neues Deutschland – 
Sozialistische Tageszeitung”. This partly arose out of the circumstance that in December 
1989, the new partly leader Gregor Gysi changed the name of the party from SED to 
“Socialist Unity Party /Party of Democratic Socialism” (SED/PDS), but also out of the 
circumstance that the newspaper replaced its open association with a political party – 
which nonetheless it de-jure remained – increasing its autonomy in relation to this party. 
Overall, the paper becomes a strong force supporting softline, reform orientated party 
members, in bringing about a internal party democratization.  
 
Around the second half of November 1989, the “Neues Deutschland” increasingly begins 
warning of the negative impact of a possible unification with the FRG, arguing for a “third 
way” as a viable alternative to the current system or instead of unification with the FRG. 
This “third way” should lead to a “socialism with a human face” and the creation of a truly 
democratic socialist state. In this, the paper also becomes a platform for opposition 
activists arguing for the continuation of a sovereign GDR (But only if they follow the stance 
of arguing for a “third way” and against economic unification). On November 29th, 1989, 
the paper prints a call by leading GDR intellectuals with the title: “Für unser Land”. An 
extract from the call, signed by Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym and Frank Beyer among others, 
reads: 
- „Unser Land steckt in einer tiefen Krise. Wie wir bisher gelebt 
haben, können und wollen wir nicht mehr leben. Die Führung einer 
Partei hatte sich die Herrschaft über das Volk und seine 
Vertretungen angemaßt, von Stalinismus geprägte Strukturen 
hatten alle Lebensbereiche durchdrungen. Gewaltfrei, durch 
Massendemonstrationen hat das Volk den Prozess der 
revolutionären Erneuerung erzwungen, der sich in 
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atemberaubender Geschwindigkeit vollzieht. Uns bleibt nur wenig 
Zeit, auf die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten Einfluss zu nehmen, die 
sich als Auswege aus der Krise anbieten. Entweder, Oder...... 
Entweder wir bleiben mit der DDR eigenständig, oder wir werden 
durch „ökonomische Zwänge“ veranlasst unserer materiellen und 
moralischen Werte zu verkaufen.“ (Neues Deutschland, November 
29th, 1989, pg 2) 
The issue also contains an article by the ND correspondent Dr. Irmtraud Gutschke, who 
stresses that the left alternative for Europe must not perish. In her article she quotes 
Stefan Heym:  
- „Wenn wir jetzt versuchen, wirklich Sozialismus aufzubauen, eine 
neue, bessere Gesellschaft zu gestalten....zeige dies die Stärke 
des großen Traums, für den so viele Menschen angetreten sind“.“ 
(Neues Deutschland, November 29th, 1989, pg 1) 
 
On December 4th, in the “Nachrichten und Kommentare” section, the paper brings a 
commentary by Urs Brockhaus, where he too argues for the survival of an independent 
GDR, on the basis of a continued democratic renewal: 
- „Frei, aufrecht, verbunden“........„Selbst jenen wenigen, die es 
bisher nicht sahen oder sehen wollten, dürfte das Wochenende 
drastisch vor Augen geführt haben: Für dieses Land, gegründet 
als Deutsche Demokratische Republik und als solche von 
Millionen gewollt, geht es um seine Zukunft als Staat mit eigener 
Identität. Das Wort Sorge ist wohl zu klein, um auszudrücken, was 
Menschen, die hier leben, arbeiten und das auch weiter tun 
wollen, in dieser Situation erfüllt. Und doch: Das Resultat des 
Denkprozesses heißt bei vielen nicht verzweifelte Resignation, 
sonder Artikulation – Aussprechen der eigenen Wünsche, 
Sehnsüchte, Forderungen. Das geschieht vielerorts laut, 
manchmal aber auch still, doch deswegen nicht weniger 
bewegend. So wie gestern....als eine Menschenkette die DDR von 
Nord nach Süd, von Ost nach West durchzog......Sicherlich 
werden die Vorstellungen und Motive der Ungezählten, die sich da 
für 15 Minuten an den Händen hielten....sehr unterschiedlich sein. 
Einig waren sie mit Sicherheit im Zorn und in der entschiedenen 
Forderung, all jene zu bestrafen, die Macht und Ämter 
missbrauchten und so unser Land und seine Bürger verrieten. 
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Einig aber auch – das zu behaupten sei gewagt – in dem Willen, 
dieses Land als das ihre einzurichten. ......Der Prozess der 
demokratischen Erneuerung darf nicht stehen beleiben. Taten sind 
gefragt.“ (Neues Deutschland, December 4th, 1989, pg 2) 
 
Another example of this is a printed readers letter by Günter Buhlke on December 6th, 
1989, on page 2 with the header “Was die Mehrheit nicht will”, arguing that the people of 
the GDR should support the appeal of the intellectuals “Für unser Land” of November 29th, 
stating that the majority of GDR citizens do not want a market economy which could not 
protect the human dignity; do not want a capitalist society with millions of unemployed; do 
not want a democracy with a 5% hurdle (referring to the political system of the FRG, 
whereby a party needs a minimum of 5% to enter parliament): do not want a society where 
people opposing the nuclear determent strategy are stigmatised as being bad; do not want 
a society which hails human rights but at the same time denies its own citizens the basic 
right to work, to shelter, to health, education either partly or even completely. 
 
This article cultivated fears by many GDR citizens that they would loose their basis of 
economic survival should unification come. This is supported by another article on the 
same day stating that 120,000 GDR refugees in the FRG are officially unemployed (Neues 
Deutschland, December 6th, 1989, pg 1) 
 
The issue of economic and full political unification remains a dominant topic until the 
elections. Increasingly, the paper prints voices of opposition groups as well as international 
voices arguing that only two German states would be in the interest of the GDR as well as 
of a secure Europe. That most of these opposition groups or international voices are 
against the SED while supporting the same stance on this issue, gives the underlining 
position – namely opposing unification – more credibility. Nonetheless, the reporting 
remains extremely one-sided, and the same opposition groups or foreign commentators 
would not be quoted on other issues. On December 15th on page 2, the paper prints a plan 
of national unity formulated by the group “Demokratie jetzt”, which clearly dismisses the 
idea of instant unification. On December 14th, the paper quotes the British Labour politician 
Tony Clarke arguing that two German states would be in the interest of Europe: “Zwei 
deutsche Staaten sind im europäischen Interesse”. On January 3rd on page 2, the paper 
prints a quote of the former dissident now president of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, 
arguing that the fate of the GDR was important for the future of Europe. On December 
16th/17th on page 1, the paper prints an interview with the futurologist Robert Jungk, who 
views the GDR as a great chance to create a truly democratic society, which could 
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become a world model. Viewing the looming economic crisis of capitalism, he warns to 
dismiss the chance of creating a more human system too early.  
 
But the paper also continues to print opposition voices from within the GDR who also 
argue against unification. Also on the issue of December 16th / 17th, the paper prints an 
article by Prof. Dr. Bernhard Graefrath, who analyses three conceptions for the future of 
the GDR: namely, Unification “Anschluss”, a confederation “Konföderation” or a 
cooperation on the basis of contracts  “Vertragsgemeinschaft”.  The article comes to the 
conclusion that only the latter makes sense, as the costs of the former would in the end be 
carried by the people of the GDR, and as only the latter posses the possibility of a socialist 
alternative to the FRG. He too comes to the conclusion, that the question must be viewed 
within a larger European framework, namely that of peace and stability: “Frage des 
Friedens und der Sicherheit”.(Neues Deutschland, December 16th/17th 1989, pg 8). An 
article by the paper editor, Gerd Prokot, on December 15th (pg 2) with the Title: “Wir leben 
doch nur einmal”, argues that only hard work, not instant unification, will bring prosperity to 
the GDR. He argues that the GDR may not be given the FRG as a Bankrupt state for free. 
At the moment, no demonstrations against unification, no reference to the mass 
unemployment inside the FRG seem to deter a great amount of GDR citizens to want 
instant unification. They seem to want to be part of this seemingly rich affluent society 
“Überflussgesellschaft”, the quicker the better. But Prokot warns, if the last 40 years should 
be a warning to the people, then that to mistrust seemingly short paths and fast solutions.  
 
To conclude on this topic, throughout the entire period the paper remained on track with 
the SED on critical issues for the continuation of the SED power in society as well as for 
the continuation of the GDR on the basis of a socialist state. Thus, the majority of 
journalists remained SED ideologues, even if they belonged to the softline wing of the 
party. As such, the party continued to argue for a democratic socialist state, one that only a 
reformed SED could guarantee. In this, the paper argues in form of own commentaries for 
this, but it also becomes the platform for younger, reform orientated SED members, foreign 
observers as well as opposition groups all advocating an independent GDR. In doing so, 
the form of reporting appears extremely one- sided, cultivating fears that a unification 
would import an unfair social model, one in which the majority of the GDR´s citizens would 
end up jobless and homeless. 
 
Beginning during the first half of December, the paper begins covering the preparations 
and conduction of the extraordinary party congress, discussing what the party needs to do 
in order to successfully renew itself. In this, the paper becomes a platform for a 
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democratization of the party, arguing on December 4th on page 4, that the half-hearted 
attempts by the current SED leadership to bring about change and to undo and investigate 
the mistakes of the past are embittering and disappointing the party’s grass roots. 
Additionally, during the same time, the paper begins discussing how best to reform the 
economy, becoming a platform for both SED specialists on the matter, high ranking 
managers of companies inside the GDR, academics and western sources. On January 31st 
on page 2, the paper quotes the “Süddeustche Zeitung” from the 27/28th of January, which 
argued that a monetary unification is highly complicated, if implemented too early it would 
lead to chaos. Furthermore, it suggests that both economic and social reforms inside the 
GDR need to be carried out in a fashion that would be accepted and supported by its 
people. On February 14th on page 2, the paper quotes scientists of West Berlin who argue 
that a monetary unification between the GDR and the FRG would lead to catastrophe. 
Although becoming a platform for different voices, the picture conveyed remains extremely 
one-sided; the paper does not attempt to inform the readers on the possible alternatives 
bringing differing views, rather here too it attempts to foster fear of and opposition to a 
unification with the West.  
 
Where the paper does attempt to offer some diverse standpoints for its readers is the issue 
of economic reform particularly the free market (N.B. this diversification is still very limited 
in the way that the reforms should not include a monetary union with the FRG). 
Additionally, it begins to inform its readers on what may lie ahead, informing them on 
market economy terminology and concepts. On February 21st on page 5, for example, the 
paper discusses the pros and cons of public ownerships quoting the “Demokratischer 
Aufbruch” arguing for a privatization of most public companies. On December 13th on page 
4, the paper prints an article by an economics Professor, Prof. Dr. A. Köhler, explaining 
what is meant by the term „Joint Venture“.  On February 21st on page 5, the paper informs 
GDR citizens where they can receive West-German financial support if they wanted to 
start an own business. Additionally, the paper begins to discuss the problem of a growing 
number of unemployed inside the GDR, demanding the quicker implementation of 
retraining.  
 
At the same time, the paper begins discussing the question of compensation for people 
dispossessed under the SED-regime. On December 16th/17th on page 1 and 2, the paper 
states that the CDU under Lothar de Maiziére, no longer stands to a socialist perspective, 
instead demanding that state companies should be returned to their former owners. 
According to the “Neues Deutschland”, the CDU, however, fails in delivering an answer on 
how the accomplishments of the working class should be secured. The paper clearly 
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disagrees with the CDU, arguing that without the ownership of the people over the 
industry, a truly sovereign people could not exist: “Ohne Volkseigentum ist eine wirkliche 
Volkssouveränität nicht zu haben” (pg 8). Additionally, the paper addresses the issue of 
compensating former real estate owners. On March 7th on page 2, the paper prints an 
exchange of correspondence between the former and new owners of a house. The old 
owners claim their ownership, asking whether the new owners had not been aware when 
they bought the house that it was rightfully the property of someone else? As a conclusion 
on this debate, the paper prints an article on March 8th on page 1, that demands that the 
property rights inside the GDR should not be challenged. Again, this debate appears 
rather one-sided. Additionally, it surely fosters fears of a unification with the West, 
especially for voters who might loose their homes as a consequence.  
 
As to the issue of right wing tendencies inside the GDR, the paper begins to cover the 
issue only as of December 1989, while still continuing its focus on the foul practice in the 
FRG concerning Neo-Nazi tendencies (as will still be discussed later on). The first example 
that this content analysis found was: “Die Stunde der Rechten in der DDR” (Neues 
Deutschland, December 16th/17th, 1989, pg 7).  
 
The election period is barely a subject in the “Neues Deutschland”, which only addresses 
the issue until the end of February. The election, however, is indirectly covered by the 
paper, as it follows the programme of the SED-PDS on its important issues: to give a 
reformed SED a second chance, to prevent a unification with the FRG on the basis of a 
continued socialist GDR and to implement economic reforms on a socialist basis.  
 
 
5.2.5. The “Neue Zeit” after the resignation of Erich Honecker 
 
As to the focus questions, to begin with the expulsion of Honecker and Mielke in 
December 1989, the paper merely informs about these, but does not write about these 
issues in detail. As to the storming of the Stasi offices, the paper initially informs its readers 
mainly as a matter of fact. Later, the underlining message is a welcoming of the end to the 
work of the Stasi, and criticism towards the reticence of former Stasi employees. On 
December 8th on page 2 for example, the paper informs about the visit of journalists to the 
Stasi headquarters. The paper concludes that while the employees were ready to answer 
questions, no answers were given to the extent of Stasi surveillance over society.  
 
As to further question of scandals of the past, the paper follows a very restricted reporting 
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on this as was the case above. Instead, it soon comes to print articles questioning the 
legitimacy of the SED´s constitutionally set dominant role. On November 15th on page 2, 
for example, it becomes a platform for the opposition group “Demokratie jetzt”, which is 
demanding a referendum on the leading role of the SED as stated in Article 1 of the 
constitution. Furthermore, it does not only criticise the political leading role of the party, but 
also the enforced communist propaganga dominating society. On October 24th on page 2, 
for example, the paper quotes the Chairwoman of the Union Tuition and Education, Helga 
Labs. She argues that up to then schools had to help students receive a Marxist-Leninist 
“World view”. The paper argues against this, stating that while the law concerning 
education stipulates that students should receive “basic knowledge” about Marxist-Leninist 
principles, the law does not state that schools should indoctrinate their students on the 
topic. It concludes  “Unsere Schule ist, als Schule für alle Kinder des Volkes, keine 
Bekenntnis-  und Weltanschauungsschule, und sie kann und darf es nicht sein”. This 
indirect approach of opposing the leading role of the SED continues in the form of 
mentioning demands of demonstrators in Leipzig who call for an end of the leadership 
claim of the SED as well as for new travel laws without restrictions (Neue Zeit, November 
8th, 1989 pg 1+2; Neue Zeit, November 15th, 1989, pg 2).  
 
Progressively, this indirect approach to voice opposition to the SED’s leading role is 
replaced with direct criticism, while still also reporting on demands by opposition groups on 
the matter. At the beginning of January 1990, the „Neue Zeit“ criticises the unbroken 
influence of the SED-PDS on the electronic media, arguing that the apparent impartiality of 
the SED-journalists in the electronic media was nothing more than hypocrasy, comapring 
the current media productions those of the former „Black-channel“3. On January 10th, on 
page 1, the paper reports on opposition groups meeting in the Magdeburg Dom, who 
criticise the factual continued leading role of the SED in the media, companies and state 
affairs. 
 
Additionally, the paper begins to criticise the work of the new, softline SED leadership and 
concentrated on issues important for the imminent transition, supporting the 
demonstrations, the beginning of reforms as well as offering an alternative view to the 
refugee problem, to mention a few. 
Examples of these included:: 
                                                
3 The “Black-channel” was a political propagandist TV-production in the GDR, moderated 
by the SED-Hardliner Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler. Its aim was to present West-German 
news with ideological interpretations in order to expose the propaganda of the so-called 
“Class-enemy”. 
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On October 19th – only 1 day after the replacement of Honecker – the “Neue Zeit” brought 
an own commentary under the headline „Neue Zeit Kommentiert“: 
- Neue Realitäten und Dialog........ Mehr Offenheit in den Medien..... 
In unserem Land gibt es den beginnenden Dialog, es gab auch 
Demonstrationen in manchen Städten, am herausragensten 
vielleicht Leipzig. Man hört gelegentlich die Meinung, auf der 
Strasse würden keine Probleme gelöst. Das ist wohl wahr. Die 
Menschen die demonstrieren - und denen man vielleicht zuerts 
einmal guten Willen unterstellen soll - wollten den Dialog auch gar 
nicht auf der Strasse führen. Sie wollen ihn unterstützen, ihn 
ermutigen, mit Zustande bringen. Es geschieht etwas in diesem 
unseren Lande. Es gibt keine Patentrezepte, aber früher oder 
später müssen wir in das Wasser unserer widersprüchlichen 
Realitäten springen, wenn der Dialog in allen seinen Formen uns 
weiterbringen soll. Dafür gilt es, zu arbeiten, zu handeln und auch 
zu streiten.“ (Neue Zeit, October 19th 1989, pg 2).  
Here, the newspaper began demanding a public dialog and it commenced to diverge from 
the SED standpoint, by stating that with the demonstrations, the people  - whom one 
should attest good faith to begin with - are attempting to bring about change and a public 
dialog with the regime.  
 
On October 23rd, the Newspaper began to address the issue of emigration, diverging from 
the previous SED standpoint that the situation was caused by the FRG attempting to de-
stabilise the GDR, and diverging from the “Neues Deutschland” which had stated that the 
GDR would loose no tear over the refugees. In this the  “Neue Zeit“ quoted the „Rudo 
Pravo“, which argued that the emigration was caused by internal GDR problems and that 
the argument that the situation had been caused by the FRG was only half-true:  
- „Die Welle der Ausreise von DDR-Bürgern war offenbar ein 
Katalysator der in der DDR existierenden Probleme. Es sei richtig, 
dass die SED Führung nicht bei der Feststellung stehengeblieben 
ist, die Emigration sei durch den von Seiten der BRD geführten 
psychologischem Krieg hervorgerufen worden, denn dies habe de 
Wahrheit nur zum Teil getroffen“ (Neue Zeit, October 23rd 1989, 
page 1). 
 
Increasingly, the paper addresses the reasons of why so many people are leaving, 
demanding change and at the same time opposing the continued state repressions. On 
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October 25th on page 2 the paper writes: “Der Versuchung zur Anpassung oft erlegen” 
“Evangelische Freikirchen zur Situation in der DDR” 
- “Mit Betroffenheit und Schmerz erfahren wir in diesen Tagen vor 
der anhaltend großen Zahl vor allem junger Menschen, die unser 
Land verlassen. Zugleich sind wir erschrocken und Empört über 
den Einsatz von Gewalt gegen Menschen, die in diesem Land 
bleiben wollen, sich aber in friedlichen Demonstrationen für 
Veränderungen eingesetzt haben. Die Notwendigkeit 
grundsätzlicher gesellschaftlicher Veränderungen ergibt sich aus 
einer tiefen moralischer Not. Der täglich erlebte Widerspruch 
zwischen der in den öffentlichen Medien dargestellten und der 
tatsächlichen Wirklichkeit wird nicht länger hingenommen“. 
 
Additionally, the paper gradually more becomes a mirror on what societal discussion exists 
as well as a platform for the emerging opposition groups, as also suggested by the article 
above. In this, the paper begins to bear witness of the changes occurring, and thus brings 
certain subjects and facts into public light.   
 
On October 24th, under the heading “Demokratie macht Arbeit” – Diskussionsforum im 
kleinen Saal des Leipziger Gewandhauses“ the newspaper reported on a meeting of over 
500 people, who got together to have a “free and open Discussion“.  Participants included 
SED-members, theologists and opposition activists including Petra Lux, spokesperson for 
the „Neues Forum“. Discussion topics included the catastrophic situation in the healthcare 
and social welfare. Interestingly, the paper mentions the spokeswoman for the “Neues 
Forum”, before the group actually received legal permission to form.  (Neue Zeit, October 
24th 1989, pg 3). Subsequent articles clearly positioned the newspaper on the side of the 
demonstrators with headlines such as: “Demonstrationen: Wille nach Demokratisierung 
hält niemand mehr auf: Bisher machtvollste Demonstration in Leipzig.” (Neue Zeit 
November 8th 1989, pg 1+2).  On November 18th, the “Neue Zeit” printed a statement by 
the opposition group “Demokratie Jetzt” under the headline “Demokratie jetzt zu 
Reisefragen”, which addressed the question of travel restrictions, arguing that the freedom 
to travel was an elementary human right, which the state was not allowed to restrict (Neue 
Zeit November 18th 1989, pg 2). On December 4th, on page 3, the paper printed parts of 
the founding call of the “Green league”, the un-partisan umbrella establishment of the 
environmental organisations in the GDR. On January 3rd on page 3 (Full page), the paper 
prints the programme declaration and statutes of the Neues Forum. Additionally, the paper 
becomes the mouthpiece of minority groups within the GDR demanding more rights. On 
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January 24th on page 3, for example, the paper reports on initiative groups fighting for the 
rights of the Sorbian minority in the country.  
 
At the same time, the paper begins to foster a discussion on the need of economic reforms 
inside the GDR. On October 25th on page 2, the paper prints a commentary by  Dr. Norbert 
Schwaldt with the title: “Ohne Leistung kein Wohlstand”. In it he writes that yes much is 
wrong in the GDR, especially concerning the question of provisions for the population. But, 
he argues, the problems go deeper. Workers were regularly told how good their work was 
and how productive the GDR was. This did not really motivate to do more. Additionally, 
lack of materials led to involuntary breaks, which had to be compensated through weekend 
work and overtime. Workers were lured with extra benefits to do this. However, in the end 
the management lost its leverage in telling the workers what to do, as these then often 
threatened to quit work. The article suggests to let them quit then. Who is not willing to 
work, should leave, instead of receiving a pay rise. It continuous by arguing that the 
desolate economic situation was enhanced through the emigration of younger workers. 
These are lured into the west with promises of “wealth through work”: “daß Arbeit guten 
Wohlstand möglich machen kann”. Additionally, consumer goods that had become 
standard in western capitalist societies, are rare inside the GDR. The article calls for an 
end to this, arguing that only far reaching reforms could increase the economic 
performance of the GDR, emulating the FRG´s promise of “wealth through work”. As a 
conclusion the article states that all the cries for more reform, for the end of travel 
restrictions, for a truly democratic society will come to nothing if the GDR – its people and 
economy -do to take action. All ideas of a brighter future depend on the people inside the 
GDR and their ability to improve the products of the economy: “Also alle Forderungen 
dieser Tage hängen von unserem Handeln selbst ab. Gelingt uns keine echte Leistung mit 
guten Produkten, werden wir schon in absehbarer Zeit noch weiter zurückbleiben”.  
  
On November 1st 1989, the “Neue Zeit” issued a statement by the CDU leadership that 
demanded that the reasons for the people leaving the GDR should be identified and 
addressed by the state leadership. What appears remarkable is that in the same statement 
the CDU demanded that the state should abide to what was stipulated by law, especially in 
relation to the election laws – publicly referring to the election fraud of May 1989. 
Additionally, the CDU called for a “public dialog” (Neue Zeit, November 1st 1989).  
 
In the same issue the paper printed an open letter by the head of the CDU-fraction, 
Wolfgang Heyl, to Interior Minister Dickel, under the heading “Forderung nach 
Legalisierung der Tätigkeit des Neuen Forums”. In it he demands that the decision not to 
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allow the legal formation of the “Neues Forum“ be re-considered, as the decision to ban it 
would not be based on legal grounds : 
-  “Bei dieser Entscheidung und der Art des Zustandekommens 
vermisse ich die Beachtung von Grundsätzen der sozialistischen 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit, wonach Entscheidungen nur auf der 
Grundlage der Verfassung, der Gesetze und anderen 
Rechtsvorschriften (in diesem Falle wohl die “Verordnung über die 
Gründung und Tätigkeit von Vereinigungen” vom 6. November 
1975 GBI. Teil I, Nr.44, Seite 723ff ergeben 
dürfen)…..Handlungsbedarf besteht daher nach meiner 
Auffassung zunächst darin, die Gesetzlichkeit herzustellen, um so 
die Voraussetzung für eine sachgerechte Prüfung des nicht nur 
von mir als berechtigt angesehenen Anliegens zu schaffen….Ich 
halte es daher für erforderlich, dass der oben genannte Bescheid 
des Ministeriums des Inneren offiziell und öffentlich 
zurückgezogen wird und dass sich die Tätigkeit des “Neuen 
Forums” auf legaler Grundlage vollziehen kann”. 
 
On December 8th 1989, on page 1, the paper prints a letter from CDU members titled  “Aus 
tiefer Sorge um explosive Lage im Lande” writing to the governments of the GDR and the 
FRG, stressing that en face of the explosive situation the only way forward was through a 
confederation between the GDR and the FRG on the lines of the current borders.  
 
On December 12th on page 1 and 3, the paper critically addresses its role in how the 
media became an instrument of the SED-leadership, laying passively, beaten under a 
bombardment of taboos. Furthermore, the paper writes that the complicity of the journalist 
was, however, not simply undone through critical writing “between” the lines, but instead 
by simply not printing ADN releases and by beginning a more unbiased reporting.  
 
Increasingly, the paper also becomes a forum for discussion on whether indeed, how the 
new SED-leadership claims, only a reformed truly democratic socialism could be the 
answer for the GDR citizens. On February 7th, 1989, on page 3, for example, the paper 
prints a commentary by Jürgen Hofmann, with the title “Socialism – yes or no?” In it, he 
concludes that after all that happened in the name of socialism, who can today still argue 
that only socialism (reformed or not) could make people free, happy, and rich? The author 
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argues that he prefers an ecological, peaceful, social state built on solidarity and without 
ideological extremes.  
 
With the question of political and economic unification looming, the “Neue Zeit” began to 
address the possible routes the country could take. In this, the paper in comparison to the 
“Neues Deutschland”, appears to attempt to portray pros and cons of unification with the 
FRG. As already mentioned, on November 29th, 1989, leading GDR intellectuals issued an 
appeal to the GDR citizens under the headline “Für unser Land”, articulating the wish to 
implement a “third way” and arguing against a unification with West-Germany. On 
December 7th, on page 3, the paper prints “Thoughts to the call `Für unser Land´” by other 
intellectuals. In an open Letter to Stefan Heyn, Prof. Dr. sc. Helmut Koch, Member of the 
“Akademie der Wissenschaften”, writes that he would not sign the “Aufruf” “Für unser 
Land”. This as he does not see the “either or” argument brought up by the call. He argues 
that much went wrong, including environmental problems, and that the GDR alone would 
not be in the position to rebuild the country:  
- “Unsere Empfindungen bei der plötzlichen Öffnung der Mauer 
haben uns und der Welt gezeigt, dass die Deutschen in ihren 
beiden Staaten eine Nation geblieben sind und weiter bleiben 
wollen….. Eine Konföderation der beiden deutschen Staaten 
scheint mir die richtige Grundlage für die politische Organisation 
der deutschen Nation zu sein.” 
 
On the same page, Trilse Finkelstein argues in “Ein neuer deutscher Schreckensruf” that 
she will sign the statement “Für unser Land”. She fears a unification arguing:  
- “nennen sie es Wiedervereinigung, gemeint ist Wieder-Herrschaft 
des großen Geldes auch hier”…”Sie wollen Einvernehmen, 
kaufen, einen Ausverkauf Inszenieren. Sie stellen Bedingungen: 
erst Sozialismus abschaffen, dann gibt es Geld. Nach 
Rechtsbegriff nennt man das Erpressung”…..”Im Namen der 27 
ermordeten meiner Familie bin ich für den Bestand und 
grundlegende Erneuerung der DDR und unterschreibe Stefan 
Heyms und Christa Wolfs Appell”.  
 
On the same page under the headline “Wir haben die Moral nicht gepachtet” Helga 
Schubert and Prof. Dr. Johannes Helm write:  
- “Warum wir den “Aufruf für unser Land” nicht unterschreiben 
möchten….Es wurde nirgends mitgeteilt, was mit der Unterschrift 
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zum Aufruf bezweckt werden soll….Es wird eine sozialistische 
Alternative zur Bundesrepublik propagiert. Fragt man nach dem 
Sinn des Begriffes Sozialismus, so erhält man zur Antwort, er sei 
bisher deformiert worden, nun käme es darauf an, seinen wahren 
gehallt zu realisieren. Doch worin dieser besteht, müsse neu 
erarbeitet werden. So soll man einer Sache zustimmen, von der 
man nicht weiss, worin sie eigentlich besteht. Von der 
ausschließlich zentralen Planwirtschaft und der 
Vergesellschaftung der Produktionsmittel usw. Ist man völlig 
abgerückt. Meint man vielleicht nur noch die Notwendigkeit eines 
sozialen Netzes? In diesem Fall könnte man von kapitalistischen 
Ländern viel lernen, z.B. von Schweden oder der BRD. …” 
They continue to argue that the call was a demagogic “Either-or” comparison. On the one 
side the peaceful, fair, ecologic and permissive society built up on solidarity. On the other 
side a material and moral buyout through foreign economic necessities and unacceptable 
conditions by the FRG. They write that these cheap black and white pictures were violating 
reality. They criticise that all ideas that had been raised up to then concerning a 
confederation, contractual unity or other forms of cooperation are being ignored, as are 
constructive economic offers by the FRG. They conclude by stating that this reminds them 
to the embarrassing propaganda calls from before: “who is not for us, is against us”. 
 
This, reporting on a “third way”, is not always in the form of mentioning the term directly. 
On January 24th on page 3, for example, the paper prints a commentary by Pastor Harald 
Schmidt with the title “Führt uns ein `Deutscher Bund` zu Konföderation, Frieden und 
Einigkeit?”  In it, Schmidt speaks out for a confederation of two German states, where both 
cooperate but still follow their own interests. This balanced reporting, allowing voices of a 
“third way” to be articulated in the paper, only exists until end of January 1990.  Thereafter, 
the paper prints voices of either for Unification, or simply neutral articles on the subject. As 
of the second half of February, the paper increasingly seems to follow the stance of the 
new East-German CDU leadership, where the question is no longer whether unification 
should come, but rather what benefits this brings the people and how this should occur. An 
example here is an article on February 21st on page 1, where the new CDU-leader Lothar 
de Meziére clearly says yes to unification, but without a dismantling of the welfare state: 
“Für Vereinigung ohne Sozialabbau”.  Generally, the underlining message seems to be 
that unification will not make the situation worse for the GDR citizens, but rather better. 
This is also supported by an article on  February 27th on page 5, stating that while the 
current time of change brings a certain degree of risk, it also brings big chances.  
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As of February 1990 the paper also begins writing about the pros and cons of a currency 
union between the FRG and the GDR. While at the beginning this seems to be a balanced 
discussion, where both support and opposition to the matter is mentioned, by the second 
half of February the paper increasingly takes the CDU-stance propagating a currency-
union before a political unification has taken place. On February 7th on page 1, for 
example, the paper still portrayed the pros and cons of a currency unification, by printing 
comments of Chancellor Kohl demanding an immediate negotiation on the matter on the 
one hand, on the other it prints a comment by the President of the West German Central 
Bank, who argues that the currency unification was not necessary. This changes during 
the second half of February 1990. An example here is an article on February 27th on page 
two arguing that with the currency union the GDR stands nothing to lose, but everything to 
win: “Währungsunion: DDR hat nichts zu verlieren, aber alles zu gewinnen”. While the 
paper seemed to offer a well balanced forum for discussion, also dissenting from the CDU 
stance at times, between February to March 1990, the paper increasingly follows the 
stance of the new CDU-leadership on these questions. Undoubtedly, this is influenced by 
the beginning of the election campaign time.  
 
As of the beginning of January 1990, the paper increasingly begins to inform its readers on 
the concepts and issues related to the coming market economy. An example here is a 
series of articles under the heading “Market economy – what is it?” by an Economist from 
Cologne, Roland Tittel. Topics included: “Mitbestimmung, Streik und Aussperrung” on 
March 13th on page 3 or “Das Soziale Netz: Wie soll es aussehen?” on March 15th on page 
3. The paper generally welcomes the coming market economy, here too following the 
official CDU stance. Examples here include an article on March 18th, arguing that business 
freedom will bring prosperity for all, and that foreign capital will secure work places.  
 
The “Neue Zeit” also only addresses the issue of right-wing problems inside the GDR at a 
fairly late time, albeit according to the findings of this content analysis, before the “Neue 
Deutschland” does so. On November 15th, the newspaper quotes the Chair of the Jewish 
Central Committee, warning of a renaissance of right wing tendencies also inside the GDR 
(Neue Zeit, November 15th, 1989, pg 1).  
 
As to the question of the election coverage, the topic receives greater importance in 
comparison to the “Neues Deutschland”. Nonetheless, it does seem that the paper as of 
February 1990 departs from a seemingly unbiased reporting it had increasingly acquired 
as of October 1989, now increasingly articulating the party programme of the CDU (as 
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During the research for the qualitative analysis, further observations were made, which did 
however not follow a clear methodical approach, but which appeared worthy of note in 




What appears interesting, is the attempt by the “Neues Deutschland” to discredit the West-
German political and especially economic system as much as possible. One dominant 
topic which can be identified from May until the first half of November 1989, is the 
apparently strong Neo-Nazi tendencies inside the FRG, which the “Neues Deutschland” on 
the one hand claims was very strongly visible during that time (especially with the electoral 
success of the “Republikanische Partei”) and on the other hand, argues that it had never 
really been targeted inside the FRG but rather even fostered by the government since the 
collapse of Nazi Germany. Examples of these are: 
1. “Neonazis terrorisierten in Augsburg jüdische Bürger” (Neues 
Deutschland, 10. May 1989, pg 5) 
2. a commentary on June 7th  on pge 2 with the title “BRD-
Justitz im Jahre 40” writes: „Nun fahndet die Polizei in der 
BRD schon 48 Tage nach dem zu lebenslanger Haft 
verurteilten Massenmörder Weise. Natürlich vergeblich. Der 
SS-Mann ist und bleibt verschwunden. Der 
Bundesgerichtshof hatte bekanntlich dem ehemaligen 
Aufseher im faschistischen KZ Auschwitz-Birkenau die 
Bestätigung des Urteils mit der Post nach Hause geschickt, 
wo er, auf Grund seines Revisionsantrages von Haft 
verschont, als freier Mann lebte, so dass er rechtzeitig 
untertauchen konnte.“; 
3. „Protest gegen Einrichtung eines neonazistischen 
Schulungszentrums“ (Neues Deutschland, September 6th, 
                                                
4 On December 15 / 16 1989, the party publicly stated that it henceforth will foster the 
transformation towards a market economy as well as the unification with the FRG. 
Research for this dissertation suggests that following this official change of dogma, the 
party began to pressurise its media to foster this view.  
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1989, pg 5) 
4. „Besorgnis in Berlin (West): Neonazis auch in den Schulen 
weiter auf dem Vormarsch“ (Neues Deutschland, September 
13th, 1989, pg 7)  
5.  „12 889 Nazis seit 1945 in der DDR verurteilt. Vor Juristen in 
Hamburg: Tiefe Kluft zur BRD-Praxis“, (Neues Deutschland, 
November 1st, 1989, pg 1) arguing that in the FRG the 
judges did not successfuly punish Nazi-criminals, partly 
because a vast number of former Nazi-judges simply 
continued their work in the FRG.  
 
Indeed, criticism of the Western model seems to be a consistent topic in the “Neues 
Deutschland”. Another dominant theme in this direction is the rising unemployment in the 
FRG, the socially unfair market economy, as well as the brutal treatment of opposition 
activists usually opposing western rearmament. Examples of these include: 
i) “Weitere Friedenskämpfer in der BRD festgenommen” 
(Neues Deutschland, May 10th, 1989, pg 5) 
ii) “Wer hört die Schreie der vielen Kinder?. BRD: 400 000 
Misshandlungen und 100 Todesopfer im Jahr” (Neues 
Deutschland, July 19th, 1989, pg 6) 
iii) “Obdachlosenhelfer rufen in Berlin (West) Notstand 
aus…..7000 auf der Strasse”. (Neues Deutschland, 
November 1st, 1989, pg 1)  
 
These articles all suggest that the newspaper attempted to create a relative picture of the 
FRG, implying that not everything was as great as many claimed. There is no doubt that 
these articles stimulated fears of many GDR citizens, that a market-economy may not 
always be better than the security of a socialist style, regulated economy, where everyone 
had a job.  
 
“Neue Zeit” 
Interesting here too is the attempt by the newspaper to discredit the West-German political 
and especially economic system as much as possible, between May to October 1989. 
Examples here include:  
- “In der BRD mehren sich die Zeichen der `öffentlichen Armut” 
(Neue Zeit, July 12th 1989, pg 2) 
- “BRD: Immer weniger bezahlbare Wohnungen” (Neue Zeit, July 
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23rd, 1989, pg 5) 
- “BRD: Hohe Arbeitslosigkeit. 7,3 % im erwerbsfähigem Alter ohne 
Job” (Neue Zeit, October 4th, 1989, pg 2) 
- Quoting the comment of an unemployed citizen of the FRG saying 
that as an unemployed one lives like in a ghetto: “US-
Nachrichtenagentur AP: Zur Situation der Arbeitslosen in der 
Bundesrepublik……Du lebst als Arbeitsloser wie im Ghetto” 
(August 30th, 1989, pg 2). 
 
It too concentrates on the apparently strong Neo-Nazi tendencies in the FRG. Examples of 
this are: 
-  “Besorgniserregende neonazistische Rückkehr” (Neue Zeit, June 
21st, 1989, pg 1) 
- “Neonazi-Chef: Unglaublicher Zustrom” (Neue Zeit, July 19th, 
1989, pg 1) 
-  “Volksblatt: Nazis bestimmen über Deutschstämmigkeit" (Neue 
Zeit, September 20th, 1989, pg 1)  
This first article quotes the Italian press writing about the alarming comeback of neo-Nazis 
in the FRG. The second article quotes the leader of the German neo-Nazi party “Die 
Republikaner”, stating how many new members the party is currently receiving. The third 
article quotes the “Volksblatt” that argues that in West Berlin, the question of judging a 
Polish refugee as being “German” is done through old Nazi SS-documents. Therefore, the 
best chances of receiving a German citizenship has the refugee whose grandfather was an 
active Nazi member. 
 
Additionally to becoming a platform for political opposition groups, the paperas of January 
1990 increasingly also becomes the platform for green activists and environmental 
questions.  On January 17th on page 2, the paper informs about plans by Greenpeace to 
open an office in East-Berlin. On February 7th on page 2, the paper print a CDU 
commentary arguing that environmental problems need to be dealt with now: “CDU: 
Vorsorge statt Nachsorge….Umweltprobleme müssen jetzt angegangen werden.” On 
February 27th on page 6 the paper asks whether ecology will be forgotten: “Bleibt Ökologie 
auf der Strecke?”.  On March 17th on page 2 the paper warns that a ecological disaster is 




6. The role of the Media during the transformation process 
 
In the introduction to his book: “Publizistischer und journalistischer Wandel in der DDR”, 
Arnulf Kutsch (1990) argues that in the case of the GDR, if the media had helped to 
initiated the “Wende” then only in a negative sense. Kutsch argues that it was precisely the 
stark contradictory political, economical and social picture as portrayed by the media, vis-
à-vis what was perceived by the people, that was one dominant motive in bringing the 
people to streets of Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin in autumn of 1989 (Kutsch, 1990, pg 9). 
There is no doubt that the constant propaganda attempts by the regime, portraying a 
completely different reality to that perceived by the people, and constantly portraying just 
how far apart the regime was from the wishes of the people, was one strong influence in 
disillusioning the people with regards to the intents of the regime as well as in bringing the 
people to demand change. However, as has been identified previously, the GDR citizens 
were used to a stark contrast between what was described by their own newspapers vis-à-
vis what was described by the West-German media as well as to the reality as perceived 
by them. They were aware of this propaganda attempt by the regime for decades. The 
argument therefore, that this stark contrast between what the regime said and what was 
perceived by the people was the factor that brought the people to the streets, is thus not 
entirely convincing. Indeed, the findings of this dissertation research point to a different 
conclusion as to the role of the media.  
 
As described in the chapter “Methodical approach”, the research of this dissertation is 
divided into firstly an “output” (journalists/media intent) and secondly and “outcome” (effect 
on the process) analysis. When analysing the role of the media during the transformation 
process, it makes sense to continue this differentiation. The first, “output“ analysis looks at 
the output of the media in order to investigate whether the respective media and its 
journalists favourably supported the transformation process. The second, “outcome” 
analysis attempts to shed light into the question whether the media did indeed have a 




There is no doubt that, up to the replacement of Honecker with Krenz, all official media 
served state propaganda. They said nothing about the blatant election-fraud of May 1989. 
They kept quiet about issues of political mismanagement and corruption. They did not 
address the issues, which brought thousands of GDR citizens to the streets of 1989 and to 
flee their own country. Although at times the individual journalist did attempt to broaden the 
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limits imposed on them, and although they often followed critical reporting in form of “in 
between the line” criticism, this was very limited and rare. When finally the regime was in 
retreat, however, allowing a liberalisation and even showing signs of a possible collapse, 
the journalists were the first to notice this, due to their proximity to the leadership. As the 
media system was so closely under direct leadership control, any signs of problems within 
the leadership immediately became apparent to the media nomenklatura. Realizing this, 
the media began exploiting the power vacuum that was arising, and the possibility 
emerged that the media system and its journalists could increasingly develop as an 
independent actor in the political reform process.  
 
The analysis of this dissertation suggests that this came cautious and slow at first, but 
became visible at the latest with the fall of Honecker, when all societal organizations, 
including the block parties and the media began expanding their autonomous space of 
action and began breaking previous taboo topics. The content analysis as well as the 
interviews suggests, that this occurred initially and more strongly in the case of the block- 
party media, and then in the media of the SED newspapers. In the former, the journalists 
finally saw their possibility to act freely, to break on previous taboo topics thus helping the 
unfolding democratization process. The media then no longer wanted to limit themselves 
to the role of simply bearing witness to the events occurring, but wanted instead to become 
an independent actor in the developing process, and thus to foster their vision of the 
future. As had already been identified, often the journalists of the block-party media had 
become members of these parties as this was the only possibility to express at least 
limited opposition while still confirming to the system. Therefore, it is important to state 
once again that this meant that they were no fervent SED-supporters to begin with. Now 
that this system was finally showing the first signs of its demise, these journalists took the 
opportunity to foster and to amplify the process taking place.  
 
Additionally, being the organ of their respective parties, the block party media began to 
support the new positioning of these parties in an emerging multi-party system, and began 
to become a platform for calls to end the leading role of the SED. On October 13th, 1989, 
the LDPD newspaper “Der Morgen” printed an article by the LDPD leader Manfred 
Gerlach, in which he directly questioned the leading role of the SED and thus portrayed 
the first “open” division within the regime. With this he was the first leading East-German 
politician to openly criticise the SED leadership, with this article 5 days before Honecker 
resigned.  Even so, many of the block party journalists, while opposing the current system 
and the SED dominance, did not oppose the idea of a socialist system per se. Similar goes 
for many journalists of the SED media. These can basically be broken down into two 
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groups: Hardline SED-members and reform (Softline) members. The former attempted to 
limit the reform process taking place, while the latter attempted to support the reform 
process within the party as well as society. Both, nevertheless saw the future of the GDR 
as an independent socialist alternative to the FRG, under a truly democratic leadership of 
the SED. When analysing the role of the media during the transformation process, one 
needs to separate the role of block party media on the one hand, and the SED-media on 
the other. Both contributed to the unfolding process, albeit in different ways.  
 
Block party media. Interviews suggest that the media of the block parties, at certain times 
already before 1989, began to expand their limits and to break on previous taboo topics. 
CDU- Bundestag Member of Parliament, Arnold Vaatz, argues that there had always 
existed a “scratching on the limits imposed” on part of these bloc party journalists 
(Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008). For example, the CDU paper “Die Union” in 1986-87, printed 
parts of a diary of Victor Klemperer, which became extremely popular. Victor Klemperer  
had published a book called “LTI: Notizbuch eines Philologen“ (Lingua Tertii Imperii) in 
which he basically analysed the language of the third reich. The reason why the book had 
became popular in the GDR, was not because one wanted to learn about the language of 
the third reich, but because one recognised that the stereotypes with which he labeled the 
language of the third reich, were identical to the stereotypes of the language of the GDR 
(refered to by Klemperer as the language of the „Fourth reich“) (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008). 
Victor Klemperer had become a significant cultural figure of the GDR, supporting 
communism while attacking its practice inside the GDR. He thus became a symbol of 
opposition to the form of communism as implemented inside the GDR, and thus his diaries 
became so popular.  The regime did not intervene, as it was “merely” a publication of the 
diaries of a well-known supporter of communism and citizen of the GDR. Nonetheless, it 
stands as dominant example of how the media inside the GDR attempted to expand their 
limits and to articulate opposition. Nevertheless, although it is true that these examples 
occurred, they were predominately limited to indirect criticisms or “between the lines” 
criticism and occurred fairly rarely. On the other hand, this indirect opposition existed and 
is important to mention.  
 
The content analysis suggests that although the “Neue Zeit” remained on track with the 
SED doctrine largely until the resignation of Honecker, nevertheless, the newspaper did 
begin to divert from the rigid SED-newspapers and in this began supporting an emerging 
liberalisation process already in the final months of the Honecker era. One important 
aspect here is that the newspaper already at the beginning of October began addressing 
why so many East Germans are leaving, bringing up problems within East Germany, 
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rather than simply portraying the developments as a plan of the “class-enemy”. The article 
by Wolfgang Hesse5 on October 4th, suggests that changes were needed within the 
country, and also articulates that these are already taking place. This is a stark difference 
to the “Neues Deutschland”, who at that point still does not see that a democratic-
discussion is needed.  
 
With the replacement of Honecker, the paper soon takes over an active role in supporting 
the democratization process. This mainly occurs in following ways: 
1. By taking sides with the demonstrators, the paper fulfils a twofold support. Firstly, 
by beginning to articulate critical reporting it sends a signal to the people that the 
form of censorship as had existed before is over, actively portraying change as well 
as indicating that the regime was in retreat. Secondly, it articulates the 
demonstrations taking place and begins a public dialogue about the demands of 
the demonstrators, as well as on the best future development. Additionally, by 
doing this it increases the pressure on the regime to allow more liberties, as even 
the official organisations are beginning to demand these. Furthermore, it de-
legitimises attempts by the regime to portray the demonstrators as “rioters”, 
sending an alternative signal to the CDU’s own voters than was spread by the 
SED-media.  
2. It began a discussion about the internal problems of the GDR. As mentioned 
above, this already began before the resignation of Honecker, but increased in 
intensity thereafter. The paper, for example, addressed corruption and 
mismanagement of the past and perhaps more importantly of the present SED 
leadership, attempting to foster a continued erosion of party legitimacy and support. 
Additionally, it began to address the issue of right-wing tendencies inside the GDR, 
something that had officially not existed in the GDR hitherto. This topic became 
highly relevant in the East-German and unified German society after the “Wende”, 
and it is therefore rightly addressed. With this the paper assumed the role of an 
Agenda-Setting “output”. 
3. The paper began to demand serious democratic control mechanisms, an end to the 
leading role of the SED and to the travel restrictions as well as continued state 
repressions.   
4. The paper begins covering political events taking place, offering the initiators and 
participants of these events a possibility to become known to a wider audience as 
                                                
5 As mentioned before, in the article Hesse begins to address the problems inside the 
GDR as one factor in the refugee crisis, instead of simply blaming the FRG, comparing the 
GDR to a house where much went wrong and needs repairing.   
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well as making public the topics of discussion. 
5. It became a platform for the emerging oppositional groups / people, either by 
mentioning their formations, meetings, demands and people, or by allowing these 
to publish their founding proclamations and statements. Again, this supports these 
groups to become known to a wider public as well as to transport their messages. 
At the same time, it helped to de-demonize these groups. A dominant example 
here is the paper mentioning the spokesperson for the “Neues Forum”, before this 
forum was actually legalized. Additionally the open letter of Wolfgang Heyl on 
November 1st, demanding the legalisation of the “Neues Forum” suggests that the 
paper began fostering an increase in the public’s awareness on these groups and 
that the CDU supporters no longer see them as a threat, something brought 
forward by the SED leadership.   
6. It supports calls for an end to the dominant role of the SED in society. Indirectly at 
first, this increases in tone as the months pass. On November 8th, on pages 1 + 2 it 
quotes calls by demonstrations demanding “Schluss mit dem Führungsanspruch 
der SED – Verfassungsänderung von Artikel 1”. There is no doubt that this also 
went hand in hand with the developments within the CDU, which began to position 
herself for the coming multi-party system. 
7. The paper fosters calls for a peaceful transition, fearing violent outbursts of 
discontent.  
8. It fosters a diverse discussion about the pros and cons of unification, allowing both 
supporters and the opposition to voice their opinions.  
9. The paper fosters an internal CDU-party democratization and discussion.  
10. It begins to inform the people on the coming market economy.   
11. The paper begins to address issues relavant for the successful transformation of 
the entire society. Examples here include the issue of right wing tendencies in the 
GDR, something that had not been addressed up till then. 
 
In supporting the liberalisation and democratization processes in these ways, the paper 
slowly assumed the position attributed to the media in western democracies, namely that 
of a “fourth estate”, as a watchdog, wanting to make the leadership and their actions more 
accountable. In the same manner, it became a platform for societal discussion and to an 
extent attempted to take over an “agenda-setting” function. Having said that, the „Neue 
Zeit“ should not be seen as a completely independent media actor either. Restrictions 
mainly continued in a twofold way. Firstly, the paper remained the organ of the CDU. Being 
such, it faced continued control of the party, and had to support the party in its attempts to 
position her for the coming elections. Secondly, in theory it was still acting until December 
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1989 within a totalitarian, one party state, in which the dominance of the SED was 
constitutionally set. Thus, should the Hardliners have attempted to forcefully reverse the 
process, the journalists’ risked reprisals. Additionally, the state initially still had enough 
means to censor the media and its workers.  
  
It is important to note, that as the CDU was positioning herself for the coming multi-party 
system and the elections, the freedom of the “Neue Zeit” was being curtailed. This 
becomes evident as the newspaper had, following the demise of Honecker and the 
capacity of the regime to exert power was eroding, initially begun to address issues 
relatively neutrally. However, as the elections drew closer, at the latest by February 1990, 
the paper increasingly followed the position of the CDU more strongly. The most prominent 
example here is surely the issue of unification. The first articles on the subject for negative 
or neutral becoming positive, neutral and negative by the later part of January; however, 
by February the articles are only neutral and predominately positive on the matter.   
 
Neues Deutschland. Although the “Neues Deutschland” largely stayed the organ of the 
Central Committee, especially its Hardline fraction, and later remained a newspaper of the 
SED-PDS, the paper encouraged parts of the reform process. Some of these influences 
came by accident; others were initiated by reform actors within the SED-media empire. As 
has already been identified, many journalists within the SED-newspapers, although being 
communists, nevertheless disliked the form of socialism as existing in the GDR. These 
saw the possibility ripe to create a truly democratic socialist state. What is interesting is 
that these journalists initiated articles, which were supported by Hardline journalists and 
even the Krenz regime, although out of different reasons. The question of uncovering 
corruption and mismanagement of the past was surely such a topic. Soon after taking over 
power, Krenz moved out of Wandlitz, and the housing estate became part of the issues the 
“Neues Deutschland” covered concerning scandals of the past, especially concerning 
corruption and the misuse of power. Although the strategy of Krenz seemed to have been 
to portray the new leadership as being reformers, moving out and thus ending the misuse 
of power, the effect as will be discussed below, for the population was quite the contrary.  
 
Additionally, especially the reform journalists supported the democratization process within 
the SED. At the same time, once the legitimacy of the old guard was completely gone in 
the eyes of the majority of the GDR´s citizens as well as the grass-root party members, 
even the hardline journalists began to support calls for a resignation of Krenz as well as for 
the extra-ordinary party congress of December 1989, which led to drastic changes within 
the party but also to the elimination of the constitutionally set dominating role of the SED.  
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As can be seen in the analysis of the content analysis later on, the calls of an 
extraordinary party congress already began in the first half of November 1989 in the 
“Neues Deutschland”, and discussions on its results lasted until February 1990. The paper 
printed daily reports on the preparation, conduction and results of the conference, allowing 
a broad range of SED-members (including former SED-members who had been forced to 
leave in disgrace) to voice their opinion. More and more these articles demanded the 
resignation of the entire old guard, as well as for far reaching democratic changes within 
the party, but also within society.  
 
At the same time, the paper became a driving force in articulating opposition to unification 
with the FRG, supporting a call to build up a truly socialist democracy as a left wing 
alternative to West-Germany. Although the reporting on this was extremely one sided, 
building on a latently existing fear of many East Germans regarding the consequences of 
unification, it did nonetheless offer one standpoint in the emerging societal discussion on 
the pros and cons of unification. The same goes for the issue of compensation of 
expropriated property.  
 
Additionally, although later than the “Neue Zeit”, the paper began addressing the issue of 
the right-wing tendencies inside the GDR. Since 1945, the position of the paper followed 
the stance that this problem merely existed in the FRG, and that basically no Neo-Nazis 
existed in the socialist German state.  As of December 1989, while still pointing to the right 
wing problems inside West-Germany, the paper also begins to address the problem within 
the GDR. Again, as this topic became highly relevant for the entire German society, it is 




5.1.2 “In between the lines” 
 
As identified previously, telling the truth and voicing criticism towards the regime or the one 
party state in the GDR until 1989, required enormous courage and usually brought 
apprehensive consequences, often bringing an end to the career of the journalist or a loss 
of access to important resources for the newspaper in which the criticism was voiced. As a 
result, journalists turned to criticism “in between the lines” when “scratching on the limits 
imposed” as mentioned above. This promised some security against state reprisals, but 
even here the journalists could not go too far without fearing punishment. These “in 
between the line” articles included the diary of Victor Klemperer as identified. But also 
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during the time of research, such examples could be found. These included the indirect 
demands for an end to the constitutionally set leading role of the SED, by quoting 
demands of demonstrators in this respect; such as on November 8th on pages 1 + 2, or on 
November 15th, on page 2. Or the article on October 23rd, on page 1, in which the paper 
quotes the “Rudo Pravo”, arguing that the refugee problem also arose out of the existing 
problems inside the GDR, and that the argument that the FRG was responsible was only 
half-true. In these examples the paper had not directly taken the word, but had fostered 
the issue by simply quoting demonstrators or a foreign paper.  
 
A further example of “in between the line” reporting is surely the changing of the ADN 
release by the “Neue Zeit” on October 11th, where the editors were not willing to call the 
demonstrators “Randalierer” or “aufgeputschte Störer und kriminelle”, but instead merely 
informed the readers that according to the state information, the police had been attacked 
by the demonstrators. As the “Neues Deutschland” had printed the ADN release 
unchanged on the same day, this sent a very strong signal that the “Neue Zeit” was 
increasingly willing to oppose the regimes position and to instead bear the truth. 
 
Indeed, as suggested by Vaatz (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008), this “in between the line” 
reporting became a dominant way of addressing taboo topics, of criticising and of 
attempting to transmit an alternative message to the one from the regime. This was 
especially the case for the block party media. Nonetheless, as the grip on power of the 
regime increasingly collapsed, as the block parties as well as organizations previously 
controlled by the SED began to assert their independence and to position themselves for a 
multi-party system, and as the media system were increasingly faced with changing 
economic realities, the necessity for this “in between the line” criticism no longer existed. 
The form of censorship –as already described – was a mixture between direct censorship 
and self-censorship. Initially, as the regime was in retreat, their possibilities and willingness 
to execute their censorship progressively vanished. This in turn led to the fall of the 
journalists self-censorship. It is important to note, however, that the change in self-
censorship only came once the regime no longer wanted to or could implement its direct 











It can therefore so far be established that the output of the media did indeed attempt to 
foster some form of change within society but also within the individual party. The 
journalists began to propagandise for their idea of the future. This propaganda attempt 
was more strongly the case in the “Neues Deutschland” (fostering the position of the SED, 
later SED-PDS) than in the “Neue Zeit”, but also the “Neue Zeit” did become an instrument 
of the CDU (especially as of the end of February 1990). Additionally, both media became a 
platform for opposition groups and views, although in the case of the “Neues Deutschland”, 
this followed a one sided approach, used in order to propagandise for the SED party as 
well the agenda of the reform SED members. The media of the block parties, did indeed 
offer a more diverse political discussion. Critical output of the media before the resignation 
of Honecker, was extremely limited, but was nevertheless present in the media of the 
Block parties.  
 
The “output” analysis above has identified different roles the respective media assumed 
during the transformation process. As described in the chapter “Methodical approach”, 
however, it is important to investigate whether these issues did in effect have an influence. 
This as even if the press were beginning to report critically, even becoming a platform for 
oppositional actors and programmes, it would alone not suffice to argue that the media 
indeed did have an influence on the democratization process and really assumed an 
“agenda setting” function.  
 
In this section, the “output” of the media is compared to interviews as well as literature, 
stating whether and to what extent the “output” of the newspapers were indeed useful for 
the democratization cause. As different “output” was identified for the block party media in 
comparison to the SED media, this section is again divided in an analysis of the block 
party media on the one hand, and the SED Media on the other.  
 
The Block party media.  
As argued by Dr. Zimmermann (Interview Zimmermann, 18.3.2008), the media of the GDR 
never stood alone. The East-German citizens were constantly informed about 
developments in the socialist states and within the GDR itself through the West-German 
media system. Therefore, the possibility of the media inside the GDR to actively influence 
public perception as well as its possibility of an “Agenda setting” function, must always be 
seen within this setting.  
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Nonetheless, as the SED leadership was no longer in the position to exert as much 
influence and control, subsequently some journalists used the thus resulting time of vacuity 
as well as perplexity inside the editorial offices, and began to express themselves more 
freely, to pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it and to propagandise for 
their idea of the future (Sparks, 2001) –  as for a short period of time, there was no one to 
tell them what to do. The interviews suggest that this development – which drastically 
increased as of October 1989 - namely the increasingly critical writing of the block party 
media, as well as increasingly critical stance of the block parties themselves (especially of 
the LDPD and its leader Manfred Gerlach), largely had a twofold effect.  
Firstly, it sent a clear signal to the people. This signal suggested that cracks within the 
system were appearing, and in turn strengthened the will of the people to demonstrate, 
sensing that a change was taking place. The fact that the bloc party media, therefore the 
media of the junior-partners in the government coalition - who were therefore part of the 
regime - were becoming more critical vis-à-vis the SED sent a clear picture of regime 
divisions.  
Secondly, it largely increased the democratization process within the respective block 
party. As suggested by Vaatz (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008), the critical reporting of the CDU 
journalists as well as their demands for change, in effect fostered a change within the CDU 
itself. Reiprich (Interview Reiprich, 20.5.2008) supports this claim. The content analysis 
also supports this, as the paper at times printed demands by CDU members, criticising the 
own party leadership. According to the content analysis the first articles in the “Neue Zeit” 
addressing the need of reforming the CDU and of setting a new course, already came at 
the beginning of November 1989, and continued almost weekly until the beginning of 
March 1990.  An example here is an article in the “Neue Zeit”, on January 24th 1990 on 
page 2 headed “Criticism by CDU base”, in which some rank and file CDU members 
criticise the decision by the CDU leadership to remain in the government of Modrow. And 
indeed the pressure by the party base to implement an inner-party democratization 
appears to have had real tangible effects: on November 2nd 1989, Gerald Götting - seen by 
the party base as being a “Betonkopf” (Interview Zimmermann, 18.3.2008) - was forced to 
resign as head of the party. He was followed by Wolfgang Heyl, who then resigned 
following a coronary, and then Lothar de Maiziére in the same month who later came to be 
the first and last democratically elected Prime Minister of the GDR. Both successors stood 
for an independent CDU, no longer standing for a socialist system but rather openly 
promoting a transformation towards a market economy and unification with the FRG.  
 
But the output analysis also identified that the “Neue Zeit” began to discuss the internal 
problems of the GDR, as well as the former but also continuous corruption and misuse of 
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power by the SED elites. This fostered a continued erosion of SED’s legitimacy and 
support among the grass root party members but also among ordinary GDR citizens. As 
remembered by Günter Schabowski (Sieren & Koehne, 1991), increasingly publications 
began to appear that corruption and mismanagement inside the regime were not yet over, 
and that the regime was even trying to cover up the corruption of the past. Stated by 
Schabowski, all this led to a shattering of the party, as the public mood against the party 
increasingly turned violent. The comrades were not only uncertain, but also intimidated, 
and left the party in droves. Anger and disappointment of the party members melted with 
the public frustration and hatred for the regime. As a result the politburo was increasingly 
cornered. Krenz blamed the media for this situation, and Schabowski for allowing the 
media the liberties. Schabowski replied that one could not proclaim the media independent 
and then accuse them of reporting unfavourably towards the regime once they used this 
independence (Sieren & Koehne, 1991, pg 141). 
 
Already before the resignation of Honecker, although still following the SED-stance, the 
block party media at the same time, began to address why so many people were leaving, 
and were beginning to address the problems within the country. This undoubtedly 
supported a societal discussion on the topic, and to return to the point made before, it 
suggested to the people that the first cracks were appearing in the system. Additionally, it 
put pressure on an internal CDU discussion.  
 
Shortly after the resignation of Honecker, the media of the Block parties increasingly 
began to mention the demonstrations, the emerging opposition groups, their members, 
their programmes and events. This had an influence in a number of ways.  
Firstly articulating the demands of the people and the aims of the opposition groups, it 
helped to un-demonize the picture the SED-media had attempted to create of these so-
called “rioters”. As suggested by Vaatz (Interview, Vaatz, 7.5.2008), the SED-media had 
printed reader’s letters, in which these condemned the violent demonstrators and their 
seemingly undemocratic behaviour. The articles of the block party media, which printed 
both pros and cons of the demonstrations, on the other hand helped to create a more 
balanced picture of the situation in the heads of people who were not necessarily opposed 
to the socialist state as such. With the article dated October 19th 1989, on page 2, the 
paper stated that the demonstrators  - whom one should attest good faith to begin with - 
are attempting to bring about change and a public dialog with the regime, the paper does 
just that. It fostered a societal discussion on the topic, and forced the leadership to 
acknowledge this discussion. Furthermore, by mentioning the “Neues Forum” before this 
was actually legally allowed as the content analysis has portrayed, the paper put pressure 
 148 
(as did the CDU party as such) on the regime to revise the decision not to allow the 
legalisation of the forum.  
 
Secondly, as stated by Siegfried Reiprich (Interview, 20.5.2008), the fact that the 
demonstrations as well as the opposition groups and their members were mentioned in the 
official GDR media, alone was already an enormous victory for these activists. It was the 
“break through to the official existence”. To the logic of every socialist totalitarian system 
belonged the circumstance, that opposition to the state and the system inside the country 
was non-existent. An opposition activist was a persona non grata, and as such could not 
be mentioned by the media. Argued by Reiprich, that these people and groups were then 
suddenly mentioned in the official media, was a gigantic breakthrough to the official 
“existence” and symbolised a psychological victory and gain in power for the opposition 
groups. Additionally, as suggested by Vaatz (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008), the newspaper 
articles informing on the opposition groups and programmes did indeed help to make 
these known to the East-German public. Vaatz argues that in this way, “Die Union” in 
Dresden for example, became a direct point of orientation for the opposition groups. 
Through “Die Union”, the group 20 that had formed in Dresden could make public their 
messages. Here a shift in the role of the GDR media as opposed to the West-German 
media could be observed. So much was suddenly happening all around the GDR, that 
local newspapers simply had the possibility to write about events and topics that the West-
German media could not. In this, as these newspapers had opened and had become more 
balanced in their reporting, the source of orientation for the people often shifted to these 
media.  
 
Neues Deutschland.  
As identified, the reaction of the SED newspapers to the unfolding events was to begin a 
critical reporting on examples of party corruption and misuse of power. One such example, 
as mentioned above, was the issue of the housing estate of Wandlitz. Although Krenz had 
supported the critical reporting of the SED-newspapers on the matter, believing this would 
distance himself to the former leadership, the effect for the population was quite the 
contrary. In the heads of the people he was part of the old regime (after all he was the 
person who announced the election results in May), and by allowing the media to portray 
this example of power abuse he simply increased the hatred towards the old guard 
including him, among even a vast number of SED rank and file members. Thus, the media 
played an important role in de-legitimizing Krenz as well as in bringing to light just how 
corrupt the old elite was. 
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Although initially, the uncovering of the former scandals only went so far as to mention the 
obvious and being limited to mistakes of the past, by December 1989, the paper also 
began uncover issues that the leadership had not wanted, at times directly uncovering 
scandals of acting SED leaders. Examples included articles suggesting that the leadership 
had not been entirely open as to the extent of luxury goods available at Wandlitz for the 
party leadership, or regarding articles concerning the hunting estate of Prime Minister Willi 
Stoph in Müritz. Stoph, had remained in office (despite directly representing the Honecker 
leadership circle) until November 7th, when he was forced to resign as a consequence of 
public pressure. The media’s coverage of his housing estate undoubtedly intensified public 
resentment against him, and largely further discredited the old guard in the eyes of the 
SED’s grass roots and the ordinary citizens. Additionally, the paper began to criticise a 
failing action on part of the new politburo to vigorously stop corruption and misuse and to 
bring those who committed crimes – no matter who they were – to justice.  
 
As a consequence, the party members increasingly began to demand the resignation of all 
former leading figures and eventually led to the replacement of Egon Krenz through 
Gregor Gysi, as favoured by the reform orientated journalists. Additionally, the media 
began to demand democratization within the party as well as criticising the Krenz regime.  
Here one strong role of the “Neues Deutschland” becomes apparent, namely its role in 
fostering the internal transformation (democratization) of the SED during the extraordinary 
party congress of December 1989, as well as the removal of the entire old guard and the 
emergence of new, reform orientated leaders. Although the paper did surely not actively 
initiate a change within the party, its continual reporting on corruption and misuse of 
power, magnified the already present mistrust of many SED party members as well as the 
hatred of many ordinary citizens not sure whether to give the new SED leadership the 
benefit of the doubt. Additionally, by extensively covering the extra-ordinary party 
conference, the paper offered a wide range of views on how to continue within the party 
and the state, although the underlining message remained that only the SED could 
guarantee a successful future for the GDR.  The paper increasingly distanced herself from 
the new politburo. This is strongly suggested by the fact that Schabowski did not manage 
to overrule the will of the employees of the “Neues Deutschland”, in making Spickermann 
Chief-Editor of the paper. Both Schabowski and Krenz had originally wanted to make the 
former Deputy-Chief Editor Harald Wessel in charge of the paper, but were forced to back 
down facing the employees opposition and will to give Spickermann the job.  
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Considering that a majority of East Germans in 1990, voted for the parties who stood for 
unification, the attempt by the “Neues Deutschland” to foster for an independent “third way”  





In Hungary, after Soviet liberalization and occupation a short period of multiparty 
democracy was replaced by a Stalinist one-party dictatorship in 1948, led by Màtyàs 
Rákosi. The regime of Rákosi was regarded as being one of the most repressive in 
Eastern Europe, but it ultimately failed in destroying pre-communist democratic 
experiences and in indoctrinating Stalinist / Leninist principles. The Revolution of 1956, 
characterized by the participation of all major social groups (students, intellectuals, 
workers, and rural communities) clearly suggests that the form of communism as 
implemented by Rákosi was rejected by the majority of Hungarians (Sükösd, 2000, pg 
128). In 1956, within a short time, a considerable part of the entire society - including large 
parts of the press - had organized and begun to demand a neutral, truly democratic 
Hungary. As suggested by Sharman “By early October 1956 significant sections of the 
press were critical of the leadership and urged the restoration of Nagy’s New Course, while 
poets and playwrights satirized the old guard and students began to discuss how best to 
return to the proper path of socialist development” (Sharman, 2003, pg72)  
 
Although Soviet troops ultimately crushed the democratic forces after 13 days, the 
circumstance of the quick re-emergence of a pluralist political society during the short 
period, had made it clear to both the Moscow backed Hungarian Communists as well as to 
Moscow, that the form of repressive Stalinist communism as implemented by the 
Hungarian regime previously would need to be changed. Consequently, while one-party 
rule was re-installed and Hungary clearly remained part of the Soviet sphere of influence, 
the new Hungarian leader, János Kádár, early on began to bring Hungary on the path of 
“Goulash Communism” (O’Neil, 1997 pg 83), a term used to describe Hungary’s high 
degree of reformist pragmatism and comparably high liberties given to the people, marked 
by economic reforms and a greater lenience towards social pluralism.  
 
After two years of harsh repression (1956 to 1958), the regimes policies changed to 
promote national reconciliation, de-politization, demobilization and cooption of the people 
(Sükösd, 2000). The regime permanently dissolved the hated and semi-independent 
Hungarian KGB – the AVH - as well as the Communist guard units, which had been used 
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to suppress the national uprising in 1956. This sent a clear signal to the Hungarians that 
the regime had shifted its mechanisms of power from omnipresent terror to softer 
measures (Sükösd, 2000, pg 133).  
 
Part of this political policy involved far reaching reforms, which brought an increase in 
especially economical but also social and political liberties.  Kádár's new policy was best 
described by his famous statement “those who are not against us are with us” (O’Neil, 
1997 pg 84). This policy was aimed at having a conciliatory effect vis-à-vis a population 
that overwhelmingly resented the Moscow backed regime installed, by arguing that it was 
the most liberal in the entire region, and that the Soviet Union would not tolerate more. 
Subsequently, as stated by Sharman: “Hungary became the happiest barrack in the 
socialist camp” (Sharman, 2003, pg88). Nonetheless, key demands articulated during the 
1956 uprising including Hungarian neutrality, a pluralist political landscape as well as a 
free press were not introduced. Important to note, was that with this shift also the regime 
“hardliners” were considerably less extreme and arguably less Stalinist than their GDR 
counterparts. 
 
People initially appeared to accept the fact that communism was here to stay for a while 
and that it was indeed the best possible path that would still be tolerated by Moscow. The 
Journalist András Heltai-Hopp (Interview, 18.2.2008) speaks of a “Kádárian-contentment” 
which became visible throughout a large part of the Hungarian population. Indeed, 
Hungary initially fared well in comparison to other countires within the Soviet Bloc, and for 
many “Goulash communism” was working. Heltai-Hopp suggests that people believed that 
economically things could only become better, believing in the superior communist system.  
 
The doctrine of “those who are not against us are with us” was largely also used in the 
handling of intellectuals. Here the regime relied on a so-called “3 T” model támogatás 
(support) tûrés (toleration) and tiltás (banning), a model that spelt out the essential 
principles of political neutralization of the intellectuals. The "3 T's" brought a softening of 
censorship, differentiating between support and toleration of the intellectuals´ work. 
Intellectuals that supported the communist regime were largely “supported”, while those 
which the regime had no use for, but which did also not directly oppose it were “tolerated”. 
Those, which directly opposed the regime or criticised it too directly were “banned”. Over 
the years those works, which had been “banned”, increasingly began to move into the 
section “tolerated”, as the general liberalization in society was expanding. This model was 
also applied for the journalists. As suggested by Zoltan Kiszelly, in the media, this model 
was applied as a societal pressure valve (Interview Kiszelly, 14.2.2008).  
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At the beginning Kádárs reforms and the attempt of national reconciliation came cautious 
and slow, however, in 1963 with a widespread amnesty for participants of the revolution 
this process received a stark momentum (Sükösd, 2000). The aim was to achieve a 
general consolidation of the system by including a wide range of social groups and by 
allowing limited freedoms ultimately fostering demobilization.  As described by Lánczi and 
O’Neil, in Hungary, beside the so-called official “first” society, an informal, parallel, 
“second” society of tolerated practices had developed with the aim of creating a vent for 
social unrest. Dissent, discontent and frustration were channelled into and meant to be 
diffused by this “second” society (Lánczi and O’Neil, 1997).Gross (2002) argues that a 
form of post-communism developed even before 1989, “one that in itself created two 
political cultures that existed side by side: an official and an unofficial one” (Gross, 2002, 
pg 14).  
 
Kádárs regime believed in the need of economic reform right from the outset of taking over 
power. As argued by Batt, it was the central policy of the political strategy of the 
communist regime (Batt, 1991). It saw reform as a way to strengthen the regimes 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its population by portraying the communist party as an agent of 
economic and social modernization and as the provider of an adequate standard of living. 
The regime abandoned compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce, and even the re-
collectivization of the 1960s attempted to persuade the peasants through incentives, 
instead of forcing them (Stokes, 1993). Due to the reforms introduced, the form of state 
power that emerged can best be described as a form of “state corporatism” or “consultative 
authoritarianism” (quoted in Batt, 1991, pg 5). Suggested by Stokes, the government 
introduced the most far reaching economic reforms of the entire Communist bloc, the most 
important being the “New Economic Mechanism” (NEM) in 1968 (Stokes, 1993). The NEM 
presented a structure for the systematic coordination away from bureaucratic state control 
as well as encouraging the re-emergence of civic citizen orientations (Girogi & Pohorytes, 
1994). As a consequence during the 1970s, Hungary appeared to be prospering, and the 
social contract of “buying” social stability through relative liberties and an acceptable 
standard of living appeared to work. This largely strengthened the “Kádárian-contentment” 
as mentioned above. As argued by Rudolf L. Tökes: „Political stability in the Kádár era 
rested on an unwritten social contract between the people and the regime“ (Tökes, 1997, 
pg 125).  
 
However, by the 1980s this picture began to change. The central elite had been forced to 
compromise and modify parts of the NEM by regional party apparatuses over the years, 
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which in effect partly reversed the reforms introduced previously and subsequently played 
a part in sliding the Hungarian economy into crisis in 1980 (Batt, 1991). Additionally, 
Hungary had paid for parts of its economic growth through foreign debts. Between 1970 
and 1979 the Hungarian state debt rose from 1 Billion $ to 9.1 Billion $. Furthermore, high 
internal subsidies hindered incentives for competition with international companies. In 
1980, Hungary was faced with “massive, unmanageable hard-currency debts, inefficient 
and outdated production structures, budget deficits and powerful inflationary pressures” 
(Batt, 1991, pg 7).  
 
In order to tackle these problems, Hungary embarked on a series of far-reaching reforms 
in the 1980s. These reforms to a great extent “opened” –at least economically - Hungary to 
the West long before such steps were even contemplated in other communist states. Thus, 
while other countries facing monetary difficulties, such as Romania, suspended payments 
and tightened spending, Hungary in 1982 became a member of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This was the boldest reform of a socialist state as it 
meant a de facto opening to the world market. In 1987 further extensive economic reforms 
followed again in the sphere of banking, followed in 1988 in areas of taxation, price control, 
subsidies policy and company law, thus in effect re-creating the possibility to legally form 
private companies (Swain, 2006, pg 145).  
 
In some respect the economic difficulties, the decision and consequences of bringing 
Hungary into the IMF and the World Bank, accompanied by an increasingly liberal society 
since the 1960s, on the whole can be regarded as the beginning of the breakdown of the 
political system, bringing a post-communist situation, as argued by Gross previously, 
before the regime actually collapsed. Additionally, the Hungarian regime recognized that 
further far-reaching reforms had become unavoidable in order to prevent a further erosion 
of legitimacy and of the economic situation. As argued by Ripp, by the 1980s a new 
political and economic elite within the regime had taken power, one that realized it had 
vested interest in implementing radical reforms (Ripp, 2002).  
 
 
1. The Media in Hungary 
 
As in all soviet satellite states, the Hungarian (communist) workers’ party (Magyar 
Dolgozok Partja – MDP) quickly began to change the conditions of ownership, control, and 
legal environment of the media. Any publications by the democratic parties were banned, 
and independent media companies were either nationalized or closed. Control of the 
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communist party over the media was absolute and characterized by severe censorship. 
The responsibilities and role of the journalists and the media as such clearly followed the 
model of Communist states in the region and initially may even have been stricter in 
comparison.  
 
Following the 1956 revolution, which led to a surprisingly quick re-emergence of societal 
groups including a pluralist media landscape, the situation changed. With the introduction 
of Kádárs liberal policies, the degree of media control eased considerably. As suggested 
by Sükösd (Sükösd, 2000) during the 1960s, although direct censorship remained, the 
even stronger instrument of media control became self-censorship and the journalists 
clientelist dependence on the media nomenklatura. As will still be elaborated in the chapter 
“The Media in transition”, the way in which the amnesty of 1963 was introduced, while 
allowing reform communists to return to important positions within the media, at the same 
time, the circumstance that many did not receive amnesty worked as a warning and led to 
a strong system of self-censorship, as the respective journalists knew exactly what would 
go too far. Indeed, in this “Velvet prison” or “culture of censorship” (Haraszti 1987), self-
censorship became a generally accepted and internalized standard among intellectuals, 
journalists, and authors, (Sükösd, 2000) cemented by the widespread acceptance that the 
division of Europe would not end soon.  
 
This situation of relative liberalism remained in place until the 1980s, although step-by-
step, the individual journalists increasingly widened the scope on what could be written 
about.  
 
This chapter is comparably shorter than the same chapter on the GDR. This, as the media 
in Hungary underwent a transition much earlier and remained in a state of transition 
continuously from the 1960s up to the end of the 1980s. The chapter “The Media in 
Transition” is thus more elaborate.  
 
As in the GDR, the choice of newspaper for the content analysis of Hungary follows the 
“most different Systems design” (Przeworski / Teune, 1970). The  “Népszabadság” was 
the direct organ of the party, while the “Magyar Nemzet” was the organ of the “popular 
front” groups, under leadership of the reform orientated politburo member Imre Pozsgay. It 
represented the largest reform-orientated newspaper.  
 
It is important to note, however, that the difference in the two newspapers was not as 
strongly the case as the difference in the two newspapers of the GDR. To begin with, as 
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will still be outlined, the entire media landscape of Hungary by 1989 was already 
substantially more pluralistic and independent than was the case in the GDR: owing much 
to the liberalization measures since the 1960s as well as the media privatizations since 
1988 and the thus resulting commercialization.  Furthermore, in both newspapers reform 
communists had considerable influence. In the “Magyar Nemzet”, being the organ of the 
“popular front” groups, this was the case as it by definition already did not represent the 
party, and as it was directly under the leadership of the reform orientated politburo member 
Imre Pozsgay; in the “Népszabadság”, it being the organ of the party, both hardliners and 
softliners of the politburo could take influence. Nonetheless, the newspypers do represent 
the “most different” official newspapers with considerable circulation. While hard- and 
softliners could influence the “Népszabadság”, in the “Magyar Nemzet” hardliners found 
barely no support, and the paper consisted of both softline regime supporters as well as 
moderate opposition. The employees of the “Népszabadság” on the other hand, consisted 
mostly of communists, both hard- and softline. As of the end of 1989, as will be portrayed 
in the subsequent chapters, this picture changed again. Following the renaming of the 
communist party, which brought the end of the hardline influences, the  “Népszabadság” 
subsequently was only controlled by reform minded communists. The “Magyar Nemzet”, 
however, at the latest following the opposition’s referendum of November 1989, 
increasingly emerged as an independent actor, freeing itself from the direct influence of 
the party softliners. Consequently, more and more it moved towards becoming a platform 
for all political forces, bar the hardline communists.   
 
 
2. Towards transition  
 
As identified previously, by the 1980s, a younger generation of party members had taken 
over who recognized the need for far-reaching reforms and began working towards 
implementing these. However, further reforms would inevitably also lead to increasing 
political and social liberties, which could of course lead to a complete collapse of the 
communist party’s monopoly on power. 
  
En face of this conundrum, the question of how best to continue became subject to heavy 
debate among the communist elite, and a conflict between hard- and softliners emerged. 
Especially from younger members of the party came an increasing demand for change. 
The party first began to diminish its own grip on political power, when in 1985, it allowed 
multi-candidate, semi-contested elections. This, as suggested by Swain, had the 
unintended outcome of weakening the central apparatus and radicalising the provinces, 
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whose support Károly Grósz, the reform minded „centrist“ party member, needed in his 
struggle to topple Kádár (Swain, 2006, pg 145). The party’s monopoly on political power 
was first openly challenged by an external group, when in September 1987, Hungarian 
intellectuals - with some support of communist officials such as Imre Pozsgay - founded 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Dekokrata Forum or MDF) in Lakitelek. As 
remembered by Dr. József Kajdi, at the meeting in Lakitelek were present a broad variety 
of dissidents, from reform communists to real opposition figures as well as dissenters 
(Interview, Kajdi, 01.04.2008). In January 1988, the MDF began a series of popular public 
meetings in the Jurta Theatre, on various aspects of democratic reform (Swain, 2006, pg 
146).  
 
Initially, following the form of self-censorship as mentioned previously, the media were 
reluctant to discuss the formation of this Forum (despite the fact leading reform 
communists had been involved in and present at its formation). Consequently, it was 
politburo member Imre Pozsgay who opened the way for the press to cover not only their 
formation but also their agenda and demands. In an Interview for the “Magyar Nemzet”, in 
November 1987, he openly talked about the meeting at Lakitelek – in which he stated that 
he participated – and argued that this meeting must not be understood as opposition as 
such, but rather as an open discussion initiated by some intellectuals who feel responsible 
for the future of the country. While stating that with some topics raised he could not identify 
himself with (including with those people who question that socialism as such could solve 
the problems of the country and its people), he stated that the issued raised are generally 
relevant issues for the entire society. He argued that during the meeting in Lakitelek, which 
clearly stood in the spirit of Glasnost, some issues were raised to which the political life 
was not yet prepared, to which the politicians however need to prepare themselves for 
(Quoted in: „Budapester Rundschau“, November 25th 1989, page 4).  
 
By quoting the complete wording of the declaration issued at Lakitelek (even the fact that 
some demanded the abolishment of the socialist system), Pozsgay made the entire 
objectives of the founding members of the MDF public, henceforth allowing the media to 
discuss the forum as such.  
 
Additionally, Pozsgay had forced a discussion on the topic among the political elite, thus 
making a further taboo topic socially and politically acceptable. As remembered by Dr. 
Kajdi, before 1988, only people, not movements were mentioned by the media. These 
usually suggested that there were only a few dissidents in Hungary, not that there was an 
active oppositional movement. Additionally, these were usually published in the police and 
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crime sections of the papers (such as the popular unrest in March of 1988 which had been 
organized by opposition groups, but had not been approved by the state and was therefore 
violantly dissolved) (Interview, Dr Kajdi, 01.04.2008).  
  
Argued by Pittaway, the formation of the MDF opened the door to the formation of further 
organizations that explicitly opposed the party-state (Pittaway, 2003 pg 59). The opposition 
that emerged comprised various ideological backgrounds and aims (Giorgi & Phorytes, 
1994). Especially the MDF can be categorised as being a moderate opposition group, 
while subsequent groups particulary the “Alliance of Free Democrats” (Szabad 
Demokratak Szovestege, or SZDSZ) and the “Alliance of Young Democrats" (Fiatal 
Demokratak Szovestege, or FIDESZ) (see below) were more extrem.   
 
Although the authorities attempted to hinder the emergence of new organizations, the 
limited efforts and success of this increased the opposition’s confidence and independent 
organizations opposed to the party state mushroomed, and many explicitly began to 
transform into political parties (Pittaway, 2003). On March 30th 1988 a group of young 
dissidents at Budapest´s Karl Marx University of Economics began a youth organization - 
FIDESZ - which provided young Hungarians an alternative to the communists youth 
organization. One of its leaders – Viktor Orban - became famous during a heavily covered 
speech attacking communist rule during the reburial of Imre Nagy in June 1989 and later 
went on to becoming Prime Minister.  In November 1988, the Network of Free Initiatives 
transformed itself into the SZDSZ, a party committed to radical liberal policies.  The same 
month saw the re-emergence of the Conservative Smallholders Party (Fuggelten 
Kisgazdaport, or FKGP), the dominant party following the 1945 democratic elections, 
which had been destroyed by the communists in 1947. Thus, as argued by Samuel 
Huntington, “In 1988 Hungary began a transition to a multi-party system” (Huntington, 
1991, pg 23). The legality of the formation of an explicitly political organization was finally 
fixed in January 1989, when on January 11th, the Hungarian parliament voted to allow 
freedom of association and freedom of assembly, thus allowing the formation of 
independent parties and groups.  
 
Much of the room for opposition to form and to voice discontent had come out of the 
circumstance that the communist elite itself had been facing severe internal splits, which 
had limited the party’s capability to resist the formation of opposition in society. 
Additionally, an increasing number of especially younger party officials no longer believed 
in the party’s right to prevent opposition voices from arising (Interview, Pach, 14.11.2006). 
As described by Pach, these developments within the party were perceived by society on 
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the whole and created a vacuum that could be exploited. As a consequence, as stated by 
Tökés,  “by the end of March 1989, a de facto multiparty system came into being” (Tökés 
1997, pg 114). And indeed, the regime did little to repress these embryonic political actors 
(Swain, 2006, pg 146).  
 
The split between hardliners and softliners within the ruling elite became most apparent 
during the party congress in May 1988 that removed Kádár himself as well as around one 
third of the Politburo members (Pittaway, 2003). Headlines dominating the newspapers in 
Hungary following this event, included:  “Everything is possible”, “Change and Constancy”, 
“The Year of Half-Change” (Quoted in Giorgi & Pohoryles, 1994, pg 12). 
 
While the immediate successor of Kádár, Károly Grosz, was not the strongest supporter of 
reform, the party congress, however, had strengthened the position of the leading 
reformers including Miklos Nemeth and Imre Pozsgay (Pittaway, 2003). Additionally, the 
conference that had removed Kádár made a vague commitment to implement a `socialist 
pluralism` (Swain, 2006, pg 146).  
 
Nonetheless, initially the government proved reluctant to implement any widespread 
reforms. This began to change in November 1988, when the Central Committee voted for 
the lifting of censorship as well as the transfer of most party privileges to government, in 
effect handing power to the softliners who largely controlled government. The 
concentration of power in the hands of the softliners was further strengthened when Grósz 
surrendered the premiership to Németh, while Pozsgay successfully submitted to 
parliament a “democracy package”, which had failed to come through in the politburo in 
July when fifteen independent MP's had submitted it (although already then it had been 
drafted by Pozsgay's reform socialist allies) (Swain, 2006, pg 146).  
 
Furthermore, groups within the party began to organize so called “reform circles” –
numbering around 100 by May 1989- in order to democratize the party and the political 
system from below. Statements by party elites suggest that by the end of 1988, these 
circles had been successful in so far as the leadership of the MSZMP had begun to 
address the question of ending the leading role of the party as well as preparing for the 
installation of a quasi-pluralistic political system (Tökés, 1997, pg 115). This was 
formalised when in February 1989, the party agreed to eliminate the party’s leading role in 
the draft-constitution it was preparing (Stokes, 1993).  Following Gorbachev's policies 
within the Soviet Union, the softliners felt confident that Moscow would not intervene and 
the hardliners had lost a main argument which they had managed to bring since the 
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intervention of 1956, namely that the Soviet Union would not permit extensive changes 
from occurring which questioned the communists grip on power.  
 
Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth and other reform politicians were eager to rapidly force 
change in early 1989. They believed that a “socialism with a human face” as Nagy in 
Hungary and Dubcék in Czechoslovakia had envisaged it, where the party would retain 
control in an emerging pluralism, would be the only way to allow the communists to retain 
power on the long run. As argued by Ripp: “the most favourable solution to them was to 
start the inevitable political transformation and to ensure that a peaceful and gradual 
version of this process took place. Therefore, the containment of political radicalism was in 
the interests both of those in power, who were attempting to save the system and who 
wished to limit changes to the creation of a `new model`, and of those members of the elite 
who were interested in organized retreat, in avoidance of any violent redistribution of 
power, and in capitalizing on the favourable conditions during the time of transition towards 
a new system” (Ripp, 2002, pg 4).  
 
Both the Soviet Leadership as well as the Hungarian politburo saw that a move towards a 
multiparty system was inevitable. However, in respect to pluralism, both believed that 
socialism had become so deeply rooted in the societies of the region that a radical 
transition away from it would not be imminent. Rather they believed that the transition 
would be gradual, or “Organic” as argued by the Hungarian reformers. Ideally, the 
transition should take place in form of a “smooth” democratization, which should be both 
initiated and controlled by the party   (Kalmár, 2002, pg 42).  As suggested by Bruszt and 
Stark: “if they could seize the high ground as champions of democracy, the reform 
Communists calculated that, with their hands no longer tied by the Brezhnev Doctrine, they 
could use their superior resources, organization, and nationally recognized candidates to 
defeat the opposition in a straight-ahead electoral contest with no strings attached” (Bruszt 
& Stark, 1992, pg 43). This view was supported by various commissions established by 
Moscow in order to evaluate the situation in Eastern Europe and for giving proposals on 
how to deal with the coming crisis, including the Department of International relations of 
the CPSU CC and the Bogomolov Institute (Kalmár, 2002).  
 
Nemeth asserted his intend to enter negotiations with the opposition, and in January 1989 
Imre Pozsgay formally declared that what had occurred in 1956 had not been a “counter-
revolution” as previously declared under Kádár, but instead a “popular uprising against an 
oligarchic system of power which had humiliated the nation” (Stokes, 1993, pg 100). This 
conclusion had been part of a report put together by a special party committee – which 
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Pozsgay had headed - to analyse Hungary’s political, economic and social developments 
during the last 30 years. Pozsgay had announced this before the report had been made 
public during an interview for a news programme without first consulting the rest of the 
Politburo (Békès & Kalmár, 2002). Argued by Tökés, this created a political “fait accompli”, 
and prevented a looming military putsch by Károly Grosz and a small amount of hardliners 
in the politburo. With this he had forced the entire party to “confront the central legitimacy 
dilemma of the Kádar era” (Tökés, 1997, pg 114). Apart from this, what appeared even 
more remarkable was the fact that Pozsgay also stated that the socialist path “was wrong 
in its entirety” (Stokes, 1993, pg 100). The politburo –less Grosz – did not want to publicly 
criticise Pozsgay's remarks, since they partly agreed with him but also feared that this 
would split the politburo even further in the eyes of the people. A few weeks later when the 
report was officially released it stated: “Under the Stalin regime the ideal of international 
communism was turned into a merciless imperial program. In the shadow of this 
endeavour, Marxist humanism completely vanished”. It continued by stating that the 
system that had been installed through Stalin was built on “bloody dictatorship, 
bureaucratic centralism, fear and retribution” (Quoted in Stokes, 1993).  
 
As suggested by Kalmár, the remarks made by Pozsgay transformed the matter from a 
debate on the past, into a debate on the inevitability of a radical change of views for the 
future (Kalmár, 2002). This also became evident when at the January 31st politburo 
meeting Rezsö Nyers unexpectedly stated that, as far as he was concerned, a multi-party 
system could emerge: “So what we need here is that together with this (that is, the 
Pozsgay issue-M.K), we should also somehow take the whole problem, the essence of the 
concrete problem, to the Central Committee, that is, what should we do now with this one-
party system (or) multi-party system. Events have overtaken us by now. I do not see any 
other possibility than to recognize the multi-party system. But let’s discuss the issue, and if 
we decide that we do not want to endorse it, then we don’t, and then everyone should 
decide for themselves, in accordance with their own conscience, whether they can or 
cannot endorse it politically. I do, to be frank, I’d endorse it, even if you do not agree with 
it.(….) And someday we will have to do it anyway” (Minutes of the January 31, 1989 
MSZMP Politburo meeting. Quoted in Kalmár, 2002, pg 45).  
 
The events at the beginning of 1989 received an own momentum, and it became clear that 
retaining control would not be as easy for the elite as previously anticipated. As argued by 
Stokes, more and more the regime was caved in, not only permitting a celebration on 
March 15th (Commemorating the 1848 revolution) but also making it a national holiday 
instead of November 7 (Commemorating the October revolution), as well as allowing the 
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reburial of Imre Nagy on June 16th, 1989 (Stokes, 1993).  As suggested by Kalmár, the 
greater number of elite members recognised that the “wait-and-see” policy was now over 
(Kalmár, 2002). Consequently, a transition of up to 5 years was envisaged by the 
politburo, during which a multi-party system would emerge in Hungary, however, under the 
dominance of the MSZMP. According to Károly Grosz, the first phase of this controlled 
transition would end in December 1990, at the next scheduled party congress. While some 
younger party members believed that this phase should end in summer 1990 with the next 
parliamentary elections, most members believed that the entire transition would at least 
last until the 1995 general elections. In order to control the subsequent events, the regime 
had already assigned a number of experts dealing with the problems of the imminent 
transition. Believing that a pre-negotiated number of seats for the MSZMP during the 
parliamentary elections - as in the Polish case - would not work in Hungary, the elite saw 
the importance in negotiating a communist president with far reaching authority, to be 
elected by the current parliament before the next parliamentary elections took place. The 
creation of a coalition with some opposition partners as well as the establishment of a 
communist president should become the central tool with which the party would attempt to 
retain control despite multi-party elections and thus became a matter of primary 
importance for the party strategy (Kalmár, 2002).   
 
Grosz was convinced (and threatened) that a break with socialism would bring violence, 
therefore in the interest of stability the party needed to remain in control and to bring about 
a coalition under its leadership. Already in February he had stated: “With this structure, 
with the political burden behind us, and with the mood into which we have been driven and 
into which we have driven ourselves, will we or will we not be able to command a majority 
in elections held in a year’s time…? A change of social system in Hungary will be 
accompanied by a civil war… As I see it, there will be no intervention here from the East or 
from the West. There will be a closed thermos flask here, in which we will have to suffer for 
our own response, and then no stone will be left standing here. I am convinced of this, 
because there is a force that will be able and willing to take arms to prevent a change of 
system….For this reason, I see it as the only way for the political transition to take place on 
a basis of agreement between the various forces…It depends on our sense of reality 
whether we find partners with whom, in a coalition structure, we can create a majority, 
where the foundations of society remain” (Minutes of MSZMP Political Committee Meeting, 
February 7th, 1989, quoted in Rainer, 2002, pg 214). 
 
In June 1989 the government invited representatives of various oppositional movements to 
participate in the discussions on reforms. The aim, as stated in the position plan prepared 
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for the February 10th/11th 1989 meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee, was “the 
discussion of the issues concerning co-operation” (Kalmár, 2002, pg 48). In order to signal 
that the regime was open for a public dialogue, the government of Nemeth declared that 
the party would no longer restrict the work of the press.    
 
Present at the “national roundtable” (which in phases in effect lasted from June 13 1989 to 
March 1990) were representatives of the party, the opposition delegates as well as 
representatives of various social organizations that had increasingly begun to assert 
independence vis-à-vis the party. The objective of the regime during the talks was twofold. 
Firstly, these bilateral negotiations should identify potential coalition partners for the 
regime. Secondly, it should place the party at the head of the transition process, exposing 
how unable the opposition would be at this stage to govern alone. As the opposition 
movements to that point had not been in discussions with each other, and as they all 
followed various objectives, the government had hoped to de-legitimize the opposition by 
revealing how badly organized and split these were. However, in order to prevent this from 
happening, the opposition groups had established a `Round table of the opposition´ (EKA) 
(which lasted from March 22 to June 10, 1989) (Ripp, 2002) prior to the round table 
discussions with the government in order to create an inner consistency thus strengthening 
their bargaining status vis-à-vis the regime. (Girorgi & Pohoryles, 1994)  
 
As remembered by Dr. Kajdi, the EKA’s purpose was to ensure the better coordination of 
the opposition’s co-operation, to create a common platform against those currently in 
power, and to make the government involve them in consultations concerning important 
legislation proposals to be submitted to parliament (such as changes related to the 
Constitution, the position of President of the Republic or the Constitutional court), and 
other key issues (such as regulations concerning party formations, control over the media, 
economic issues and questions relating to the upcoming elections) (Interview Dr. Kajdi, 
01.04.2008).  The opposition had made it clear that it would prevent any attempt by the 
regime to be split. This became evident when the opposition refused to attend further 
discussions unless the FIDESZ be allowed to join (Kalmár, 2002).  
 
The strategy of the regime evidently did not work. The opposition initially proved that it was 
not only organized and willing to unite vis-à-vis the regime, but it also showed its 
willingness to force about change through mass demonstrations, as they did on March 
15th.  The MSZMP had to recognise that it could not form a coalition before the 1990 
elections. Nonetheless, the regime still believed to be firmly in control. They calculated that 
the outcomes of elections would still be in favour of a dominant MSZMP (between 40-45% 
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of the vote), and therefore the question of a coalition not pressing. Additionally, the regime 
still believed that it could negotiate a President to be elected before the free parliamentary 
elections would take place.  
 
The first phase of the “national roundtable” talks lasted until September 1989, when it 
appeared that an agreement between the regime and the opposition forces had been 
reached concerning amendments to the constitution which enabled Hungary’s transition to 
a multi-party system as well as an electoral law for the pluralistic national assembly. At this 
point, however, the inherent division in the opposition became apparent as they could not 
agree on whether direct presidential elections should come before the parliamentary 
elections –as favoured by the regime – or whether the president should be elected by the 
new democratically legitimized parliament. The MDF supported the regime, however, the 
SZDSZ, FIDESZ, the FKGP and the newly founded Social Democratic Party wanted the 
President to be elected after the elections by a newly elected, democratically legitimized 
multi-party parliament. Behind this discussion lay several factors: firstly, the question of 
whether Hungary should be a Parliamentary or rather a Presidential republic. Secondly, 
the opposition recognized the plans of the regime and saw that should the President be 
elected beforehand, a representative of the old elite –most possibly Imre Pozsgay – stood 
good chance of becoming president, thus allowing the party to effectively hold onto power 
even if the parliamentary elections would not bring a victory for the party. Additionally, as 
argued by Pittaway (2003), the SZDSZ believed that in order for Hungary to follow the 
transformation process successfully, a clear break with the past was needed.  
 
Consequently, the SZDSZ together with its allies began collecting signatures to force a 
referendum on this issue. In order to mobilize mass participation, they cunningly attached 
this issue to less controversial questions such as banning party activity at the workplace, 
reallocating party property and banning the Workers guard – the paramilitary party workers 
organization (Pittaway, 2003). Within a short period of time, 200,000 signatures were 
collected, double the amount needed to force parliament to call a referendum (Renwick, 
2002) and the referendum was held on November 25th. Despite a MDF boycott the result 
was in favour of the opposition. 
 
Apart from inflicting a major blow to the regimes attempt of assuring party control in a new 
system, the referendum had a major influence on party politics. Prior to the referendum the 
SZDSZ had been a junior partner in the “opposition roundtable delegation”, the MDF 
representing the most dominant group. The referendum, however, vastly boosted the 
SZDSZ’s popularity among the population, even in areas nobody had previously heard 
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about them. In the perception of many the SZDSZ became the party that stood most 
strongly for a new beginning.  Additionally, it enhanced the MSZMP´s erosion of support 
among the people and destroyed the regimes chances of creating a coalition with the 
MDF. Not wanting to appear too close with the regime, the MDF was forced to distance 
itself from it should it want to regain some of the supporters taken by the SZDSZ. Under 
the leadership of Jozsef Antall, the MDF positioned itself as a party of the moderate centre 
dedicated to following national values.  
 
The communist elite now recognised that its support in the population was not as strong, 
that socialism might not be as deeply rooted in society as previously expected. At this 
point, the regime went a step further from simply promising a multi-party system, as it had 
first done in February 1989, now also yielding to popular demand that this system did not 
necessarily need to continue on the basis of a socialist state.  
 
The developments that were occurring increased the deep insecurity within the regime 
regarding the best future path.  Consequently, disagreements between hard –and 
softliners within the communist party fervently re-surfaced. Increasingly, the reformers 
recognized the need to distance themselves from the past even more strongly in order to 
retain or rather regain public legitimacy. The failure to authentically break with the past 
together with the erosion of the communists grip on power across the entire region, which 
was now becoming increasingly more evident, resulted in a drastic decline in public 
support for the party (Pittaway, 2003). As suggested by Lánci and O’Neil: “By the late 
1980s the means by which the party had maintained its social support began to turn into 
its greatest enemy. As changes within Soviet politics became more evident, the ruling 
Hungarian Socialist Workers´ Party……found itself at a loss how to respond. It had 
predicated its rule on the argument that it created a more tolerant form of dictatorship for 
its subjects in comparison with the rest of the bloc; now developments were making that 
justification obsolete. As the party stagnated and split into factions, unable to react to 
events, sectors of society began to press the second society into the first, incrementally 
expanding the political space for debate within Hungary” (Lánci and O’Neil, 1997, pg 85). 
The media were surely one of these sectors of society. Sensing that change could now be 
forced, “the already semi-open media began to pluralize themselves at a dizzying pace, as 
new papers and journals appeared virtually overnight and as remaining official taboos 
were cast aside. Even central party and government newspapers soon became identified 
with party factions, using their relationship to publicize their own views on political reform” 
(Lánci and O’Neil, 1997, pg 85).  
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The party rank and file increasingly began to revolt against the conservative wing of the 
politburo –predominantly against party Secretary General Grósz. This also reflected the 
general mood in society, which more and more gave the reform leaders within the politburo 
a strengthened position. In April 1989, Grósz claimed that he had wanted to call a “state of 
economic emergency” together with Prime Minister Németh, but that he had been voted 
down by the Central Committee. Németh himself knew nothing of the plan, and 
subsequently repudiated the claim in the media (Renwick, 2002). This enhanced the open 
conflict between the hardliners and softliners within the party leadership. At the Political 
Committee meeting on April 19th, 1989 and the April 28th meeting of the International, 
Legal and Public Administration Policy Committee of the Central Committee, the 
government members present, including Miklós Németh, Gyula Horn and István Horváth, 
opposed the plans of party hardliners wishing to ban a demonstration during the reburial of 
Imre Nagy. Instead, they argued for an official rehabilitation of Nagy as well as for all those 
convicted for the participation in the 1956 uprising, as well as an official government 
attendance during the reburial  (Rainer, 2002, pg 215).  
 
Additionally, Németh replaced six hardline cabinet ministers, and generally began to act 
more independently in his role as head of the government vis-à-vis the party leadership 
(Ibid). These actions not only reflected the general mood in the country but also within the 
party grass-roots. The remarks and subsequent actions by Németh provoked strong 
independent-minded action from the media: the reform orientated newspaper “Magyar 
Nemzet” adopted a campaigning stance in trying to find out who was telling the truth in 
relation to the remarks by Grósz (Renwick, 2002, pg 199).   
 
The division between the hard- and softliners ultimately culminated in the transformation of 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt or MSZMP) into 
the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Part, or MSZP) in September 1989. 
While the MSZP was the de facto successor party of the old MSZMP insofar as it inherited 
its assets as well as that its representatives led the government until the elections in 1990, 
some hardliners re-organized separately as a newly formed Hungarian Communist 
Workers´ Party (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt).  
 
This transformation, however, was not enough to prevent a further erosion of the regimes 
popularity. Suggested by Sükösd: “No matter how deeply committed to change ex-
Communist leaders declared themselves to be, and no matter how much they publicly 
expressed regret for some of their earlier actions, voters well remembered their record and 
their unchanging positions on many critical issues not previously open to public debate 
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(Sükösd, 2000, pg 144). The split of the MSZMP, together with the emergence of further 
left and centre-left parties additionally weakened the party, as it led to a process of 
fragmentation on the left, which would later leave the MSZP isolated during the elections of 
1990 (Tökes, 1997).  
 
The regime, increasingly standing with its back to the wall, gave way on an important issue 
that had been addressed by both the opposition and the media, namely the question of the 
party’s assets. On October 20th, the Finance Minister stated that “since 1977 all of the 
party’s real estate has been in state possession, and the MSZMP has held it only with the 
rights of a trustee” (Quoted in Renwick, 2002, pg 204). 
 
In the winter of 1989 a scandal (which became known as the Danubegate or “Dunagate” 
scandal) (Sükösd, 2000, pg 147) was released by the media, which came to have a 
devastating effect on the credibility of the entire regime, and especially its reform 
members. This scandal involved a high-ranking secret service official leaking information 
to a journalist suggesting that the secret police was still observing the actions of the 
opposition leaders, and that the party leadership (including Imre Pozsgay) were receiving 
sensitive information on these, their parties as well as their election strategies. In order to 
prove these allegations, the official smuggled a journalist and cameraman into the secret 
police headquarters, where the documents of these actions were shown. Although it was 
not the “deciding” event which brought the voters away from the MSZP, Dr. Szabó Zoltán, 
a reform minded MSZP member of parliament since the time (Interview, 19.2.2008), states 
that it was one factor why the party lost votes and that it enormously damaged the image 
of the reformers.   
 
Parliamentary elections consisting of a complex electoral system with majoritarian and 
proportional elements finally took place over two rounds in March and April 1990. As 
argued by Stokes: “The electoral campaign was open, professional, free, and bitter” 
(Stokes, 1993, pg 179). The result was a defeat for the left (the MSZP obtaining a mere 8 
per cent of Votes), giving the national-Christian centre right a victory. The MDF won 44 per 
cent of the votes, its leader Jozsef Antall therefore subsequently formed a three party 
centre-right coalition (consisting of MDF, FKGP and the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party –or KDNP). Needing oppositional support to tackle remaining constitutional issues, 
the MDF entered an agreement with the largest opposition party the SZDSZ - having 
obtained 23 per cent – which allowed the SZDSZ candidate, Arpad Groncz (who had been 
imprisoned for six years following the 1956 uprising), to become the first President of the 
new Hungarian parliamentary republic. In return the government coalition gained 
 167 
parliamentary support from the SZDSZ in strengthening the post of Prime Minister in 
relation to parliament (Pittaway, 2003).  
 
Regime change in the Hungarian case therefore occurred through “negotiation“ between 
the regime and the opposition groups; a “negotiation” initiated by the softline regime in the 
hope to retain power in a multi-party system. It began with a split between “Hardliners” and 
“Softliners”, where the latter managed to secure control.  As argued by Giorgi & Pohoryles 
(1994) the Hungarian regime having perceived the overall dysfunctionality of the system 
and increasingly coming to recognize the gradual erosion of its power base and 
legitimation, embarked on political reforms and on further economic reforms already in the 
mid-1980s. The „liberalization“ phase in Hungary therefore already began early on, 
receiving a strong impetus at the end of the 1980s. This “liberalization” phase eventually 
led to “Institutionalization“ of democracy (democratization) phase at the end of 1989. Thus, 
different to the GDR, in Hungary the transition was a process of political erosion over a 
long period of time rather than sudden failure. 
 
 
3. The Media in transition 
 
As already mentioned, the liberalization reforms continuously implemented since the 
1960s also had an effect on the extent of political control over the media, which eased 
considerably. Indeed, as argued by Lanczi and O’Neil, in Hungary following Kádárs 
reforms, the media were less strictly controlled than elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe, allowing broader scope for discourse (O’Neil, 1997). Not only did the amount of 
direct influence on the media by the party leadership weaken, but increasingly also people 
who had fallen out due to their involvement in the 1956 uprising were allowed to return to 
important positions in all parts of society, including media positions. This was part of the 
general amnesty introduced by the regime in 1963. The people affected by the amnesty 
can be broken down into four categories: 
1. Those on death row. These were not released and the fact that they were awaiting 
execution suggested just how serious the situation still was. This situation acted as 
a warning signal and greatly fostered self-censorship.  
2. Some leading intellectuals and political figures, although not on death row, 
remained in prison until the late 1960s. This also sent a clear warning message to 
those rehabilited. 
3. Some were given amnesty, but were only given low profile jobs such as working in 
archives. An example of this was Miklos Vasarhelyi, who had been prime minister 
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Nagy’s press secretary. Although periodically he was able to publish some non-
political texts, he never again received a high ranking position within the media 
system.  
4. The fourth group of people were repentant communists who received a “second 
chance” and indeed returned to high-ranking positions.  
 
The form the amnesty worked followed the logic of the so-called “3 T” model as referred to 
previously. This amnesty had both bad and good side effects. On the one hand, this 
amnesty strengthened a system of self-censorship in the media. The reason for this was 
that while the amnesty rehabilitated many intellectuals, at the same time, although 
introduced as a general amnesty, in reality it was only a partial amnesty working as a 
general warning what would happen if one went too far. On the other hand, however, it 
increased a pluralism of ideas present within the media, as party nomenklatura responsible 
for controlling the media system as well as the journalists that retunred could attempt to 
liberalize their respective fields from the inside. Nonetheless, those journalists that could 
return were clearly picked communists who mostly accepted their guilt in 1956. Therefore, 
the amount of opposition they were both willing and prepared to pursue, at least at the 
beginning, remained low. Nevertheless, the majority of these were undoubtedly reform, 
softline communists and this certainly placed at least part of the control of the Hungarian 
media system into reform forces within the regime.  
 
Hence, as argued by Sükösd, these rehabilitated intellectuals then positively affected the 
democratization process by actively disseminating democratic values and concepts and by 
beginning to address previously taboo topics (Sükösd, 2000,  pg 149). An example of this 
was the former radio journalists Endre Gömöri, who had supported Imre Nagy. Although 
he was not allowed to return to the radio following the amnesty, he soon became the 
foreign affairs spokesperson for the liberally orientated newspaper “Magyarorszag”. 
Already in the 1970s, this newspaper began to publish excerpts of western newspaper 
articles with western standpoints in it, which led to some issues being forbidden in many 
eastern-bloc countries, including the GDR (Interview, Heltai-Hopp, 18.2.2008). 
 
As a consequence of the high number of reform communists (softliners) in the media 
nomenklatura, as well as the fact that many journalists in top positions by the mid 1960s, 
had been active in the 1956 uprising, ensured that the official media system enjoyed 
considerable credibility within the population.  As a result in Hungary, comparably to the 
rest of the region (most notably Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union itself), there 
existed relatively little samizdat literature. Additionally, the media sector as a career option 
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became open for everyone by the end of the 1960s, as young people interested to enter 
the media sector no longer had to attend the state journalism schools in order to receive a 
job in the media. Instead, it became possible for young university graduates to conduct an 
internship in the radio, the press or TV. Those who were good enough could continue and 
visit the school of the journalists´ association. Of course this was controlled by the regime, 
but nonetheless it did influence a further opening of the media system (Interview Pach, 
14.11.06).  
 
There existed a difference in the extent of liberalization in the press according to the 
respective genres. While the entertainment media were allowed considerable 
independence already early on, news or “political” media remained more strongly 
controlled. These initially –especially concerning Hungarian politics - remained obliged to 
use the news coverage provided by the central wire service (MTI), in order to prevent non-
conformist information from being released. Additionally, there existed several taboos that 
could not be broken (Sükösd, 2000). The question of the party’s dominant position in 
society could not be addressed, nor the question of whether Soviet forces should remain in 
Hungary. According to Ferenc Pach, news coverage in one Warsaw pact country about 
another socialist brother state always had to quote the national news service of that 
respective country (Interview, Pach, 14.11.2006). As a consequence, as argued by 
Sükösd: While “cultural media was allowed to become varied and interesting as a result of 
specific policies intended to coopt intellectuals, academics, and young people in 
Hungary… Political news coverage was ritualistic, repetitive, dull and extremely boring. 
Depolitization, alienation, cynicism, and disbelief were the response on the part of the 
audience”  (Sükösd, 2000, pg 131). 
 
However, the extent of control over the political media also became less as the overall 
liberalization of society continued. In 1976 the liberalization process witnessed a 
considerable push, even leading to a dual media system, as a growing number of 
independent sources and channels of communication began to surface (Sükösd, 2000). 
These opposition sources, which were to an extent tolerated by the regime, in effect broke 
the communists longstanding communications monopoly (Ibid). This to a degree led to a 
competition between the illegal and semi-illegal media on the one hand and official media 
on the other, to an extent forcing the official media to write more objectively and to address 
more critical topics if they wanted to remain in favour of public opinion. This led to an 
increase in the extent of media independence, the scope of state censorship becoming 
increasingly dependent on the size of the publication – the larger the audience it reached 
the more censorship it witnessed. The form of state-censorship as was the case elsewhere 
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in Eastern Europe, in Hungary was replaced by a stronger system of self-censorship than 
had previously already existed, allowing scope for debate (with occasional sanction if a 
newspaper went too far) (Lánci and O’Neil, 1997). Remembered by Dr. Kajdi, the 
weakening of political and state powers largely contributed to the loosening of control over 
the media, resulting in the publication of writings and reports (from the middle of 1989) 
which were still unconceivable even half a year earlier (Interview, Dr. Kajdi, 01.04.2008).  
 
As a consequence, as suggested by Lánci and O’Neil:  “in Hungary, the official media 
themselves developed into a central institution for political debate, allowing for the semi-
open discussion of sensitive topics” (Lánci and O’Neil, 1997, pg 84).  
 
Subsequently, the second society increasingly entered and interacted with the first. As 
argued by the Hungarian sociologists Elemér Hankiss: “In a strange way, the second 
public sphere invaded the first. People, trespassing on the grounds of the first public 
sphere and symbolically expanding their freedom, openly discussed important issues, 
criticized the regime and attacked sacrosanct taboos; but they did all this in an allegorical 
and allusive language, the use and understanding of which became a societal game and a 
highly refined art. Everybody took part in this nation-wide connivance, the members of the 
ruling elite included. They swooped down only when allusions became too abusive or 
touched upon spots that were too sensitive” (Quoted in Lánci and O’Neil, 1997, pg 84).  
 
Although many Hungarian journalists often supported the ideals of communism, many at 
the same time believed in the need of political, social and economical reform. Some 
followed the stance of the reform leaders within the politburo who imagined a more 
“humane” form of socialism; while not wanting to do away with the ideals of communism, 
nevertheless permitting a free and truly democratic society. This influenced them in 
addressing sometimes long overdue discussions on political reform and thus initiating a 
debate both within society but also among the party elite.  
 
Additionally, as the interviews suggest, the party nomeklatura responsible for the media 
were also predominately in the hands of reform communists. As liberalization in the 
political sphere increased and as the fight between the hard- and softliners created some 
sort of vacuity, the large number of reform orientated communists who re-entered the 
decision making level of both the party and the media as a result of the amnesty in the 
1960s, increasingly began to pursue their agendas more strongly and to expand the topics 
that they could write on.  As remembered by András Heltai-Hopp, the situation for many 
journalists to write more freely was strengthened by that fact that by the 1980s, the 
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majority of the members of the Agitation and Propaganda department were not hardline 
communists, but instead young reform orientated communists. This was especially the 
case in those responsible for economic questions in the media, but also visible throughout 
the entire apparatus.  
 
A key factor in enabling the “Magyar Nemzet” to cover previous taboo topics, clearly lay in 
the person of Imre Pozsgay. As has already been addressed, it was his remarks on the 
radio that set a political fait accompli regarding the politburo stance on the events of 1956. 
Additionally, in his role as the leader of the Popular front groups, the “Magyar Nemzet” was 
under his control. As remembered by Dr. Zoltan Szabó, leader of one of the most radical 
orientated party reform circles in 1989 (the Budapest reform circle), Imre Pozsgay explicitly 
instructed the newspaper editors to write about the reforms as much as they could and 
break on taboo topics. Additionally, he allowed the newspaper to become the mouthpiece 
of the Budapest reform circle. Beginning in summer of 1989, every Wednesday, the reform 
circle members would meet with the newspaper editors. In these meetings the editors were 
told what the circle was discussing and what they thought was important to be made 
public. In the Thursday issue of the newspaper these points were then published. Imre 
Pozsgay was one of the main leaders of the communist reform wing, and initially held 
widespread authority over the reform movement. Being in charge of the “Magyar Nemzet” 
he was able to „direct“ a comparably big newspaper, and in addition he exerted a strong 
influence (due to his personal authority) over many further journalists working for other 
papers.  
 
Thus by the end of the 1980s, journalists were in a relatively safe position to write critically. 
Firstly, the nomenklatura of the newspapers as well as the members of the Agitation and 
Propaganda department of the party were overwhelmingly reform orientated allowing the 
journalists to write more critically. Secondly, high-ranking party functionaries including 
politburo members were actively instructing the media to take a more critical stance. As a 
result, the journalists felt protected vis-à-vis hardline party elites. Thus, the increasingly 
liberalized atmosphere for the media employees partly came as a result of division within 
the regime, whereby the increasingly stronger softline wing of the party instructed the 
media to support the unfolding liberalization process. 
 
It is important to note that, according to the interview findings, this liberalization of the 
media as well as the direct instructions of the softline fraction to begin a more critical 
reporting, did not “create” critical journalists. Instead, it strengthened those journalists 
representing the softline party members or moderate opposition, who had always wanted 
 172 
to begin a more balanced, critical reporting, but who had been restrained by the existing 
power status quo, fearing negative consequences. Moreover, as the softline regime 
leadership was increasingly sidelining the power of the hardliners, the hardline journalists 
found it increasingly difficult to have their voices heard.  
 
The reform movement within the regime at the beginning was rather homogenous, but by 
1989 the movement was dividing along a social democratic direction on the one hand, and 
a popular „folkish“ direction on the other. Imre Pozsgay, clearly supported the latter 
movement, and as this was not the stance of the majority of journalists and of the reform 
movement as such, by the later half of 1989 he to a great deal had lost his authority. Thus, 
as suggested by Dr, Zoltán Szabó (Interview Szabó, 19.2.2008), he lost most part of his 
authority to „direct“ the media by the end of 1989. This came as the general position of the 
party also increasingly weakened, as events such as the referendum initiated by the 
opposition or the Dunagate scandal further discredited also the reform forces. The 
interview findings as well as content analysis suggest that, while Imre Pozsgay wanted to 
influence the media to report in a „folkish“ direction, as well as to dictate on which 
opposition group to concentrate on most (which in this case was the MDF which Imre 
Pozsgay supported from the very beginning), by the end of 1989 the journalists would no 
longer listen. Thus, it is at this point, that the initial liberalization - which had been directly 
fostered by Imre Pozsgay and other party reformers - led to the media detaching 
themselves even from the direction of the reform communists, which up to then had always 
guaranteed their protection vis-à-vis party hardliners. The liberalization introduced had 
increasingly widened the limits of what was possible, and increasingly more, the media 
were no longer dependent on the regime for their survival. As will be identified in the 
succeeding chapter, the privatization of the media system greatly amplified this process.  
 
Thus, as stated by Dr. Zoltán Szabó (Interview Szabó, 19.2.2008), by then the media had 
visibly become more pluralistic, increasingly asserting their position as an independent 
actor. Indeed, the interviews suggest that the media no longer simply wanted to merely 
document or bear witness to the changes occurring, or to print critical articles supported by 
the softliners, but instead wanted to actively „tell the truth as they see it, or to 
propagandise for their idea of the future”. This certainly came from a general erosion of 
party authority, which largely created a political „vacuum“. As argued by Dr. Jószef Kajdi, 
the media workers felt that they had become „masterless“ and uncontrolled, therefore they 
„bravely“ entered into the realm of politics, sympathized with certain opposition 
organizations and their leading politicians, and the media began taking on a opposition 
role, supporting the development and popularity of opposition movements and 
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organizations. Consequently, by the end of 1989 the opposition groups were mentioned as 
often in the public media as was the MSZP (Interview Dr. Kajdi, 01.04.2008) (the legal 
successor of the MSZMP, which dissolved itself in the autumn of 1989) 
 
As has been identified previously, by 1988 the media increasingly began to cover the 
opposition; its formations, programmes and people. Remembered by Dr. Kajdi, several 
factors and events gradually influenced the journalists in writing about the opposition 
groups and in supporting them. These included the formation of the opposition groups 
(particularly the MDF, the SDSZ, FIDESZ), the formation of the Opposition round table, the 
support by some politburo members and their comments (especially regarding these 
formations as well as previously taboo topics), as well as the weakening of political and 
state powers of the communist party which increasingly became obvious. This resulted „in 
the publication of writings and reports (from the middle of 1989) which could have been 
inconceivable even a half year before” (Interview, Dr. Kajdi, 01.04.2008).  
 
The remarks by the regime elites regarding the prospects of further liberalization 
measures, the open support of some regime members vis-à-vis the emerging opposition 
groups, as well as the decision to enter round table negotiations at the middle of 1989, all 
signalled to the entire society that the regime was willing to enter a “negotiated change” 
and that a multi-party system would inevitably come. The interviews for this dissertation 
suggest that this retreat of the regime that became increasingly more evident, was one 
major factor in bringing the journalists to begin an ever more critical stance and to 
progressively more strongly begin to break on previous taboos.  As remembered by Dr. 
Kajdi:  “After it was made public that the state party in power sat down to negotiate with the 
EKA (the oppositional round table sdw), the official media entered into a news-race on 
reporting about EKA meetings, political declaration of the organizations and key figures of 
the EKA, and the National Round Table meetings….from that time almost the whole media 
became a participant and supporter of democratic transition” (Interview, Dr. Kajdi, 
01.04.2008). 
 
As the party rank-and-file increasingly sidelined the conservative wing of the communist 
party, headed by the party Chairman Károly Grosz, this also came to have a strong effect 
on the position of Grosz to dominate the party institutions including the party organ 
“Népszabadság”. As already identified, many of the journalists who were indeed 
communists, nonetheless represented the reform fraction. Grosz could make sure that the 
nomenklatura of the “Népszabadság” was more hardline than in the “Magyar Nemzet”, but 
as the events were unfolding in 1989, he found it increasingly more difficult to control the 
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paper. This as some of the leading nomenklatura of the paper did indeed support reform 
initiatives and this coincided with a time of vacuity, when the hardline fraction inside the 
party were simply too distracted to dictate and control what was happening in the paper. 
Thus it is fair to say, that while in the case of the GDR the official party organ the “Neues 
Deutschland” remained in the hands of the inner politburo leadership around Honecker, in 
Hungary this was not the case. Instead, different groups within the regime leadership - 
hardline and softline - influenced the paper. Additionally, faced with a party split between 
hardliners and softliners, the hardliners who were increasingly marginalised could simply 
no longer execute disciplinary measures against rebellious journalists. This was reinforced 
by the decision in November 1988 (as mentioned previously) to strengthen the powers of 
the government vis-à-vis the politburo. The breaking away of the paper from the control of 
Grosz was finalised, when in December 1989 the party renamed itself into the MSZP, and 
the hardline fraction under Grosz formed a new communist party. As the MSZP was the 
legal successor party of the MSZMP, the paper became the organ of this reformed 
socialist party. The possibility to dictate the direction of the paper was, however, further 
curtailed when at the end of 1989 40% of the papers were sold to the German publishing 
group Bertelsmann AG. This not only led to commercial interest further dictating the 
“output” of the paper (see below), but the MSZP could no longer decide on staff decisions 
and direction alone.   
 
 
4. The influence of media privatization 
 
The process of privatization of the print media beginning already in 1988 –bringing the 
involvement of mostly Western European publishers - was a strong impetus on the path of 
media liberalization. Consequently, as stated by Lánczi and O’Neil, still under a one-party 
state, before free elections took place, the Hungarian media landscape became the most 
highly privatized in the region, with the greatest amount of foreign capital (Lánczi and 
O’Neil, 1997, pg 86). Additionally, as the regime - by allowing privatization of the media - 
decided that newspaper publishing was a commercial activity that could thus not be 
controlled by the regime, at the same time, it dissolved its department for agitation and 
propaganda. This further eliminated the party’s control capability over the media 
(Jakubowicz, 1995).  
 
As suggested by the interviews for this dissertation, the process of privatization positively 
affected transition by allowing the journalists to engage in political debate even more 
openly. Additionally, as remembered by András Heltai-Hopp, it in many respects not only 
 175 
allowed them to do so, but rather also forced the entire media system to write more openly 
due to a growing commercialization (Interview Heltai-Hopp, 18.2.2008).  This process had 
thee influences on media liberalization: 
 
Firstly, it to an extent freed the journalists, as they no longer had to fear as strongly being 
sacked if they reported critically on the regime. It largely strengthened the “safe” position of 
the journalists as identified above, and boosted the already present “green light” from 
reform communist leaders to begin a more critical reporting.   
 
Secondly, sensing that transition might be imminent, the journalists did not want to appear 
too pro-regime, fearing later anti-communist reprisals by the new state leadership.  
Therefore, also those journalists who were not working for one of those newspapers that 
were privatized in 1988, still had reason to break free from abiding too closely to the party 
line. As argued by Zoltan Kiszelly, the media institutions and journalists alike wanted to 
have a good standing with all parties, as they did know which party would emerge as 
dominant force following the next elections (Interview, Kiszelly, 14.2.2008). 
 
Thirdly, as remembered by Heltai-Hopp, the initial euphoria of the sudden increase in the 
journalistic freedoms that privatization brought (influencing them to “free toe express 
themselves, pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it, or to propagandise 
for their idea of the future” (Sparks, 2001, pg 22)), vanished as the journalists realized that 
they had to follow a market reality, which increasingly gave priority to business interests. 
As sated by Dr. Zoltán Szabó, in a market economy, the media had to begin a commercial 
thinking of writing what sells (Interview, Szabó, 19.2.2008). As a result, the fact that the 
newspapers had to make money to survive, strongly influenced the topic selection of the 
various media, increasingly moving in the direction of a media “boulvardization” (Interview, 
Heltai-Hopp, 18.2.2008). As remembered by Dr. Szabó, this amplified the drive of the 
respective media to uncover political “scandals” of both the past and the present, believing 
that these would multiply their sales (Interview, Szabó, 19.2.2008). 
 
Nevertheless, the situation was not without risk for the journalists. One should not forget 
that in 1988, the tide of change across Central and Eastern Europe had not yet been 
clearly cemented; Hungary was still a one party state, and the state still had considerable 
power to act against the independence of the media. The state could also decide to undo 
the privatization (especially the spontaneous privatization) that had occurred. Additionally, 
even if change was imminent, the possibility that the old leadership would manage to 
retain considerable power in a new system (most probably through a strong president) 
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appeared possible. Thus, the journalists, although sensing that change might be imminent, 
still jeopardised their own existential position. Suggested by Bajomi-Lázár, by questioning 
the hegemony of the party the journalists risked their jobs, their incomes as well as a 
number of further privileges including that of easy access to information (Bajomi-Lázár, 
2001, pg 188). That the situation could still be turned around was made clear, when in 
March 1990, the Soviet Army conducted manoeuvres in Hungary. The fact that these 
coincided with the elections, for many acted as a warning that the process should not go 
too far. The MDF (Magyar Nemzet, 7.2.1990, pg 3) heavily criticised that these 
manoeuvres were being held during the elections as well as during a time when the 
continued presence of Soviet troops was subject of public discontent.   
 
Nonetheless, the economic reforms of 1988, regarding privatization and foreign investment 
had a paramount influence on the media’s room for autonomous work, as it further 
eliminated the party’s room to directly influence the media output.  The reforms created a 
basis for the creation of private companies in Hungary, and as the reforms were flexible, 
they created a situation were spontaneous privatization occurred (Giorgi & Pohoryles, 
1994). 
 
This dissertation had previously argued that new economic realities limited the freedom of 
the press while the old system was still in place. This appears to hold true for Hungary. In 
that, as suggested by the interviews, the media output began to be dominated by market 
orientated thinking, which became one driving force especially in uncovering political 
scandals, leading to stronger investigative journalism.  
 
According to Frydman spontaneous privatization had been “the predominant means of 
privatization in Hungary to date” (quoted in Giorgi & Pohoryles, 1994, pg 16). The term 
´spontaneous privatization´, involving a huge influx of western capital, with reference to 
Hungary has a double meaning: firstly, it refers to the process of a ‘partial transformation’ 
of companies, usually but not only linked with the acquiring of a new owner. Secondly, it is 
used in a wider process of enterprise-initiated transformation or privatization. These 
transactions of spontaneous privatization took place with practically no state regulation.  It 
was the source of considerable debate regarding the balance of decision-making power 
between top and lower level employees and about the role of the state in maintaining 
control over the whole process of economic transformation (Giorgi & Pohoryles, 2004). 
The media was heavily affected by this form of privatization, where a vast amount of 
foreign money was invested in the print market.  
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The process of privatization, however, was not limited to “spontaneous privatization”. 
Rather, it was also actively implemented by the government. As remembered by one 
journalists working at that time, the process of privatization occurred in three distinct ways: 
 
Firstly, the majority of state owned newspapers (which represented the greatest bulk) were 
partly sold to western investors (initially the state retaining more than 50 %, but this 
became less and less as the months proceeded).  
Secondly, the government sold off 4 of its newspapers.  
Thirdly, some of the newspapers that belonged to the state witnessed a spontaneous buy 
out of the management, which created an own publishing house that owned the respective 
newspaper.  
 
The reasons for the privatization of the media remain subject of debate. Until this day, the 
opposition claim that the privatization occurred in order to enable the communists to retain 
power over the media once a democratically elected government would take over. Argued 
by FIDESZ Member of Parliament, Dr. Tamás Deutsch-Für (Interview, 15.2.2008), in 
selling off the media the communist elite pursued a twofold objective:  
 
Firstly, they sold off the respective media to foreign owners but kept the bulk of the money 
that was paid, thus retaining economic power in the new system.  
Secondly, the regime sold the media under the condition that the bulk of the communist 
journalists remain in their position for a time period of up to 10-15 years, thus in effect, 
retaining influence over the media.  
 
Although this argument may hold some truth, especially in respect to the financial part, the 
argument does not appear entirely convincing. By 1989 the economic situation of the party 
state was in a critical condition. The financial burden of running this vast media empire that 
belonged to the state as well as the government was indeed crippling. Moreover, it does 
not appear entirely convincing that the companies that were investing would be prepared 
to engage in such a contract concerning employee status over such a long period of time. 
As this contract was not officially agreed, who would make sure that the investors held 
their word once the democratic system was installed? Additionally, the opposition forces 
were questioning the ownership structure of social organizations under party control, which 
the government admitted in the late 1980s belonged to the state and had since the 
communist takeover of power merely been administered by the party in the role as trustee. 
With the re-naming and re-formation of the communist party in October 1989, the 
questioned ownership structure became even more apparent. Thus, it appears that the 
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selling of the media occurred mainly as the state was simply no longer able to pay for this 
media empire which up to then never had to cover its costs, and in order to regulate the 
ownership question.  
 
It is true, however, that the majority of media employees present until lately, were 
employees present already before 1989. In the case of employee takeovers of companies, 
the reason for this is self-apparent. In the case of the media that were bought by foreign 
investors this is, nonetheless, not explained solely on the grounds of an agreement by the 
former regime and the investors. Instead, as suggested by the interviews for this 
dissertation, these investors bought companies that had a working employee structure, 
which meant that from the receptionist to cleaners to journalists, a well-rehearsed team 
already existed. Although some people existed to fill the posts, it would have been hard to 
find sufficient people qualified to take over everything immediately.  Even if people were to 
be found, the costs of training would have come on top on the investments to be made. 
Out of this reason a strange cooperation between the former employees (also if they were 
socialists) and the new owners emerged. This was not only the case for Hungary, but also 
for the East-German media landscape, where as previously identified, while the Chief-
Editors were often replaced with West German people, the rest of the staff often remained 
the children of the old system.   
 
As to the newspapers of analysis, the “Népszabadság” underwent a partial sale in 1989, 
when 40 % of it was sold by the MSZP to the German conglomerate “Bertelsmann AG”. It 
retained influence over the paper by transferring the rest into a MSZP foundation “Szabad 
Sajtó”. Today this foundation still holds 27% of the paper, the rest now belonging to the 
Swiss publishing house “Ringier”. The “Magyar Nemzet” was the only major daily which 
had not privatized itself at least partially before the parliamentary elections of March 1990. 
In 1990 the new government blocked attempts by the editorial staff to sell it to the Swedish 
daily “Dagens Nyheter”, instead selling it to the French publisher “Hersant”, who was 
viewed by the government as being more conservative (O’Neil, 1997).  
 
To conclude on this topic therefore, media liberalization was initiated by government 
reforms, supported by the active instruction by softline regime members to begin a more 
critical reporting (and thus from a split within the regime leadership). The privatization 
measures occurring since the 1960s greatly boosted this process, leading to a 
commercialized environment and further eroding the possibility of the regime to influence 




5. Comparing the respective Hungarian newspapers of research 
 
The research for this dissertation clearly suggests that the conclusion of Lánci and O’Neil 
(Lánci and O’Neil, 1997, pg 84) namely that  “in Hungary, the official media themselves 
developed into a central institution for political debate, allowing for the semi-open 
discussion of sensitive topics”, had already come by 1989. As argued by Dr. Kajdi 
(Interview Kajdi, 01.04.2008), the first breakthrough where the media reported on 
opposition to the regime and above all on the formation of oppositional groups and party’s 
directly, came in March/April 1988 with the formation of the FIDESZ. This evolving critical 
stance of the media towards the regime then became considerably more strongly in tone 
towards the end of the analysis. Also remembered by Dr. Kajdi, the real breakthrough took 
place in the spring of 1989 when the movements, organizations and parties established (or 
sometimes re-established) began the Opposition round table (EKA) with the purpose of 
ensuring a better coordination of their co-operation.  
 
While at the beginning of January 1989 the media (in the case of the analysis both 
respective newspapers but especially the Magyar Nemzet) appeared to follow or at least 
cover the initiatives of the reform orientated Regime members, by December 1989 / 
January 1990, the media appeared to have additionally broken free of the influences of 
these reform elites and began to act more strongly as an independent actor in the 
developing process.  
 
Furthermore, the split of the party, which culminated in the re-naming of the party into the 
MDZP together with the formation of a separate “Hardline” communist party in December 
1989, in addition to a widespread de-legitimation of the regime in general in the public’s 
perception, fostered the increasing independence of the media vis-à-vis the regime. Thus, 
it is fair to say that while the reform regime actors – particularly the group around Imre 
Pozsgay – initiated the liberalization process in the media, by the end of 1989 already, 
these had lost considerable control and the media began to assert its independence. This 
also appears to be confirmed by the content analysis findings. 
 
Both newspapers of analysis were the organs of two different groups within the ruling elite. 
On the one hand the “Népszabadság”, the official organ of the party, between May 1988 
until the renaming of the party into the MSZP in September 1989, strongly influenced by 
the Hardline-leader Károly Grosz. Although the reform forces within the party could 
influence the paper already before September 1989 (partly because the nomeklatura 
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within the party responsible for the media and the media nomenklatura themselves as well 
as the government leadership were reform orientated), the end of the control of Grosz in 
the party in December finally ended any direct influence he could still take on the paper.   
On the other hand the “Magyar Nemzet”, officially the organ of the popular front groups, 
and therefore directly under the control of the reform minded politburo member Imre 
Pozsgay, in his position as the leader of the popular front groups. The fact that it was he 
who initiated a public discussion on the events of 1956 already in January 1989, together 
with his public support for the formation of the MDF already in 1987, put a radical reformer 
in charge of one of the biggest Hungarian newspapers. This gave the paper and especially 
reform-orientated journalists enormous liberties to begin a critical reporting, even more so 
as Pozsgay had directly instructed them to do so.   
 
As in the corresponding chapter on the GDR, this chapter will begin by portraying the 
results of the quantitative analysis, as described in the chapter “Content analysis design”. 
It portrays which topics were identified by the key word search as topics being discussed 
by the respective newspapers during which time of the research period. In a second stage, 
the qualitative findings (which represent a greater focus in comparison to the quantitative 
analysis) will be presented.  
 
5.1.1 Quantitative analysis 
 
As already stated, the research time (May 1989 until March 1990) was divided into half-
months (15-16 day time frame). For the recording of the quantitative analysis, it was 
important that the respective paper covered the topic (as selected and identified in the 
chapter “Content analysis design”) at all within the given 15-16-day time frame (either as 
an own article / commentary or by a foreign source). Thus, even if only one small article 
was printed, this was recorded. The recording was made through an “x” for the respective 
newspaper in the particular timeframe; a red “X” indicating that the respective topic was 
covered by the “Népszabadság”, a blue “X” indicating that it was covered by the “Magyar 
Nemzet”. This went for the random weekly sample search (always Wednesdays), as well 
as for those topics, where daily samples were taken during case varying time periods (as 
described in the chapter “Content analysis design”). The recordings therefore do not 
suggest the frequency of the respective topics within each sample 15-16 day time period. 
N.B. the recordings only show topics that occurred following the predefined words and 
phrases: thus, certain further dominant topics existed; however, these were not recorded, 
as they did not match the predefined words set. No importance was given to length or 





5.1.2 Quantitative analysis findings 
 
The recordings of the pre-selected topics of the quantitative content analysis for the 
“Népszabadság” and the “Magyar Nemzet” as identified during the keyword sample search 
can be found in Appendix 2. Below, a comparison between the findings in form of a bar 
graph can be found. This bar graph directly compares the number of times each specific 






5.1.3 Quantitative analysis comparisons  
 
The quantitative analysis suggests that many critical topics were already being addressed 
by both newspapers early on during the time of analysis. The findings of the interviews as 
well as the background research seem to be confirmed, namely that the media in Hungary 
by 1989 was by far more independent and critical –at least insofar as to the diversity of 
critical topics addressed – than their GDR counterparts during the same early period. 
Thus, the media in Hungary already early on began to discuss issues important for the 
imminent transition. 
 
As to the statement of Imre Pozsgay on the events of 1956, both papers cover the issue 
during the second half of January and the first half of February 1989. Thereafter, it remains 
a topic irregularly in both papers until the last articles on the topic this content analysis 
found: namely, during the second half of August 1989 in the “Magyar Nemzet” and during 
the second half of November 1989 in the “Népszabadság”. Overall, in the former the topic 
was identified during seven sample time periods, while in the latter it was identified during 
five sample time periods.  
 
With regard to the first special attention focus question on the political scandals of the past 
and the present - namely the “Dunagate” scandal - this content analysis found no 
reference in the “Magyar Nemzet”; in the “Népszabadság” it was referred to during the 
second half of January 1990. As to the second special attention focus question, namely 
the opening of the archives, the analysis found that in the “Népszabadság” it was referred 
to during the second half of November 1989 and in the “Magyar Nemzet” it found 
references during the second half of December 1989 and the first half of January 1990.  
 
As to the Hungarian round table negotiations, both papers begin reporting on this issue 
during the second half of May 1989. The issue remains an issue irregularly until the 
second half of November in the “Magyar Nemzet” and the first half of December in the 
“Népszabadság”. Overall, the topic is covered by the former during three sample time 
periods and during six in the latter. As to the oppositional round table, the first article 
identified was during the second half of May 1989 in the “Népszabadság”, and during the 
first half of June in the “Magyar Nemzet”. Overall, the issue received attention during two 
sample time periods (namely during the second half of May and during the second half of 
August 1989 and )  in the former, and in three sample time periods (namely during the first 
and second halves of June and during the first half of August 1989) in the latter. 
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With regard to the referendum initiated by the opposition, both papers continuously report 
on the issue from the second half of October until the second half of November 1989.  
 
Interesting to observe was that neither newspapers printed articles demanding that Soviet 
troops leave Hungary. All were matter of fact articles. As will be discussed later, the only 
negative article in this direction came in the “Magyar Nemzet” in 1990, when it criticised 
that the Soviet army was conducting military manoeuvres in Hungary during the elections.  
 
The picture of the media landscape in Hungary at prima facie therefore suggests that both 
the “Népszabadság” and the “Magyar Nemzet” fostered critical discourse and that both 
assumed an agenda setting role. Both addressed the issue of the need of a constitutional 
reform quite early, as well as the need to reform the socialist one party state as such (in 
both instances the  “Népszabadság” did so even before the “Magyar Nemzet”).  Both wrote 
on the necessity of economic reform from the very beginning of the time of research (the  
“Népszabadság” wrote on the issue during nine sample time periods, the “Magyar Nemzet” 
during ten). Additionally, both also covered the issue of the coming multi-party system 
early on. The “Népszabadság” covered the issue from the second half of January 1989   
during five sample time periods until the second half of August 1989. The “Magyar 
Nemzet” did so from the second half of February 1989 during six sample time periods until 
the first half of February 1990. In both papers the round table negotiations and reforms in 
Poland were extensively covered as of the first half of February 1989. In the 
“Népszabadság” the topic of Poland is covered during thirteen sample time periods until 
the first half of September 1989. In the “Magyar Nemzet” this analysis found articles during 
eleven sample time periods until the first half of February 1990. In the former the events in 
the GDR is covered during eleven sample times periods from the second half of 
September 1989 until the second half of March 1990. In the latter the issue is covered 
during nine sample time periods, from the second half of March 1989 until the second half 
of February 1990.  
 
Nonetheless, significant differences between the two newspapers do exist. While both 
papers write on the need of a constitutional reform in Hungary, this content analysis found 
that only the “Magyar Nemzet” wrote on the need of public constitutional control (during 
five sample time periods from the first half of March 1989 until the first half of February 
1989.) Additionally, while on the one hand both papers mention the formation of 
oppositional groups and parties: during eleven sample time periods from the second half of 
February 1989 until the second half of January 1990 in the case of the “Magyar Nemzet”; 
and during nine sample time periods from the first half of March until the first half of 
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December 1989 in the “Népszabadság”. On the other hand, however, these very groups 
and parties receive a greater platform (and significantly earlier) in the former than in the 
latter. In the “Magyar Nemzet” these receive a platform from the first half of February 1989 
(increasing with intensity during and after the referendum) for twenty sample time periods 
until the second half of March 1990. In the “Népszabadság” these only receive a platform 
for ten sample time periods from the second half of August 1989 until the second half of 
March 1990 (therefore to the time when the hardliners within the party where largely 
discredited and had lost most of their authority, and shortly before the renaming of the 
party when these then had lost all remaining positions).  
 
Additionally, a dominant differing topic appears to be the mentioning of “Parcel 301”. While 
the “Magyar Nemzet” prints first articles on it as early as the second half of February 1989 
for four sample time periods until the second half of August, the “Népszabadság” does not 
mention it at all. As to direct references to Imre Nagy, in the “Magyar Nemzet” these could 
be identified during six sample time periods from the second half of February 1989 until 
the second half of June. In the “Népszabadság” direct reference could only be identified 
during one sample time period, namely during the second half of May 1989 (hence shortly 
before his reburial).  
 
Furthermore, the first critical articles directed at the party begin as of the first half of 
February 1989 in the “Magyar Nemzet”; in the “Népszabadság” the first articles in this 
direction could be identified as of the first half of May 1989. Overall, the former reports on 
this issue during four sample time periods, the last being during the second half of 
December 1989; while the latter reports on this issue during two sample issues, the last 
during the second half of July 1989.  
 
As to the issue of party assets, the first articles in the “Magyar Nemzet” were identified as 
of the first half of November 1989, while it was only addressed in the “Népszabadság” as 
of the first half of January 1990, according to the content analysis.  
 
The show trial of László Rajk is not found in the “Népszabadság”, while it is continuously 
addressed as of the first half of February until the second half of March 1989 in the 
“Magyar Nemzet”.  
 
Both papers begin reporting on the water barrage project “Bös-Nagymaros”, however, 
significantly earlier in the “Magyar Nemzet”. The “Magyar Nemzet” addresses the issue as 
of the first half of March 1989, during eight sample time periods until the second half of 
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November. In the “Népszabadság” this analysis found the first article on the issue during 
the first half of May 1989, and the last also eight sample time periods later during the 
second half of December.  
 
These all suggest that the “Magyar Nemzet” was more critical (or at least earlier so) on 
important issues than was the “Népszabadság”. The only dominant exception to this, were 
critical articles towards the past and the question of failed reforms in the past. Here, the 
first such articles could be found as of the first half of December 1989 in the former, but 
already during the second half of February 1989 in the latter.  
 
Concerning the election of March 1990, the “Magyar Nemzet” appears to cover the 
elections more often than does the “Népszabadság”. In the “Magyar Nemzet” the first 
reporting on the topic was identified during the second half of October 1989, for eight 
sample time periods until the second half of March 1989; in the “Népszabadság” the issue 
is only addressed during two sample time period, namely during the second half of August 
1989 and the second half of March 1990.  
 
 
5.2 “Qualitative analysis” 
 
5.2.1 “Magyar Nemzet” 
 
The Magyar Nemzet, being the organ controlled by Imre Pozsgay, covers the radio 
Interview of Pozsgay in which he stated that the events of 1956 were not a counter-
revolution as stated by the party until then, but instead a popular uprising. The paper also 
prints comments by western media on the statements of Imre Pozsgay, which are all 
positive.  
 
As to the focus questions concerning the scandals of the past, the content analysis found 
the following:  
Interestingly, although the “Magyar Nemzet” is generally regarded as having supported the 
democratization process, the paper does not mention the “Dunagate” scandal, as far as 
the content analysis could identify. This scandal largely de-legitimized the reform forces 
within the regime in their attempt to distance themselves from the past, and is seen as a 
major factor in influencing the low election results for the MSZP in March 1990. That it is 
not mentioned in the “Magyar Nemzet” therefore is not surprising, as it was the organ of 
exactly these reform forces. It suggests that the paper still to this time remained on the line 
 187 
of Imre Pozsgay on important issues. This also confirms the findings of the interviews, 
namely that initially critical articles were only allowed and even supported by the softliners 
insofar, as they “only” criticised the hardliners, and not the softliners and that they 
supported the liberalization that the softliners wanted to pursue.  
 
As to the opening of the state archives in autumn of 1989, the first articles on the topic this 
content analysis found began as of December 1989, criticising that some of these archives 
are being destroyed in order to prevent information from being made public. On December 
28th on page 4, for example, the paper prints an article demanding that the State attorney 
investigates as a criminal offence the destruction of the archives. The paper demands that 
clear procedures need to be established stipulating what happens with the archives as well 
as who has access to them. On January 10th 1990, on page 3, the paper prints an open 
letter by the MSZP concerning the allegations of the destruction of the archives, in which 
the party argues that what was destroyed were not official documents but rather personal 
documents by officials no longer working in the archives. Nonetheless, as a result of the 
public outcry, even these documents will no longer be destroyed according to the party. 
This proved a major example of how press coverage influenced state actions.   
 
As to the additional focus question, namely the round table negotiations and the question 
of whether the president should be elected by the electorate before the elections of March 
1990, or rather by a newly elected parliament, therefore the question of whether Hungary 
was to be a parliamentary or rather presidential republic, the “Magyar Nemzet” did cover 
the discussion during the round table negotiations, but only limitedly. On June 14th, the 
paper informs on pages 3,4 and 5 about the commencing of the round table negotiations, 
and allows different views on the respective issues.  Once the SZDSZ had called for a 
referendum on the subject, however, the paper begins to address the issue more in detail. 
Once the referendum had been called, the paper becomes a platform for all sides to 
explain why they are for or against the referendum. An example here includes an interview 
with a SZDSZ representative on October 18th on page 3, in which the SZDSZ receives the 
opportunity to explain why they want the referendum.  
 
As to the further keyword search findings: 
As of January 1989, the paper begins to print as a series the court documents of the show 
trial of Lászlo Rajk (Magyar Nemzet, January 31st 1989, page 9). Rajk had been a 
Hungarian Communist and minister of the interior and foreign affairs in 1948. In 1949 he 
had fallen victim to Rákosi’s show trials, as he was a homegrown communist, as opposed 
to the Stalin-backed communist group around Rákosi. Although he had been rehabilitated 
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already in 1956, the subject remained largely taboo. This, as the Rajk trial had marked the 
beginning of the removal of all political parties in Hungary as well as the beginning of a 
strict Stalinist-style communism in the entire soviet bloc, marked by an anti-Titoist drive in 
the countries under soviet hegemony. Any communist ideas dissenting from Stalin were 
seen as dangerous and thus eliminated. That the paper brings up the topic in 1989, 
suggests that the reform communists were attempting to distance themselves from the 
Stalinist past, aligning themselves with Hungarian communists such as Rajk who enjoyed 
popular recognition.  
 
The popular front groups already early in 1989 had begun to demand constitutional 
changes and were beginning to address a changing role of these groups in the emerging 
multi-party system. The paper follows this and begins to address issues of political / 
constitutional changes and begins printing articles criticising the dominant role of the party 
in political, economic and judiciary life. Examples here include: 
1. An article on the popular front groups who demanded political / constitutional 
changes on February 8th 1989, on page 3. 
2.  A critical interview with a MSZMP member, on February 8th 1989, on page 5, 
asking whether it would not be problematic that judges are directly elected by the 
party. 
3. An article on February 15th 1989, on page 5, arguing that the coming of the multi-
party system will change the role of the popular front as well as stating an internal 
discussion in the popular front on how best these should respond to the coming 
changes.  
4. An article by the president of the Hungarian National Bank, Bartha Ferenc, on 
November 22nd 1989, arguing that the Bank should be under the control of 
parliament, not under the control of government. 
5. On January 15th 1990, on page 5, the paper argues that while economic reforms 
are necessary, first the legal framework needs be erected.  
 
Undoubtedly fostered by the comments of Imre Pozsgay on the events of 1956, a societal 
discussion on that time as well as the topic of a possible re-burial of Imre Nagy and what 
exactly happened to him in 1956 begins to surface. In 1989 it was generally believed that 
his remains were buried together with other people killed in 1956, in a mass grave known 
as “parcel 301” of the Municipal Kozma Street Cemetery outside of Budapest. On February 
15th on page 2, the Magyar Nemzet begins to openly write on this so-called “Parcel 301”. 
The paper writes that the general idea among the population was that Imre Nagy was in 
the grave. It criticises the regime by stating that while the responsible department say that 
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they have no idea who was in the grave, it would be a matter of five minutes to look up the 
respective documents to find out. Additionally, on May 5th, 1989, on page 5, the daughter 
of Imre Nagy talks on the death of her father, and what she remembers happened. This 
concentration on Imre Nagy remains largely until the end of June 1989. The reporting on 
this mass grave symbolised not only a “scratching” on the journalistic limits imposed (even 
if it occurred with the backing of the softline fraction), but it also shows an example of how 
the paper picked up relevant issues of society, and began a critical discussion on it.  
 
Additionally, the paper increasingly becomes the platform for oppositional groups that had 
already formed or were in the process of forming. Initially, the oppositional group 
mentioned most often was the MDF (which had also been initiated with considerable 
support of regime members, particularly Pozsgay). This changes as of October 1989 with 
the referendum, after which the reporting on oppositional groups becomes more balanced. 
Examples here include  
1. An article on Match 1st on page 2, articulating the demands of the MDF. 
2. An article on April 26th on page 2, informing that the MDF held a day of debate. 
3. Announcements on November 1st on page 10, in which various opposition groups 
including the FIDESZ and the SZDSZ receive the opportunity to inform on party 
activities and important notices.   
4. On November 8th 1989, on page 3, the paper reports on a press conference held 
by FIDESZ, in which they state that they would not take money for the party from 
the state as long as the current system of money transfers to parties is not 
changed. They demand that the funds of all parties be frozen until clear and 
transparent system is formed.  
5. On January 3rd 1989, on page 5, the paper speaks about the quantity of new 
parties that have emerged, and explains what they each stand for.  
6. On February 27th on page 4, the opposition groups, particularly the MDF, FIDESZ 
and SZDSZ (although more strongly the MDF and FIDESZ) articulate their 
programmes.  
 
In addition to becoming a platform in which oppositional groups and parties could articulate 
their demands and programmes, the paper also becomes a platform for intellectuals. On 
April 12th 1989, on page 3, for example, the paper prints an open letter by intellectuals, 
arguing that for a successful societal renewal it is important that a property reform be 
introduced. State owned companies should be transformed into public property where the 
people receive money to buy shares.  
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Around the time of the referendum in 1989, the paper begins to print articles dealing with 
the MSZP party renewal. On November 1st 1989, for example, on page 4, the paper prints 
an article by Schlett István (later Professor of Political Sciences at ELTE University) in 
which he asks what has changed, if anything? He asks whether it was like the renewal of a 
restaurant. Same staff, but did only the name of the restaurant change or also the food? 
He states that the new party has surely not yet become a party in a European sense. He 
asks whether the basics of effective governance will be developed? Nonetheless, he 
argues to give the party the benefit of the doubt, concluding that if you go to a restaurant 
with a changed name, then you should at least try whether they serve new food, before 
you judge them according to the old name. As the interviews for this dissertation suggest, 
these articles undoubtedly were initiated by reform party members in order to advance a 
public differentiation between the old hardline regime and the new party dominated by 
reform members.  
 
A dominant topic in the paper between April 1989 to March 1990, is the restructuring of the 
Hungarian economy, particularly ways of privatization. Examples here include: 
1. An article on April 15th 1989, on page 7, discusses ways of privatizing state 
companies. 
2. On November 1st 1989, on page 9, the paper prints an interview with a newly 
formed company “Capital international”, discussing Hungary’s need for foreign 
capital, while at the same time asking whether the capital needs Hungary? 
3. On November 22nd, 1989, on page 4, the paper prints a ¼ page article with the 
header “Az infláció a teljes csödhöz vezet”, criticising the economic policy of the 
government. It argues that the government should have built up an inner market, 
gotten rid of state monopolies, erected a competitive market and changed the 
property structure of business´, before liberalizing the prices. It states that out of 
the minimal requirements, the government had implemented nearly nothing, which 
led to a massive rise in inflation.  
4. On January 15th 1990, on page 5, under the headline “A manángazdaság jövöt 
igér” the paper prints a column stating that only private enterprise could be the 
future of the country.  
  
A dominant topic beginning in March 1989 and remaining strong until November 1989 is 
the "Bös-Nagymaros" Water barrage. This Water barrage, involving Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, envisioned a cross-border barrage system on the river Danube. It was 
agreed on in November 1977 as part of the “Budapest treaty”. Already in 1981, the 
Hungarian government pressed for a slowdown of the project due to lack of funding. In 
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1984, the “Danubian Circle”, a group protesting against the project out of environmental 
reasons, was founded. By the late 1980s it became a hated symbol of the old communist 
regime, and in 1989, the government suspended the project following widespread public 
opposition. The suspension created strong ill feeling between the Czechoslovakian and 
the Hungarian governments, the Hungarian decision being seen as a signal that the 
reformist government was yielding to popular demands too strongly.  
 
At the end of 1989 / at the beginning of 1990, a dominant topic within the paper is the 
question of the MSZP party assets. The first articles on this topic already come in 
November 1989, but increase in quantity and criticism as of February 1990. As already 
mentioned above, on November 8th 1989, the paper became a platform for the FIDESZ 
demanding a clear and transparent system for party funding. On March 21st 1990, on page 
5, the paper reports on a court case, where the MSZP is accused of trying to unlawfully 
redirect state assets, by hiding them and illegally bringing them into different companies.  
 
In the final two months leading to the elections, the paper clearly becomes more 
independent vis-à-vis the reform forces, and becomes a platform for especially the four 
biggest parties; namely the FIDESZ, the MDF, MSZP and SZDSZ. As far as this content 
analysis could make out, the newly founded communist party (MSZMP) receives no 
platform directly. On March 14th 1990, on page 3, the paper prints an article arguing that 
the MDF and the SZDSZ will become the largest fractions, and analyses what kind of 
people would have what party affiliation. On March 21st on page 5, the paper informs the 
readers how the election procedure looks, how many forms each voter receives, where he 
can go and what rights he or she has. On March 26th, 1990, the paper headline reads: 
“Hungary voted for system change”.  
 
The “Magyar Nemzet” did not demand directly that the Soviet troops should leave 






The “Népszabadság” also covers the radio interview of Pozsgay on the events of 1956, on 
January 30th 1989, on page 6. It writes that the judgement up to then that the events of 
1956 were a counterrevolution is not matched by the findings of the commission. 
Additionally, in the same article, the paper speaks of the need of a multi-party system, 
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where the MSZMP will need to work together with one, two or several parties. The paper 
concludes that maybe it is possible to cooperate with these parties; maybe those who 
cannot cooperate will end up in the role of an opposition. The paper admits that structural 
problems exist, part of which was the lack of a political debate and autocratic decisions:  
“Alapvetö gond: immár 15-20 éve nem sikerül elérni, hogy az alapfolyamatok és a 
politikai szándékok egy irányba menjenek, ezek minden akarat ellenére eltérnek 
egymástól. Ez mutatja, hogy szerkezeti bajok vannak. Ezek közé tartozik, hogy 
nem volt igazán mélyreható politikai vita, amely a voluntarizmusnak, az öknényes 
döntésnek gátat szabhatott volna. “ 
 
As to the additional focus questions, the content analysis found the following:  
The first article that this content analysis found on the opening of the state archives was on 
November 24th 1989, on page 8. In it the “public’s club” states its anxiety that the archives 
in Budapest and in the countryside would be destroyed by the party. The paper informs its 
readers that this club had already initiated a discussion on the limits to which the people 
had the opportunity to research the archives. It argues that since May nothing really 
changed, demanding that now the archives should really be made public, and that all 
restrictions should be lifted. Additionally, it demands an official statement about these 
archives.  
 
As to the “Dunagate” scandal, this content analysis found a first indirect reference to it in 
the paper on December 20th, on page 1, when the interior minister is quoted talking of the 
need to reform the work of the secret services. On January 24th 1990, on page 6, the 
paper uses a short MTI release to report on the scandal. On January 25th 1990, on page 1 
+ 4, the paper prints government reactions to the scandal. The paper quotes the state 
secretary of the Interior Ministry who says that he would not admit the allegations of the 
“Dunagate” scandal, but wants the people to remember that the secret service previously 
acted according to the old state ideology. The secret service had to gather information on 
opposition groups and people, as the worldview of these people was not conforming to 
that of the party. He states that the government has changed much since then. A new 
initiative in the party was brought through to change the instructions for the secret service 
as long as no new state security regulation is decided on. The paper is largely on the side 
of the government.  
 
As to the additional focus question, namely the question of whether the president should 
be elected by the electorate before the elections of March or rather by a newly elected 
Parliament, therefore the question of whether Hungary was to be a parliamentary or rather 
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presidential republic, the paper did cover the discussion during the round table 
negotiations, but only limitedly. Like the “Magyar Nemzet”, the “Népszabadság” informs 
about the commencing of the round table negotiations, and allows diverse opinions about 
the issues, albeit more limited than the “Magyar Nemzet”. Again, this becomes more 
diverse once it is clear that a referendum will be held. Between November 15th – 25th, the 
referendum is covered in depth, and both the MSZP and the MDF opposing the 
referendum as well as the opposition groups in favour of the referendum receive ample 
possibility to transmit their ideas. Both the MSZP and the opposition receive a platform to 
offer their views on the referendum. 
 
As to further keyword findings:  
Generally, during the initial period of the content analysis, the paper attempts to portray 
the new leader Károly Grósz as a reformer, beginning a new period after the old regime 
under János Kádár had ended. This picture fits well to the article on January 30th, 
mentioned before. Firstly, it comments on the remarks by Imre Pozsgay, while at the same 
time indirectly indicating that now a new system is coming, initiated by the regime. This is 
also supported by another article on January 30th, in which the paper covers the speech 
made by Grósz during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Grósz speaks of 
the need for a European economic cooperation. Grósz argues that Europe needs new 
ways, and a break with the past. For the future it is important that the socialist states, 
which lag behind in many ways, are able to overcome this backwardness and act 
successfully as a European partner. In his view the socialist states have no choice but to 
introduce reforms, and that socialism stands in front of a historical challenge. Recognizing 
this challenge may free strong energies in order to bring change. Grosz argues that the 
Soviet perestroika is the biggest socialist movement since the revolution of 1917, and that 
the socialist states are looking at critical years ahead. One big challenge will be that 
“COMECON” needs to be reformed; another that liberalisation reforms in the socialist 
states need to improve conditions for western capital and investments.  
 
In general the paper welcomes the changes occurring throughout the entire communist 
bloc. On April 19th 1989, on page 1, for example, the paper discusses comments by Hans-
Dietrich Genscher (the then Foreign Minister of the FRG) on the need of reforms in 
socialist states. The article on the whole views positively the processes of change within 
Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the paper continues to see socialism as the 
only force to successfully bring reform and a socially balanced situation.  
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Overall, the paper follows the line of Grósz, arguing that while a time of reform has come, 
these should not go too far. This is suggested by an article on January 31st, on pages 1 
and 2, in which the new partly leader receives a platform to respond to the interviews 
made by Pozsgay. Grósz states that he had not heard the statement made by Imre 
Pozsgay directly, but does not understand why he concentrates on this period so much. 
He argues that what political significance this will have is still unclear and is not up to one 
person to decide. Maybe the commission has documents that support the conclusion of 
Pozsgay, but he (Grósz) has so far not seen them. However, he cannot state at this point 
whether the findings will lead to a change in the official dogma. The paper follows the 
position of the hardline fraction of the party on the comments made by Pozsgay, namely 
that this was his view and not that of the entire politburo. Although in effect Pozsgay had 
made a political fait accompli with the statement, this is initially not acknowledged by the 
hardliners, and these use the paper to make their views public.  Another example of this is 
an article on February 1st, 1989, on page 3, in which Janos Lukács, a central committee 
secretary and member of the political committee, receives an opportunity to express his 
view. He argues that what Pozsgay said was his own conclusion, not the official stance of 
the central committee. He states that on February 10th 1989, this will be discussed in the 
central committee, and then an official party position will be formulated.  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time, the split in the party between the hardliners and softliners 
also becomes apparent in the “Népszabadság”. While the “Magyar Nemzet” was clearly 
controlled by Imre Pozsgay, the “Népszabadság” was subjected to influences from both 
camps within the regime. An interview, which was published in the same issue as the one 
with Janos Lukács, albeit on page 5, makes this visible. The interview is conducted with a 
member of the commission that Pozsgay headed. He states that the reason why the 
commission was put in place was due to the importance of understanding the past. He 
explains who was in the commission and how the research had been conducted. He states 
that the results show that the events were a popular uprising: a suppressed people, living 
in a terrorist system led a popular uprising against this state. This uprising wanted to renew 
the socialist system, not do away with it. He concludes that when the soviets came, the 
uprising changed to a national uprising. This portrays that the paper did not only portray 
the hardline position (supporting the background research as well as interview findings).  
 
That the paper is not purely the mouthpiece of the hardline party leadership around Grósz, 
is also suggested by the circumstance that the paper in general becomes a platform for 
both hardline and softline forces within the politburo. On March 29th on page 3 for example, 
under the headline “Tulajdonreforma van szüksége Magyarországnak”, the paper quotes 
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an interview of Imre Pozsgay that he gave for the International Herald Tribune. In it he 
stated that according to him, by the middle of the 1990s Hungary will have developed into 
a multi-party democracy. Additionally, he criticises the socialist economic system and 
suggests how the economies of the socialist states should develop from here, arguing 
against a combined economic plan. He argues that Hungary does not need a new 
Marshall plan help, but instead, each country should develop separately according to their 
own needs:  “Sok nyugati kérdezi, miért van elöbb szükségünk politikai reformra ahhoz, 
hogy lehessen növekedésorientált gazdaságunk. Csak azt felejtik el közben, hogy nekünk 
nincs gazdaságunk. Amit látnak, az látszatgazdaság, amelyben a politika felfalja a 
gazdasági tevékenységet és energiát. Helyre kell állítanunk az állampolgárok 
autonómiáját, tulajdonreform révén kell gazdává tennünk öket. Egyébként az új 
alkotmányunk által biztosított jokok üresek maradnak.”  
 
Furthermore, on April 12th 1989, on page 7, the paper mentions discussions of the MSZMP 
reform circle “platform freedom”, and discusses the various independent reform platforms 
being formed within the party. On May 10th 1989, on page 1, under the header “Reformunk 
nemzetközi feltételei” – “Horn Gyula elöadása”, the party prints comments by the party 
reformer and as of 1990 the Chairman of the MSZP, Gyula Horn.  Horn clearly speaks out 
for a democratic system, a multi-party system and the market economy. He argues that 
while the party was not in crisis, the inner party stability was made difficult by the fact that 
Hungary was witnessing an economic crisis. Additionally, the party was facing certain 
divisions concerning values and ideological questions. He criticises the party development, 
arguing that although the political style changed, no changes were made as to the 
structure of power and exercise of power. This led to an inner party stagnation in the last 
15 years. As to demands by some reformers concerning Hungary’s future role in the soviet 
bloc, Horn argues that Hungary should not and cannot leave the Warsaw pact.  
 
Additionally, the paper already in February begins critical articles on reform plans by the 
party, as well as the internal party reforms. On February 8th, on page 3, for example, the 
paper prints an own commentary under the header “Alkotmányráltozatok”, which is critical 
towards the change of the constitution. The article is filled with sarcasm, and does not 
understand why the party leadership argues that the new constitution should be finished 
by 1990 by the earliest. The journalist sarcastically says that he would like it earlier, but 
that one needs to accept the stance of the party. Although the decisions of the party 
leadership until now had always come autocratically too quickly, now in this case they 
“need to take time”. Again sarcasm becomes evident, as the commentary asks why now it 
takes so long when usually everything needs to be done quickly. The journalist agrees with 
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the party that a constitutional reform is necessary, but does not understand why it takes so 
long. He praises the fact that a discussion in the party is underway, that the grass roots 
finally have something to say. He states that currently many opinions are being heard; 
even alternative organisations can make their opinions public. The commentary views this 
positively, and praises that while before the law making process involved little discussion 
of party members and societal groups, now the working has become better, more 
formalised, involving a wide range of different opinions.  
 
On March 22nd 1989, on page 4, the paper criticises the government that journalists are 
not allowed to join the “closed” meetings of parliament. The newspaper argues that the 
public has the right to find out what is discussed in parliament.  
 
On May 10th 1989, on page 8, the paper prints a commentary with the header “Csernok 
Atilla: A megujulás buktatói”. The commentary criticises the party, arguing that as long as 
the economy worked the party took the credit, but now that the crisis has come they 
distance themselves from the economy, blaming economists, stating that the workers are 
too lazy, and arguing that the changes initiated are taking longer than expected. It 
concludes by arguing that if we (the party) do not want that the last drop of trust is lost, 
then the party needs to face its responsibilities. The party needs to renew itself down to the 
roots and to free itself from the old legacy.  
 
On March 1st, 1989, on page 3, the paper addresses the renewal of itself. In reference to 
the societal changes, the newspaper cannot cover all aspects. It remains the organ of the 
party and follows the aims of the party, but wants to create a newspaper that represents 
and portrays a broad range of societal opinions and discussions.  
 
And indeed the paper does become a platform for a wide range of oppositional groups and 
parties. Nonetheless, the extent to which opposition groups receive a platform is not as 
strongly the case as in the “Magyar Nemzet”. Although the paper stated it would open the 
paper to a broad range of opinions and discussions in March 1989, this content analysis 
found that this only really began as of June 1989, with the beginning of the round table 
negotiations. Example here include: 
1. A commentary on June 7th on page 7, in which Fodor Gabor, a member of FIDESZ, 
argues for the need of quick political reforms. In the commentary named  “Európa 
esak egy lépes?” Gabor argues that many are saying that political reforms should 
come slow, as it is dangerous to have political reforms too far ahead of economic 
reforms. But he thinks that the danger of the political reforms overtaking economic 
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reforms are much less dangerous than if the political reforms as such are too slow. 
He argues that political reforms should go more quickly, only then can Hungary 
come “back to Europe”.  
2. On June 14th, on pages 4 +5, the paper becomes a platform for the independent 
democratic league and national peoples front.  
3. On July 5th, the MDF in an open letter demand the resignation of Aczél György, the 
father of the 3 T model mentioned earlier.  
4. On August 23rd, the paper prints an article on page 2, in which an MDF gathering is 
covered. It mentions that the MDF demand early elections in December 1989.  
5. On September 20th, on page 3, the paper prints a column on the round table 
negotiations, and informs its readers on what the topics of the negotiations are, 
including demands by oppositional groups.  
 
Initially, the opportunity for opposition groups to receive a platform is limited, and the MDF 
receive more opportunity than other opposition groups. This appears to be in connection 
with the hopes by the MSZMP to enter a coalition with the MDF after the next elections.  
 
This changes as of November 1989, following the renaming of party and the split with the 
party’s hardline fraction. Thereafter, the number of critical reporting become more, and 
more opposition groups are mentioned. On January 24th 1990, on page 2, the paper 
becomes the platform for the SZDSZ, who state that they want a fair fight, and argue that 
the MSZP often use unfair means of propaganda to fight the SZDSZ.  
 
The paper largely welcomes the renaming of the party, arguing that a new democratic era 
has begun (October 11th, 1989, page 1). The paper fosters the aim of the MSZP in trying to 
portray the party as a modern reform party, arguing on February 14th on page 3, that in 
reality oppositional ideas are often born in the MSZP: “EMLÉKEK A SLAMPOS 
DIKTAT´RA EVEIBÖL: Az ellenzeki gondolatok gyakran az MSZP-ben születtek”.  
 
Interesting appears to be that in comparison to the “Magyar Nemzet”, the paper does not 
only become a platform for the democratic opposition, but also for the reformed communist 
party under Grósz. On January 31st, 1989, on page 2, the paper quotes the MSZMP who 
argue that should the centre-right groups win the next general elections, a petit-bourgeois 
dictatorship would emerge. Additionally, the MSZMP party programme is explained.  
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Similar to the “Magyar Nemzet”, a dominant topic in the paper is the economic reforms, 
often criticising the lack of in the past, and arguing what possibilities exist in future. 
Examples include: 
1. On February 15th 1989, on page 7, the paper prints a book review that critically 
analyses the economic reforms since the 1950s. The book argues that now not 
only reform rhetoric is necessary, but rather real tangible action. Already in 1955 
politics hindered economic development. After the 1970s important reforms 
became necessary but the central committee instead introduced reforms that were 
not enough to significantly improve the situation. Far reaching steps remained out. 
The first chance for real chance to overcome stagnation came in Mai 1988 (on the 
party congress). However, this process is far from over, and the experiences of the 
last 30 years show that reform processes often stopped. In order to ensure that this 
will not happen this time, it is important that the political leadership remains strongly 
on course of economic reform. No reform rhetoric is necessary for this, but instead 
real tangible action.  
2. On June 7th 1989, on page 8, the paper prints an own commentary demanding that 
the government publicise more economical statistics from the statistical ministry. It 
argues that if statistics are being published, then at least the entire picture should 
be made public. It criticises that the Hungarian deficit is published as a net statistic, 
instead of publishing the gross deficit number.  
3. On September 27th 1989, on 2, the “Népszabadság” prints an article analysing 
which economic model Hungary should now best follow, and whether Hungary 
should join “Efta”. 
4. On November 4th 1989, on page 4, the paper addresses a general insecurity 
among the population concerning privatization in form of a commentary. The 
apparent attempt made, is to ease some of the fears concerning privatization and 
to foster a societal discussion on the topic.  
 
The “Népszabadság” also begins reporting on the Water barrage programme "Bös-
Nagymaros", although considerably later than the “Magyar Nemzet”. The first content 
analysis article on the topic in the “Népszabadság” came on May 18th 1989, in which the 
paper quotes the West-German “Süddeutsche Zeitung”.  The article argues that the 
Hungarian actions are entering international dimensions; as for the first time in the 
communist bloc’s history a socialist state is ending its commitments towards another 
socialist state.  As mentioned before, the “Magyar Nemzet” in comparison already begins 
reporting on the subject as of the first half of March 1989.  
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The elections are only limitedly covered in the paper between March 15th – March 
23rd1990. During this time the oppositional parties still receive a platform to elucidate the 
aims of their parties and their programmes. On March 20th, for example, the SZDSZ 
receive a ¼ page interview on page 7, in which they state that they see the natural 
opposition for themselves in form of the MDF.  Nonetheless, no direct ads for the parties 
are placed. On March 23rd, on page 4, the paper prints an article that states that the MSZP 
will be under the top three to four parties following the elections. As of March 23rd, the 
paper prints more articles on the elections, however, the opposition no longer seem to 
receive a platform. 
 
Similar to the “Magyar Nemzet”, the “Népszabadság” begins to ask critical questions 
concerning MSZMP party assets. Already on June 7th 1989, on page 7, the paper prints an 
interview asking whom the estates belong to that the party controls, and whether the party 
should be forced to give part of its assets to the emerging oppositional parties.  
 
Interesting to observe, is that both the “Magyar Nemzet “ and the “Népszabadság” begin a 
critical reporting of Ceausescu long before this is the case in the media of the GDR. The 
content analysis suggests that while the GDR media only begin to criticise Ceausescu in 
the last months of 1989, the first anti- Ceausescu articles this content analysis could 
identify in the Hungarian media already began in March 1989. On March 22nd, on page 3, 
for example, the “Népszabadság” prints an article quoting an MTI statement about the 
international anti- Ceausescu mood as well as an open letter by former high-ranking 
Romanian officials criticising the dictator. Undoubtedly, as the Moscow imposed friendship 
among the socialist “brother states” was breaking, the traditional - but since 1945 publicly 
dormant - animosities between the two countries resurfaced. This also coincided with the 
struggle of the ethnic Hungarian minority in the Romanian Transylvania region, which led 
to thousands of refugees leaving Romania for Hungary at the end of the 1980s. As the 
background research and interviews for this dissertation suggested, the Hungarian reform 
government early on allowed the media to begin a critical reporting on Romania, up to then 
a novelty in the internal relations of Soviet bloc countries. This was therefore also 
confirmed by the content analysis.  
 
Although the “Népszabadság” does report on the events of 1956 and later on the reburial 
of Imre Nagy, this is by no means as fervent as in the “Magyar Nemzet”. The content 
analysis did not find articles on “parcel 301”, and the paper largely appears to follow a 
restricted reporting on the matter. On May 18th 1989, on page 3, for example, the paper 
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simply informs its readers on a commission which had been formed to re-investigate the 
sentencing of Imre Nagy.  
 
 
6. The role of the Media during the transformation process 
 
Analysing the media in Hungary in 1989 to 1990, one comes to the conclusion that the 
media were by far more liberalized and independent as their GDR counterparts. The liberal 
“goulash communism” implemented since the 1960s leading to a comparably liberal 
society in the soviet bloc, the reform orientated regime members (strengthened by the 
party conference in May 1988), the reform orientated media nomenklatura, the open 
conflict in the regime between the hardliners and the softliners, as well as the privatization 
of the press, all fostered an increasingly independent media landscape by 1989. 
Additionally, the processes of reform and change occurring throughout the region but 
especially also in Hungary in 1989 until the elections in March of 1990, increased the 
media’s possibilities to emerge as an independent actor and to assume the role of a fourth 
estate. Indeed, by the end of 1989 the media –especially the press – found themselves in 
a limbo position. Although new democratic rules had not yet been officially set, at the same 
time, the degree the party was able to or even willing to exert influence over the media had 
eased drastically. Several liberalization reforms that had been implemented previously 
certainly supported this. Overall a vacuum had formed which allowed the journalists to act 
more freely. As a result, a “culture of critical discourse” (Gouldner, 1979) had replaced 
party jargon.  
 
The media nomenklatura  – being so close to the regime - were the first to notice that this 
vacuity had come, that something was changing. Noticing that something was changing 
increased their readiness to openly address previous taboo topics. However, the 
interviews as well the available literature suggest that the media also in the Hungarian 
case were not the forerunners of the democratization process. Instead, the media began 
covering the opposition groups and organizations directly once these had become strong 
enough to publicly fight against the regime and once the regime allowed the media more 
liberties. Only then – eventually - did the media emerge as an independent actor, further 
influenced by the changing ownership structures of the media landscape and the thus 
developing competitive environment. As argued by Dr. Kajdi, once these points happened, 
the positive role of the media is undeniable; latest by the spring of 1989 there was an 
explosion of media coverage about the presence of opposition organizations and their 
political goals, mainly in a positive “interpretation” (Interview Dr. Kajdi, 01.04.2008). This is 
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also supported by the interview with Dr. Szabó, who argues that in 1989 there developed 
an own momentum that led to greater media autonomy and critical coverage, but that 
without the initiation by high ranking communists to do so, this would not have been 
possible (Interview Dr. Szabó, 19.2.2008). Lipovecs argues similarly, namely that until 
1988 the journalists were similar to journalists in the rest of the soviet bloc and that they 
showed little courage to oppose the status quo. This changed only once the sluices began 
to be opened by the regime, for example by the radio interview with Imre Pozsgay in 
January 1989 (Interview Lipovecs, 15.02.2008).  
 
It is important to mention that the interviews for this dissertation suggest that in 1989 the 
media began to undergo a process of commercialization. This process influenced the 
media output enormously. As argued by Dr. Szabó, in 1989 the media became more 
pluralistic but also more business like, following the reality of a market economy where one 
needs what sells best. This logic became the dominant driving force behind what was 
covered by the media (Interview Dr. Szabó, 19.02.2008).  This is also supported by the 
interview with András Heltai-Hopp, who argues that the initial euphoria that the journalists 
had, that they could finally write freely, was soon gone. Although the political freedom to 
write critically had come to a large extent, the economic reality placed new restrictions on 
the journalists. For many this came as a shock, as they learned that one could not only 
write freely, but that one also had to make money (Interview Heltai-Hopp, 18.02.2008). 
This logic influenced the choice of topics covered. Heltai-Hopp concludes that for many 
journalists the privatization process had a different influence than initially anticipated. While 
one could write more openly, in the end this openness was limited as only those articles 
were printed that could also be sold (Interview Heltai-Hopp, 18.02.2008).  
 
When analysing the role of the media during the transformation process in Hungary, it 
again makes sense to continue the differentiation of “output” and “outcome” analysis as 
used previously. Again, the first, the “output“ analysis looks at the output of the media in 
order to investigate whether the respective media and its journalists favourably supported 
the transformation process. The second, “outcome” analysis attempts to shed light into the 





As identified in the foregoing chapters, the Hungarian media landscape since the 1960s 
had witnessed a gradually increasing liberalization. The societal, political and economical 
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reforms initiated by the Kádár regime, marked by a high degree of reformist pragmatism 
and comparably high liberties given to the people, had made sure that by the 1980s 
Hungary was one of the most liberal countries of the region. As to the media set up, the 
return of former dissidents to the media following the amnesty of the 1960s, the inclusion 
of many reform orientated communists in the party nomeklatura responsible for dictating 
the media, the media privatization in 1988 as well as the overall more liberal society in 
comparison to the other countries in the soviet bloc, all made sure that by the middle of 
1989 the media were in the position to bring an output supporting change.  And indeed, 
the research for this dissertation suggests that the respective media did attempt to 
positively influence the developing reform process in various ways.  
 
During the period of research, the Hungarian media in general attempted to favourably 
support the democratization process in the following ways: 
1. They began to make scandals of the past but also of the present public. Examples 
here are: the issue of the opening of archives, where the media began criticising 
the half-hearted attempts by the regime to sincerely open them up as well as cases 
where the regime supported the destruction of these; the “Dunagate” scandal, 
which was uncovered by the media and made public; or the question of party 
assets. These “scandals” of the past including misuses of power, led to a call in the 
papers (but also society) of the introduction of “democratic control mechanisms”.  
2. Additionally, the media became a platform for the developing opposition groups, 
making their programmes, meetings and leaders public. A special wire service 
(Országos Sajtószolgálat – “the national press service”) was established to offer 
opposition groups a platform to convey their messages and statements (Sükösd, 
2000, pg 145). Argued by Pach (Interview Pach, 14.11.06), as so much was 
happening daily, it became very difficult for the opposition groups to make the 
editors aware of their press releases as these were simply bombarded with 
information. The wire service gave the editors the possibility to search for 
information they thought was important, while at the same time facilitating the work 
of the opposition groups, as they simply sent one press release instead of 
addressing each media individually.  
3. The media began articulating topics important to society and in this began telling 
the truth as they see it, or to propagandise for their idea of the future. With this, 
they attempted to assume an „agenda-setting“ function. A central example here is 
the demand for economic reform and ways of privatization, which became a 
dominant topic in the media as of April 1989 according to the content analysis. 
Another is the discussion on “parcel 301”.  
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In addition, especially positive influences in the developing reform process for each 
respective newspaper of analysis could be identified:    
 
“Magyar Nemzet” 
As has already been established, the “Magyar Nemzet” was the organ of the reform wing 
of the communist party as well as of the popular front groups. In this, the paper supported 
the reform process in following ways: 
1. The paper became a platform for the views of the reform orientated regime 
members. This not only made the split within the regime apparent but also fostered 
an internal party democratization process.  
2. The paper increasingly argued to differentiate the reform forces within the regime 
from the former hardline regime of Rákosi, Kádár or even from people such as 
Grósz. In order to do this, it began to mention former communists that opposed the 
Stalinist doctrine (such as Rajk) and indirectly aligning them with the reform forces. 
But at the same time, it de facto broke on previous taboo topics and supported a 
societal discussion on mistakes of the past, including Stalinism in general. 
3. Several reform regime members, including most notably Imre Pozsgay, supported 
the formation of opposition groups such as the MDF. As a result these then 
received a platform in the “Magyar Nemzet” to publicise their ideas, meetings and 
events, before this was often the case in other official newspapers. An example 
here is surely the interview with Pozsgay printed in the Magyar Nemzet, in 
November 1987, in which he openly talked about the meeting at Lakitelek including 
the formation and demands of the MDF. As of March 1989, this content analysis 
found that the paper continuously acted as the platform for the opposition groups. 
This lies in contrast to the “Népszabadság”, in which this content analysis found the 
first examples where the paper became a platform for these groups as of August 
1989.  
4. As the paper was not only the organ of the reform forces within the MSZMP, but 
officially the organ of the popular front groups, the paper began to act as the 
platform from which these began to articulate their growing independence from the 
party as well as to demand political / constitutional changes. The first examples in 
this direction this content analysis found, already began in February 1989.  
 
“Népszabadság” 
As has been established in the content analysis, the “Népszabadság” became a platform 
for both regime hardliners and softliners. In this, the paper especially supported the 
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democratization process in the following ways: 
1. It fostered a societal discussion on previously taboo topics as both the hardline and 
softline views became public.  
2. The nomenklatura of the paper were party members. In this, the fact that both party 
reformers and hardliners were mentioned together with the fact that the journalists 
themselves often addressed critical issues – especially issues concerning the 
reform of socialism, of the economy, of the political system as well as the reform of 





6.1.2 “In between the lines” 
 
Research for this dissertation suggests that the need for writing in between the lines for 
Hungarian journalists in 1989 was no longer as necessary as before. As remembered by 
András Heltai-Hopp, the liberalization of the 1980s had culminated by 1989, as a result of 
which the journalists began to directly address critical topics and no longer needed to do 
so “in between the lines”.  Instead, Heltai-Hopp argues that the writing “in between the 
lines” was more characteristic for the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was also confirmed 
by the interview with Dr. Kajdi, who argues that already from the middle of 1989, the media 
became “masterless” and could thus write articles which would have been inconceivable 
even a half year before (Interview, Dr. Kajdi, 01.04.2008). This is also supported by Miklós 
Sükösd, who suggests that already by 1988 a power vacuum was becoming evident, one 
that the journalists began to exploit. Hence, as a result by 1989 “the unrestricted political 
agenda of the samizdat surfaced in the legal (official) media public sphere” (Sükösd, 2000, 
pg 141).  
 
And indeed, the content analysis also suggest that by 1989 the press was free in their 
writing to that extent, that “in between the lines” was no longer necessary. Although the 
press continued to support the regime to a strong degree (at least the reform orientated 
forces), if criticism was made or if taboo topics were raised, this was done directly. 
Furthermore, the actions of the reform regime forces directly supported this. Statements 
made by the party reform circles in the newspapers or also by Imre Pozsgay regarding the 
founding of the MDF, increasingly made it politically and socially acceptable for journalists 
to do the same. Hence, no examples of “in between the line” criticism were found during 






It is important to highlight at this point again that, as mentioned previously, the Hungarian 
media enjoyed considerable credibility in the eyes of the population. This largely positive 
public attitude towards the media and their journalists increased the ways in which the 
media could influence society in the sense of an “agenda setting”.  And indeed, the 
research for this analysis, predominately the interviews, suggests that the “output” as 
identified above did have an influence on the democratization process. This influence 
mainly arose in the following ways: 
1. The regime divisions and the actions of reform elites created a power vacuum that 
the journalists could exploit. Similar to the situation in the GDR, the media 
nomenklatura  – partly representing the regime and being so close to the top 
regime leadership circle - were the first to notice that this vacuity had come, that 
something was changing. Noticing that something was changing increased their 
readiness to openly address previous taboo topics. This change was then 
perceived by the population and the opposition groups, who in turn felt more 
confident to voice direct opposition. Dr. Tamás Deutsch-Für, member of the 
FIDESZ, supports this. He argues that when people noticed that even journalists 
were taking freedoms, the society step by step also took more liberties (Interview, 
Deutsch-Für, 15.02.2008). According to Deutsch-Für, at the beginning of 1989, 
most media “output” still followed the communist propaganda, even if only the 
“softline” version. But what really concerned people were the small examples of 
critical reporting that had already begun. When these came, everyone wanted to 
read them, as it was a sensation that after 40 years of communism the media was 
beginning to break free and that not only communist propaganda could be read. 
This was the case for both newspapers of analysis. Nonetheless, it is important to 
state once again that it was the reform communists that at the beginning directly 
instructed the media to write more critically or rather even used the media to voice 
reform views through interviews directly. An example here is surely the remarks by 
Imre Pozsgay in the “Magyar Nemzet” on the formation of the MDF with their 
demands. This, however, does not diminish the positive effects these critical 
articles had on society.  
2. As to making the scandals of the past but also the present public, the media 
fostered a continual erosion of party legitimacy in society and at times forced about 
change. An example of this is the topic of the opening of state archives. Following 
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the massive media coverage concerning the apparent lack of public access to 
these archives together with allegations in the media that these archives were even 
being destroyed, the regime publicly apologized. Furthermore, it stated that 
although only personal documents related to former employees had been 
destroyed, as a result of the public outcry now also these would no longer be 
destroyed. Additionally, public access to these archives became easier.  Moreover, 
although neither media of analysis were forerunners in the media sector on making 
the “Dunagate” scandal public, the interviews for this dissertation suggest that the 
media that did bring the scandal to light played a dominant role in de-legitimizing 
the regime.  As this scandal was being made public by the media, it was not only a 
major setback to the attempts of the new leadership to distance themselves from 
the past, increasing the already battered position of the party in society - but it also 
led to an increase in the public’s call for more democratic control. It was suggested 
that a one-party system lacking democratic checks and balances would ultimately 
lead to such actions. The media covered the scandal in terms of “constitutionalism 
versus Socialist Party hegemony” (Sükösd, 2000, pg 147).  In this case, the media 
played the role of a 4th estate usually attested to the media in a democratic system. 
As a result of the scandal, the head of the group in the Interior Ministry working 
against ‘internal reaction’ and the deputy minister supervising state security were 
sacked. Finally, the interior minister resigned (Rainer, 2000), suggesting just how 
far the process of democratization had already progressed.  
3. By bringing the faces and programmes of the emerging opposition into the public’s 
perception, the media began setting a new “democratic agenda” (Bajomi-Lázár, 
2001, pg 188). As suggested by Sükösd, as the media began reporting on the 
events of the opposition, they began spreading their political communications to the 
public, giving them a public presence, a public face, and contributing to the 
legitimation and pluralization of these opposition groups.  “In effect, the Hungarian 
media helped to rescue the democratic opposition from the small and relatively 
closed “intellectual ghetto” to which it had been relegated over the preceding 
decades. Eventually, the media played a crucial role in making the political 
programs, policy alternatives, and leaders of the new parties known to the 
emerging Hungarian electorate” (Sükösd, 2000, pg 145). The media were thus a 
factor in mobilizing the citizens for participation in the looming elections and in a 
general participation in the new democracy, resocializing the Hungarians to accept 
democratic values (Ibid). A clear example here is the referendum of 1989, initiated 
by the SZDSZ. The regime had planned Hungary to become a presidential 
republic, where the president was to be elected prior to the parliamentary elections 
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of March 1990. This would have most likely allowed the regime, most probably in 
the person of Imre Pozsgay, to effectively hold onto power in a new democratic 
multi-party system, even if the parliamentarian elections would not bring a MSZP 
majority. This was largely prevented by the referendum, during which the 
opposition could publicise their agendas and reasons for the referendum through 
the media. As a result, the referendum brought a public support for the SZDSZ 
initiative. Additionally, it boosted the popularity and profile of the SZDSZ, as up to 
then it had been a junior partner in the opposition forces known mainly to the urban 
voters. The same went for the FIDESZ, who also supported the referendum. 
Argued by Deutsch-Für, the referendum greatly boosted the image of the FIDESZ 
party because it and the SZDSZ had received so much media coverage (Interview 
Deutsch-Für, 15.02.2008). Suggested by Péter Bajomi-Lázár, through their work, 
the media fostered the development of a new political socialization: by transmitting 
the norms of the pluralistic western democracies, they changed the political culture 
of the Hungarians. This was increased by the fact that various newspapers offered 
free space for classified advertising of the meetings of parties, their addresses as 
well as contact person. This all supported a process of a “personalization” of 
politics, as people previously unknown became the faces of the newly emerging 
oppositional forces through the media coverage on them (Including people such as 
Viktor Orbán).   
4. Sükösd argues, “by covering crucial political events of great symbolic importance, 
the mass media reinforced and legitimized the symbolic appropriation of the 
national past and democratic traditions by the new democratic parties” (Sükösd, 
2000, pg 146). Surely the most symbolic of these was the coverage of the reburial 
of Imre Nagy, the March 15th gathering as well as the October 23rd demonstrations 
commemorating the 1956 revolution (Dayan & Katz, 1992, quoted in Sükösd, 2000, 
pg 146). 
5. By acting as a platform for reform communists, the newspapers fostered a critical 
discussion on topics taboo until then, and strengthened the position of the reform 
forces vis-à-vis the hardliners especially Grósz.  As argued by Tökés, the fact that 
the radio interview with Imre Pozsgay concerning his commissions findings on the 
events of 1956 were subsequently picked up by all major media, created a political 
“fait accompli”, and prevented a looming military putsch by Károly Grósz and a 
small amount of hardliners in the politburo. With this he had forced the entire party 
to “confront the central legitimacy dilemma of the Kádár era” (Tökés, 1997, pg 114) 
and had made a societal discussion on the topic politically acceptable. On the other 
hand, it widely strengthened the position of the reform communists in the eyes of 
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the people vis-à-vis the hardliners, and thus strengthened their authority. Another 
dominating example of taboo topics raised, are the articles on parcel “301” brought 
up by the media. As already mentioned, Imre Nagy was a taboo topic, by beginning 
to openly address who was in the collective grave – while it was generally believed 
that it was Imre Nagy among others – not only fuelled the discussion on the person 
of Imre Nagy and thus directly on the events of 1956, but it also symbolised an 
attempt by the media to break on previous taboos. Although the dissertation 
research suggests that initially it was the softline fraction of the regime that 
instructed the media (in this example the “Magyar Nemzet”) to begin reporting on 
the issue, it undoubtedly not only fostered a discussion on Imre Nagy (leading to 
his reburial in March) but it also sent a clear signal to the readers that the regime 
was split up and later on in retreat. 
6. In this both newspapers of analysis had an effect on the internal communist party 
democratization process. On the one hand, the media gave reform forces within the 
regime the possibility to make their standpoints clear, thus placing pressure on the 
hardliners. On the other hand, the journalists, often reform communists themselves 
(especially in the case of the Népszabadság), began to tell the truth as they saw it, 
or to propagandise for their idea of the future. Again, they too pressurised the 
hardliners to allow both a party democratization as well as a democratization in 
society.  
 
Furthermore, the journalists began articulating political topics previously not discussed, 
issues important to society or issues relevant for the imminent transition ( assuming an 
“agenda setting function”) themselves in addition to simply becoming a platform for the 
opposition or party reform forces to articulate these. A dominant example here is the 
question of economic reform and privatization. Another is the issue of the Water barrage 
programme “Bös Nagymaros”. For many people of Hungary as well as many media 
workers, the opposition to the project arose mainly as it was seen as a heritage of the old 
hated hardline communist system. At the same time, however, as argued by Ivan Lipovecs 
(Interview Lipovecs, 15.02.2008) much of the opposition was voiced through the argument 
of environmental problems. Thus, the media became a platform for the discussion of 
environmental issues and for environmental groups.  
 
Additionally, the media mobilised for political demonstrations as in the summer of 1989 for 
the funeral ceremony of Imre Nagy, which placed great pressure on the regime and forced 
them to quicken the reform process of the country. Tamás Deutsch-Für argues that it was 
important that the media began covering topics important to the democratization process, 
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even if the media system as such opposed these issues. An example here is the 
referendum initiated by parts of the opposition in 1989. According to Deutsch-Für, 
important for the democratization process was that while the media did not openly support 
the referendum, at the same time, they did not openly oppose it. Instead, the media 
neutrally and objectively reported on it, giving both sides the position to argue for or 
against it (Interview Deutsch-Für, 15.02.2008). Consequently, as argued by Bajomi-Lázár, 
by articulating issues previously not discussed as well as creating a platform for the 
opposition to be voiced, the media and the journalists created a pluralistic public discourse 
long before a system with democratic institutions was established (Bajomi-Lázár, 2001, pg 
188). 
 
In the Hungarian case, perhaps even more so than in the case of the GDR, when 
analysing the media “outcome”, it is important to look at the different roles of the 
“Journalists” as individual actors on the one hand, and the “Media” as an institution on the 
other. The media as an institution not only signalled that the first cracks in the one party 
state had come. Additionally, the print media – in the case of the content analysis 
especially the “Magyar Nemzet” – was instructed by Imre Pozsgay to act as a platform for 
the reform forces within the regime and the increasingly independent popular front groups, 
and to begin a reporting on the opposition activists and intellectuals (initially most strongly 
on the MDF). This undoubtedly increased the societal discussion already present and 
allowed the reform forces to make public their ideas. When the reform forces around Imre 
Pozsgay were then no longer as possible to exert their influence on the media workers, 
and the hardliners had lost their authority even more strongly, this role became even more 
dominant. The journalists then out of different reasons began to assert more 
independence from the regime and began to become more critical in tone against the 
entire regime also vis-à-vis the reform forces. Opposition groups then received more 
opportunity to voice their positions, and criticism largely developed beyond control of the 
softline forces. Additionally, scandals such as “Dunagate”, but also increasingly economic 
problems and questions of party assets de-legitimised the attempts by the reform forces to 








VI. The GDR and Hungary: a comparison 
 
It is no surprise that as the GDR and Hungary represent different modes of transition, so 
too did the preconditions of the respective media to influence the developing processes 
differ.  
 
Regime change in the GDR and in Hungary came through two different paths: the former 
was change through “revolution”, and as argued by Stokes, one not by an organised 
opposition but instead by “an entire people” against the regime which lost control (Stokes, 
1993, pg 140). In the GDR, the organised opposition that formed came largely from the 
masses on the streets in the last months of 1989. These then brought a rapid political 
mobilization, or what O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) call a “popular upsurge”. This 
upsurge forced within a short period of time some significant political concessions, through 
a replacement by slightly more reformist (softline) forces, which then initiated a 
“liberalization” phase.  
 
In the case of Hungary, it was a “negotiated revolution” (Bruszt, 1990), through a peaceful, 
regime-controlled opening. A reformist force from above reinforced the opposition, where 
the opening was initiated by pragmatic segments of the ruling elite. The formation of 
opposition groups such as the MDF and the introduction of the Hungarian round-table 
negotiations, both supported or initiated by the state, reflected an acceptance on part of 
the softliners of the inevitability of far-reaching political change. It was intended to serve as 
an example of political action on part of the elite, which should benefit and legitimize both 
the reformist group within the regime and the opposition movements that formed and were 
invited to participate (Ekiert, 1991, pg 307). Thus, in Hungary the transition was a process 
of political erosion over a long period of time, rather than sudden failure. 
 
This naturally placed the respective media under two different pre-conditions. Comparing 
the media in the respective countries of research, one clearly comes to the conclusion that 
by 1989, the Hungarian media landscape was much more pluralistic, more critical and 
more independent than its GDR counterpart.  This had been suggested by the background 
reading and by the interviews conducted and had indeed been confirmed by the content 
analysis. Thus, while the media in Hungary had already been addressing critical issues at 
the beginning of the research time, in the GDR this only developed during the last 6 
months of the research time. A direct comparison between the content analysis findings 
(see the quantitative analysis findings of the GDR and Hungary surely suggests this.  
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In the GDR, the regime attempted to prevent any debate of reform or liberalization in 
society and attempted to strictly control the media output. Furthermore, the media system 
until October 1989 largely remained in the hands of hardline party nomenklatura members, 
marked most evidently by the person of Joachim Herrmann.   
 
In Hungary, one had a regime where the party softliners largely controlled the media and 
which not only gave the media more autonomy but also already at the end of 1987 / 
beginning of 1989, had directly instructed the media to begin a critical discussion in order 
to both facilitate further reforms which they believed were necessary, and to portray 
themselves as modernizing mavericks in order to strengthen their legitimacy. Additionally, 
the reforms in Hungary since 1956, by 1989 had overall created a society that was far 
more liberal than was the case in the GDR. As stated by Swain: “Hungary by the mid-
1980s had enjoyed more than twenty years of `goulash communism` under János 
Kádár…and more than fifteen years of the most radically reformed economy of the Soviet 
bloc” (Swain, 2006, pg 145).  
 
Thus, while in Hungary, the pattern of party control over the media system became subtler 
over time, in the GDR little changed in the post-Stalinist era. In Hungary direct influence 
over the media eased considerably, although of course censorship remained. As the 
journalists remained heavily dependent on party well wishing in keeping their job, the form 
of censorship, however, shifted more towards a form of self-censorship. As suggested by 
Sükösd, “self-censorship became a commonly accepted and internalized norm among 
intellectuals, journalists, and authors, reinforced by the belief that the divided Europe of 
Yalta systems would remain in place for at least one or two generations” (Sükösd, 2000, 
pg 131). This too, however, diminished over time. In the GDR also, censorship was mixed 
with a form of self-censorship, although the mechanisms of direct control and direct 
censorship remained much more strongly in place than in Hungary. 
 
In Hungary, this liberalization of the media initiated by the reformist regime, was supported 
by the privatization of parts of the media system as early as 1988. This process positively 
affected transition by eliminating a direct control of the party over the working of the media. 
Additionally, it in many respects not only allowed them to do so, but rather also forced the 
entire media system to write more openly due to a growing commercialization. This 
process in the GDR occurred only at a later stage, but the first influences of a changing 
economic working reality could be identified as of November 1989.  
 
The dissertation before had assumed that changing economic restrictions began to 
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change the form of media output – leading to a commercialization - shortly after the 
liberalization had been initiated, while the single-party state was technically still in place. 
The research findings for this dissertation, therefore indeed suggest that this was the case.  
 
Hence, as it dawned to the vast number of journalists that the party state was coming to an 
end, and that this very state was no longer in the position to guarantee an economically 
unrestricted press, the journalists found themselves in an ever more commercialised 
environment. This meant that in order to survive economically, the newspapers and the 
journalists had to increasingly adapt to a market orientated approach of making news. 
Faced with the necessity to deliver an interesting product to the readers, the media, even 
the official party press, could no longer simply print party propaganda. Competition among 
one another (as well as with the former illegal “samizdat” publications) increased this. 
Indeed, the findings of the dissertation for both countries of research suggest that as 
remembered by Dr. Zoltan Szabó (Interview, 19.2.2008), in 1989 the Media became more 
pluralistic but at the same time also more business like. As argued by Dr. Szabó, in a 
market economy, one needs to write what sells. That became a dominant and driving force 
behind what was covered by the media. In Hungary this process was boosted by the 
circumstance that much of the Hungarian media landscape had already been privatised 
between 1988 to 1989. In 1989 most official quality newspapers were sold either 
completely or at least partially, which gave them an increased autonomy vis-à-vis the 
regime, and increased the competition pressure on these to write more interestingly for the 
readers. But also in the GDR – although the majority of newspapers were only privatised 
or placed in trust after the March 1990 elections – this gradually became visible following 
the opening of the Berlin-Wall in November 1989, bringing the entry of West-German 
newspapers on the East-German market. In the GDR although initially this was not purely 
a direct financial pressure (many still receiving subsidies), as the influx of West-German 
newspapers lowered the sales of the East-German press, the East German journalists 
began to fear losing their jobs should their newspapers not manage to successfully retain 
their readers on the long run (Interview Bötcher, 19.3.2008).  
 
Henceforth the newspaper had to go with the time, which meant a step-by-step increase in 
the commercialization and “boulevardization” of the entire media landscape (Interview 
Heltai-Hopp, 18.2.2008). Additionally, the increasingly commercialised environment led to 
an ever more investigative journalism. Thus, in both cases by end of 1989 at the latest, as 
the regimes were in a state of decay, no longer in the position to subsidise this vast 
economic burden, the journalists were thrown into cold water: overnight, they had to follow 
an increasingly commercial logic which stated that only if they successfully attract readers, 
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can they survive financially.  
 
This naturally dramatically changed the system –being aware of this situation caused by 
the fact that they simply could no longer finance this media empire; the regimes were 
forced to allow the media more leniency in making news. The journalists were faced with 
the economic necessity of changing party faithfulness with a loyalty towards the 
expectation of the readers. This was a tremendous impetus for the media to begin a more 
unbiased and critical stance towards politics, increasingly acquiring the position of “fourth 
estate” as usually attested to the media in western democracies.  
 
Although by 1989, the media in Hungary was by far more liberalized and independent from 
the regime than was the case in the GDR, the findings of this dissertation suggests that by 
the end of 1989, the media also in the GDR began to break free from party control and 
emerge step-by-step as an independent actor in unfolding democratization process. In the 
GDR this occurred rapidly in four ways:  
Firstly, following the replacement of Honecker, softline party members took over controlling 
the media, marked most evidently by the replacement of Joachim Herrmann with Günter 
Schabowski. These then began to allow greater media autonomy. This process was 
boosted by signs of a demoralization among many lower rank and file elite members in 
sense of purpose and discipline to defend the SED’s right to rule (a similar process also 
became evident in Hungary).  
Secondly, as the SED was increasingly standing with its back to the wall, the block parties 
began to distance themselves from the communists, demanding reforms and beginning to 
question the leading role of the SED positioning themselves for a multi-party system that 
now seemed possible.  
Thirdly, as the events at the end of 1989 were unfolding, the journalists suddenly found 
themselves in a short time of vacuity, where the party was no longer able and willing to 
exert as much influence over the media as was previously the case. This occurred 
drastically in the first months of October 1989.  As a consequence, suddenly the external 
mechanisms of control vanished, where the media workers suddenly found themselves 
free to express themselves, to pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it, or 
to propagandise for their idea of the future – for a short period of time, there was no one to 
tell them what to do  (Sparks, 2001, pg 22).  
Fourthly, this time of vacuity was soon replaced by the influences of a changing economic 
reality, which henceforth came to dominate the media’s agenda –as mentioned above – 
and positively affected the media’s critical output.  
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Additionally, in both countries media liberalization came due to a conundrum that the 
reform elites were increasingly facing: how could they authentically claim to be pursuing 
the aim of a truly democratic socialist system, without at the same time allowing freedom of 
speech and media independence?  
 
This dissertation has therefore portrayed in the preceding chapters that in both countries of 
research the precondition for the official media to assume an active and positive role in the 
transition process was an easing of political control over the media, whilst acknowledging 
that the forms of transition in both instances differed. Furthermore, in both cases the media 
were the first to notice a retreat of the regime. In both cases reform minded (softline) 
members of the regime, began to directly instruct their media to begin a more critical 
reporting and to support the calls for reform. This came first and more strongly in the 
Hungarian case, but also became visible in the GDR after the resignation of Honecker and 
due to the increasing opposition of the block-parties and their media. Additionally, 
comments by reform forces printed in the newspapers paved the way for certain topics to 
become politically “acceptable”, topics that the media could subsequently pick up on. Part 
of the reason why the softline forces allowed a media liberalization arose out of attempts 
by these forces to instrumentalize the media in order to portray themselves as modernising 
mavericks, attempting to erect a truly democratic socialist system.  
 
It is important to note, that in both instances the instructions by reform communists only 
went insofar as to de-legitimise the hardliners and to demand further reforms, while 
supporting the softliners attempting to portray themselves as reformers. In the case of the 
GDR further critical reporting was instructed by the “block-parties” over their own media en 
face of the increasing emancipation of these parties vis-à-vis the SED. This reporting was 
to criticise the SED per se, and to foster discussion on the transformation towards a 
democratic, multi-party system.  
 
In both cases therefore, the initial “freedom” of the media to begin a more critical, balanced 
reporting, breaking on previous taboos, came as a result of regime divisions. In both 
countries the emerging confrontation between party hard- and softliners, as well as the 
increasing capability of the softliners to sideline the former, led to a power vacuum that 
could be exploited by the journalists. As a result the media workers suddenly felt 
“masterless“ and uncontrolled. 
  
Once the initial liberalization measures were introduced, in both cases the regime lost 
control through the mobilizing effects this had, and the regimes were thus forced more into 
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retreat. Thus, the loss of political and state powers of the regime largely contributed to the 
further loosening of control over the media, which subsequently began a content output 
that would have been unthinkable hitherto.  
 
In both the GDR and Hungary a “plurality of opinions” in the media became apparent 
before this occurred in other sectors of society. This came as the media nomeklatura had 
direct access to the politburo members and noticed changes before these became evident 
to the rest of society. Additionally, as the media had always been under tight control of the 
party leadership, once this leadership was no longer able to or wanted to exert their 
influence on the everyday work of the media, the vacuum mentioned above became 
apparent in both countries. This vacuum in both countries allowed the media nomeklatura 
and also the lower-rank-and file journalists to act more independently.  
 
In the entire soviet bloc telling the truth required courage and brought apprehensive 
consequences. Although individual journalists sometimes attempted to broaden their 
scope of actions, and although many opposed the system at times either through 
“messages between the lines” or directly (which mostly brought serious consequences), 
overall the media system only came to oppose the regime once these had already initiated 
a liberalization, and once the consequences no longer seemed as fearful. In both 
countries, however, although this only occurred after the first cracks had become visible, 
the increased independence of the media system vis-à-vis the regime occurred while the 
one party system was still in place, while the possibility of a reversal of the liberal policy 
still existed. In this, after the first liberalization policies of the regime were introduced, an 
interplay - between the increasing liberties given by the regime on the one hand, and the 
increasingly positive role of the media in fostering more changes to occur on the other 
hand - began; the more the regime was in retreat, the more the media developed as an 
independent critical actor, the more the regime lost further control.   
 
Furthermore, the moment the reform forces of the elites set out to (re)-gain credibility in the 
eyes of the people, as soon as they engaged in talk with societal/opposition groups and 
organizations, as they stated their aim of erecting a truly democratic socialism, the door 
was swung open for the journalists to follow their own agenda and to speak freely. At this 
point the limited “controlled“ liberalization gave way to a media liberalization, which could 
no longer be controlled by the regime. In this, the media indeed began to act as a 
watchdog, discussing shortcomings in the reform process, uncovering “scandals” and 
making the opposition forces, their ideas and aims public. 
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While the reasons for the media liberalization differed in each respective country, the 
outcome was very much similar: a media beginning to assume the role attributed to the 
media in democracies, it being that of a fourth estate. Nonetheless, the extent of this 
differed among the respective media, as will still be discussed later on in this chapter.  
 
Hence, despite the different modes of transition in comparison between the GDR and 
Hungary, similarities do exist. The media in both countries were the first to witness a shift 
in the political reality. This occurred in different times and in different ways, nonetheless, 
the outcomes were very much the same. In both instances a vacuum was created that 
enabled the journalists to be “free to express themselves, to pursue their own interests, to 
tell the truth as they see it, or to propagandise for their idea of the future” (Sparks, 2001, 
pg 23). It is important to note, that most of the journalists in both cases were not anti-
communists, but instead –at least initially - envisaged a form of “communism with a human 
face” as viable alternative to simply acquiring western market capitalism.  This differed 
slightly in the CDU media, where the party put pressure on their respective media to 
support their political aims.  
 
Overall, following similar roles in the emerging democratization processes for the media 




1. The newspapers of both countries sent a clear signal that changes were coming, 
that the regime was in retreat. This came in form of commentaries, or articles by 
regime members articulating regime divisions, or simply by “witnessing” and 
articulating the events occurring.  
2. The media made political scandals of the past but also of the present public.  
3. The newspapers of both countries became a platform for the developing opposition 
groups, such as the “Neues Forum” or “Group 20” in the GDR, in Hungary groups 
such as the SZDSZ or FIDESZ, in which the formations of these were covered and 
in which these received the possibility to articulate and publicize their demands, 
programmes and people.  
4. In both countries the media began to cover issues previously “taboo” and issues 
simply not discussed. Although this varied in degree and reason, by addressing 
these issues, the media intended to assume an “agenda-setting” function or simply 
offered a platform for societal forces to address these issues in the newspaper and 
thus in public.  
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5. In both cases, the papers began to address issues important to society and 
relevant for a successful transformation process. These included in particular 
questions relating to a transition towards a market economy, including issues such 
as what to do with public property and privatization measures.  
6. The media in both countries began to address the issue of the communists’ 
constitutional leading role as well as the establishment of truly democratic control 
mechanisms. In the GDR, both opposition groups but also the “block parties” soon 
began to address the issue of the SED's leading role. In Hungary too, opposition 
forces soon began to discuss the issue of the party’s leading role, addressing the 
need of democratic control of party financing or following the “Dunagate” scandal, 
of mechanisms controlling the misuse of power.  
7. In both instances the media began to demand reforms towards an inner-party 
democratization process of the respective communist parties (in the case of the 





1. The signals transmitted in the media that finally changes were occurring, exposing 
that the regime was both split up and in retreat, had an enormous mobilization 
influence, as the people were beginning to realize that more change and further 
liberalization were both possible and within reach. This is supported by the 
interviews for this dissertation, for example with Siegfried Reiprich (Interview, 
20.5.2008) in the GDR, and Dr. Miklós Sükösd (Interview, 18.2.2008) in Hungary. 
Furthermore, the signals de-legitimised the respective communist party, as it 
exposed just how unable the party still was to control the media or to avoid the 
establishment and empowerment of a truly democratic media (Sükösd, 2000).   
2. As to the making of scandals of the past and the present public, this not only 
increased the internal democratization processes of the parties in question by 
giving grass root members more reasons to demand inner-party control 
mechanisms, but it also fostered an erosion of popular support for even the reform-
orientated communists. In the GDR issues such as the reporting on the housing 
estate of “Wandlitz” greatly increased public resentment against Krenz (Interview 
Bötcher, 19.3.2008), even though the aim of the reporting was different. In 
Hungary, the “Dunagate” scandal enormously discredited the reform forces 
(Interview Kiszelly, 14.2.2008) and their attempt to distance themselves from the 
old regime before the general elections.  
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3. By becoming a platform for the emerging opposition groups, the media coverage in 
both countries helped to rescue the opposition from a small and relatively closed 
“intellectual ghetto” (Sükösd, 2000, pg 145). In both cases the mentioning of the 
opposition groups brought them into “public existence” (Interview Reiprich, 
20.5.2008), which symbolized an enormous psychological victory. Although some 
opposition members were known to the public in Hungary (such as Árpád Göncz of 
the SZDSZ, later the first President of the new republic) others such as the newly 
formed FIDESZ and its leader Viktor Orbán were not. This was also the case in the 
GDR. The Neues Forum, which came to be one of the biggest opposition groups, 
and hoped to become the GDR's equivalent to the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, 
had only formed in September 1989. Although by December around a dozen more 
opposition groups had joined the church organizations, the “Neues Forum” and the 
five parties from the former block parties during the second round table meeting, its 
leaders still remained largely unknown. This increasingly changed as the opposition 
groups and leaders were mentioned in the papers or even received a platform in 
these. This is supported by the interviews, in particular with Siegfried Reiprich 
(Interview, 20.5.2008) and Arnold Vaatz (Interview, 7.5.2008) in the GDR or Miklós 
Sükösd (Interview, 18.2.2008) and Tamás Deutsch-Für (Interview, 15.2.2008) in 
Hungary.  Furthermore, as suggested by Sükösd, by presenting a new generation 
of leaders to the public, the media supported a “personalization” of politics in a 
positive sense of introducing up till then unknown individuals to the masses, linking 
people to parties, programmes, policies and statements (Sükösd, 2000).  
4. By beginning to address topics previously taboo, both respective media, either 
through an “agenda-setting function” through own commentaries and articles or by 
becoming a platform for societal forces and reform regime members articulating 
these, indeed came to define important societal discussions on important issues. In 
Hungary the media coverage on “parcel 301” largely fostered a societal discussion 
on the remains of Imre Nagy and thus on the events of 1956 (Interview Deutsch-
Für, 15.2.2008). In the GDR, a similar role is confirmed by the interviews with 
Arnold Vaatz (7.5.2008) and Siegfried Reiprich (20.5.2008). In both cases these 
also involved questions relating to the transformation towards a market economy, 
or crimes conducted since 1945 as a result of the communist imposition of power.  
5. By beginning to address issues relevant for the successful transition process, the 
media largely supported the development of a new political socialization (Péter 
Bajomi-Lázár, 2001), by transmitting the norms of the pluralistic western 
democracies, they changed the political culture of the respective countries. Thus, 
during the transition processes the media played a crucial role in spreading 
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democratic values, views and aptitudes. As argued by Sükösd “both abstract 
democratic concepts and the everyday procedures and the reality of pluralist 
democracy were presented to audiences” (Sükösd, 2000, pg 149). Additionally, by 
informing people on the concepts of the market economy and by informing the 
readers on market economy terminology, they helped the readers in finding their 
way in the post-communist systems. These included help as to where one could 
receive financial support to start up an own business, or questions relating to the 
rights of the people in the upcoming elections and how the election procedure will 
take place. The research for this dissertation suggests that these articles proved 
tremendously helpful, as many of the citizens had never witnessed free elections, a 
working democracy or a free market economy. Practically overnight, many had to 
become used to concepts such as insurances, new banking systems etc. 
Furthermore, the media set the agenda for issues which were to become important 
to society on the whole: in Hungary environmental issues were raised by articles on 
the water barrage Bös-Nagymaros (although the intent was not entirely to foster an 
environmental discussion); in the GDR the issue of right-wing tendencies inside 
East-Germany was raised. This had been a taboo topic and had officially not 
existed in the GDR up to then, but it came to be a real problem for the unified 
Germany and to dominate societal discussion until today.   
6. Interview partners for this dissertation including Dr. Zoltán Szabó (Interview, 
19.2.2008) in Hungary and Arnold Vaatz (Interview, 7.5.200) in the GDR, suggest, 
that the demands in the newspapers to end the leading role of the respective 
communist party, as well as the demands to introduce real democratic control 
mechanisms (demands often even articulated by party members), placed great 
pressure on the respective regimes. How could they authentically argue to want a 
truly democratic society built up on socialist values, without allowing these changes 
from taking place? How could they promise an end to the misuse of power from the 
past, without allowing truly democratic bodies from controlling the work of the 
government?  
7. The interviews also suggest that in both cases the media employees (in both cases 
mainly consisting of softline communists or moderate opposition members) with 
their remarks enormously fostered an inner democratization process of the 
communist parties in question. In the case of the GDR, as suggested by Arnold 
Vaatz (Interview Vaatz, 7.5.2008), additionally the block-party media largely 
initiated an inner-CDU democratization process. By allowing a discussion on the 
need of inner-party reforms and by even demanding these, the newspapers 
supported demands by softline party members in this direction. Additionally, the 
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papers began to assume a watchdog function, making public should the party 
leadership not implement the reforms promised.  
 
The democratic agenda setting function was an especially important role for the media in 
both countries of research, where crucial issues had completely evaded public discussion 
for several decades. As argued by Sükösd “when combined with the public’s hunger for 
information about these topics, the media’s ability to fill this vacuum meant that their 
agenda-setting role was much more pronounced and sharply evident than it is in 
established democracies, where such topics are covered regularly. By expanding their 
scope of news coverage and opinion pieces to cover hitherto taboo topics, the media 
contributed to the setting of an open-ended, democratic, and pluralist political agenda. 
Moreover, it was an agenda that helped the opposition forces, partly because it largely 
overlapped with their reform agenda and partly because many of the issues on this 
agenda could be viewed as valence issues overwhelmingly favourable to them” (Sükösd, 
2000, pg 144). Although this role became apparent in both countries of research, it 
changed during the time of analysis as a result of the elections in 1990. In the GDR it could 
be observed that the „Neue Zeit“ assumed the “agenda-setting” role as of October 1989, 
only to begin moving towards becoming more strongly the mouthpiece of the GDR-CDU by 
February 1990 (in their aim to advocate the transition towards a market economy and 
unification with the FRG). As to the „Neues Deutschland“, the „democratic agenda 
function“ only existed insofar as it reflected the position of the SED (later SED-PDS), it 
being to foster the continuation of the GDR on the basis of a truly democratic socialism, 
against the idea of an economic and political unification with the West. In Hungary, the 
dissertation findings suggest that the „democratic agenda setting“ function increased 
continuously between January 1989 to March 1990, indeed by November 1989 the 
political influences on the papers of research appear to have been smaller than was the 
case in the GDR. This, however, also varied from paper to paper, the „Népszabadság“ 
remaining the party paper never being quite as balanced, as was the „Magyar Nemzet“. 
 
Bennet (1998) argues two important roles the media play in transformation processes. The 
first is the “witness role” and the second the “reifying or confirming role”. The “witness role” 
is the process of making public the various transformations that are taking place in all 
aspects of society, as the old regime starts to loose its grip on power. The “reifying role” 
verifies and legitimates the changes taking place by presenting a variety of images and 
information that coincide with one another, which in effect makes the shift in society seem 
“real”.  Indeed, this is also what occurred in the two countries of research. The content 
analysis as well as the interviews for this dissertation suggest that the media in both 
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countries did indeed begin making public the changes in society as well as the increasing 
loss of control and power of the regime (including divisions within the regime softline and 
hardline fractions). Furthermore, the media (to varying degrees) indeed did provide 
different images and information on what was happening (either through own 
commentaries or by becoming a platform for various people and groups), by offering 
information on which possibilities existed (including the pros and cons of these), by 
informing on events occurring as well as by presenting the different political and social 
views, programmes and aims of the relevant political forces. By bearing witness of the 
changes occurring, the media made public that the emperor was “wearing no clothes”.  
 
In the formation of mass mobilization resulting from the initiated liberalization measures, 
the findings of this dissertation suggests that the media played a pivotal role, fostering this 
process. Apart from signalling that the first cracks in the system had arisen, that control of 
the regime over society was easing, it mobilised parts of the opposition that had remained 
calm up to then fearing reprisals; now that the control willingness or ableness of the regime 
appeared lowered as suggested by the media’s output, these now began to voice their 
criticisms more fervently. By channelling information about alternative groups and parties 
to the citizens, the media not only brought these into “public existence”, but also mobilised 
and enabled the voters to make a balanced judgement on who to vote for during the first 
free elections for most people in both countries.  
 
While initially the softline regime members had hoped to emerge from the elections as 
dominant forces, the events of 1989, the scandals uncovered and above all the articulation 
of what alternatives existed, were all factors that led to the victory of democratic forces 
during the March 1990 elections. The de-legtimation of even the reform forces was greatly 
fostered by the media, as critical issues regarding mismanagement, corruption as well as 
the continued misuse of powers were being made pubic.  Furthermore, the publication of 
calls for events and demonstrations of the opposition made possible that the people found 
out about these and could participate.  In Hungary this mobilised the masses in 1989 for 
the funeral ceremony of Imre Nagy (Sükösd, 2000). Arnold Vaatz argued during the 
interview for this dissertation (Interview, 7.5.2008) that in the GDR – in that particular case 
in Dresden -  it gave the opposition group “Gruppe 20” the logistical power to make public 
their demands and to mobilise for public support and for their events and demonstrations. 
While surely previously the Western Media had served as dominant point of orientation for 
the East-German citizens, in the finals month before the 1990 elections so much was 
happening so quickly, that the western media simply did not have the infrastructure to 
make public all events. Hence, increasingly the GDR media landscape assumed this role, 
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making public demonstrations, gatherings and oppositional demands even from the 
smaller groups.  
 
As one needs to keep in mind that every transition is in a very real sense unique, the 
issues of democratization in the GDR were sometimes markedly different to the issues 
present in Hungary. Therefore, some positive attempts by the respective media to support 
the developing process must naturally differ. These main differing roles of the respective 
media included in the case of the GDR the question of unification with the FRG or the 
question of compensation and ownership of property by FRG citizens expropriated by the 
communists. In the case of Hungary these issues included a symbolic requisition of the 
national past and democratic traditions by the new democratic parties. To these included 
calls for an end to the soviet military presence as well as the coverage of the reburial of 
Imre Nagy, the March 15th gathering as well as the October 23rd demonstrations 
commemorating the 1956 events. With hindsight, this requisition of the national past led to 
a rather problematic nationalistic tendency on part of many citizens and politicians.  
 
In both countries of research it is important to differentiate between the media as an 
institution as such and the individual journalists. While the media de jure remained state 
controlled (until the respective privatizations and the thus resulting commercialization 
occurred), the journalists in charge by the later part of 1989, mostly consisting of either 
reform communists or moderate opposition members, already began to foster a 
democratization of the system, while officially the state was still controlled by one party.  
 
The media system in both countries were thus regarded by the public as being part of the 
regime; and in both countries since 1945 the media had been used as a tool to 
propagandise the regime’s stance. As such, any changes in the way the media reported 
was seen as a mirror on what was happening on the political level. In this the media being 
part of the regime could send important signals to the public that a first split in the inner 
consistency of the regime had arisen as well as to what extent these divisions went. 
Furthermore, this made certain topics “acceptable” which in turn had a snowballing effect 
bringing issues into public discussion that would have been unthinkable hitherto. The fact 
that organizations previously strictly controlled by the regime were now increasingly 
asserting their independence, not only had a mobilising effect on the rest of society, 
signalling that further change were both possible and within reach. If a part of the regime 
could begin to demand change, why could ordinary citizens not do so too? But it also 
made apparent that change has come insofar that the respective parties no longer could or 
wanted to maintain full control over these organizations.  
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The journalists on the other hand, became actors in telling to truth as they saw it and in 
propagandising for their idea of the future; by offering the media to develop into a place of 
diverse discussion, where different voices could be heard, and where issues important for 
the transformation process were articulated. As soon as they began offering a different 
picture to that portrayed by the regime, this directly opposed the existing status quo. This 
came in form of uncovering political “scandals”, own commentaries writing on the events 
unfolding or on how they thought the country should proceed politically and economically, 
quoting opposition members, or simply by allowing the opposition groups direct access to 
voice their positions in the media. To be sure, the journalists boosted many of the factors 
relating to the role of the media, particularly in making obvious that the regime no longer 
did or could censor its media system. 
 
Thus, both were important in portraying just “how naked the emperor really was” and what 
alternatives existed; acting as a catalyst for the further power erosion of the respective 
regimes and hence for further change.   
 
In has previously been addressed that the independent and positive role of the respective 
media differed in its extent. This goes for the media in a country-to-country comparison but 
also in an inner-country comparison. The media in Hungary – even the official organ of the 
communist party – was considerably more independent from political forces than were the 
GDR media, and remained so until the elections of 1990. Again, this arose out of different 
conditions surrounding the respective media. The “Népszabadság” although supporting 
the MSZP (especially during the immediate election time), did become more balanced in 
its reporting than did the “Neues Deutschland”.  While the “Magyar Nemzet” was also the 
mouthpiece of the popular front groups, it seems that it broke free from the influences of 
reform forces within the regime particularly Pozsgay (as identified in the chapter “Media in 
Transition”) at the end of 1989, becoming more independent to support re-founded or 
newly founded political parties. The “Neue Zeit” remained the mouthpiece of the attempts 
by the CDU to position herself for the coming elections. This became stronger as the 
elections were coming closer. Furthermore, that she became a platform for the emerging 
opposition in the GDR arose to a large extent as the journalists themselves were softline 
CDU members (fostering an inner CDU democratization process), but also because these 
opposition groups often had shared issues in common with the CDU.  
 
Although the media landscape in Hungary does seem more balanced, critical and 
independent to its GDR counterpart per se, in an inner country comparison, both the “Neue 
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Zeit” and the “Magyar Nemzet” appear considerably more independent and critical than did 
the “Neues Deutschland” or the “Népszabadság”. This has much to do with the simple fact 
that both latter papers remained the organ of the party until the very end, and that in both 
papers the nomenklatura consisted of people believing either in a “third way” or in the 
continuation of the status quo (this then changed in both papers by the later part of 1989 
insofar that the hardliners lost most authority also in the papers, which left “softliners” in 
control who nonetheless - although not wanting a continuation of the status quo -believed 
in the need of the continuation of a socialist system).   
 
As for the GDR, the “Neues Deutschland” was one dominant force in uncovering mistakes 
of the past and in fostering an inner SED democratization process. However, the form of 
reporting always appeared rather one sided, raising fear of a unification with the FRG, 
warning of the negative consequences of this for Germany and especially Europe on the 
whole. While it did increasingly foster a continual erosion of legitimacy of the old guard vis-
à-vis both grass root party members but also the population (the latter sometimes arising 
unintended as through the reporting on the “Wandlitz” housing estate), the underlining 
message remained to give a reformed SED a second chance. (The bar graphs below 
illustrate this well). As such, it called for the continuation of an independent GDR on the 
basis of a truly democratic socialist system; one in which only a socialist party could 
guarantee a successful long-term future. As to this point, the “Népszabadság” in Hungary 
played a similar role. Although it did become more balanced in its reporting in comparison 
to the “Neues Deutschland” as the previous chapters have suggested, the comparison 
between the “Népszabadság” and the “Magyar Nemzet” suggests, that the former was 
nonetheless by far not as fervently critical and balanced as was the latter. This was 
especially the case when it came to giving opposition groups a platform as the bar graphs 
below suggest. Important was that both the “Neues Deutschland” and the “Népszabadság” 
moved more closely in line with the positions of regime party as the elections of March 
1990 drew closer.  The “Magyar Nemzet” it appears was the most independent (among the 
newspapers of analysis) from political forces by the end of 1989 / the beginning of 1990. 
The findings of the content analysis and the interviews do show that although it was by far 
not completely free from political pressures (as the inexistent articles on the “Dunagate” 
scandal suggest), nonetheless, it was considerably more independent than the other 
newspapers of research.  
 
The bar graph below depicts a content analysis comparison (for the entire research time of 
each country) between all newspapers of analysis regarding the main focus questions plus 
 225 
the issue to what extent the respective newspaper became a platform for or simply 




The graph clearly shows that the respective topics were usually mentioned more often in 
the Hungarian newspapers and there in the “Magyar Nemzet”. One needs to keep in mind, 
however, that this is not entirely surprising considering the circumstance that in Hungary 
the political liberalization had begun considerable earlier. The bar graph below, comparing 
the relevant issues after political liberalization had also begun in the GDR - therefore as of 





Here one sees that once an easing of political control had also taken place in the GDR, the 
media in the GDR began to assume a similar role as the media in Hungary. The bar graph 
depicts well the inner country and country-to-country comparison mentioned above.  As to 
the mentioning of opposition groups or becoming a platform for these, the Hungarian 
media landscape was undoubtedly ahead. However, in both instances, the respective 
“reform orientated” newspapers of each country was ahead of the respective “party organ”. 
In both countries the “reform” newspapers championed on reporting on the March 1990 
elections, while the party organs did so less. The special attention focus questions also 
supports the previously described. In Hungary it suggests that although the media was 
overall more critical and balanced than in the GDR, the respective newspapers of research 
were by far not completely free from political / ideological constraints (as suggested by the 
non-existence of the “Dunagate” scandal in the “Magyar Nemzet”).  In the GDR, the graph 
suggests that the issues that were covered by the two respective newspapers greatly 
differed: while the “Neue Zeit” concentrated on current issues including giving the 
oppositional groups a platform, the “Neues Deutschland” concentrated more on the 






VII. Conclusions and further comments 
The media as a “motor of change”? 
 
 
When analysing democratization processes, even more so when comparing these with 
one another, one needs to keep in mind that every transition is genuinely distinctive. 
Having said that, all successful attempts to foster transition appear to be characterized by 
a particular combination of factors. As identified, one is the question of elites, their 
attitudes and their claims to power and exertion of effective rule. Likewise important seems 
to be the growth of individual societal forces that recognise the changed political situation 
early on.  
 
Chapters 4 + 5 have illustrated that both countries of research represent two different 
modes of socialism since its respective imposition at the end of the 1940s. This also had 
an effect on the role of the media system in both countries of research by 1989, where the 
respective system’s independence and thus resulting credibility among the own population 
also differed considerably. It has been portrayed that the media in the GDR was seen as 
an extended arm of the regime until 1989, voicing no real opposition bar some exceptions. 
The media in Hungary, in contrast, enjoyed considerable credibility by 1989, a 
circumstance stemming from the overall more liberalized position of the media system and 
the fact that many reform communists that had been involved in the 1956 events had 
returned as media nomenklatura members following the amnesty of the 1960s.  
 
The hypothesis for this dissertation had presumed that where the media were able to play 
a relatively independent role from the outset of the democratization process, the media 
could contribute positively to the process, acting as a catalyst and exponent of change, 
offering a platform for discussion and thus fostering alternative views and critical debate. 
While acknowledging that a liberalization of the respective regimes had to be present 
beforehand, this dissertation assumed that the greater the liberties of the media at the 
outset of the transition process, the greater the speed and success of the democratization 
process. The findings of this dissertation indeed suggest that this hypothesis holds true. 
Thus, in neither the GDR nor in Hungary, had the media forced about the “liberalization” 
phase. Rather, the “liberalization” phase already had to be initiated by the regime, before 
the media further supported the emerging transformation process.  
 
The dissertation has outlined that the media in both countries were the first to witness a 
shift in the political reality. In the Hungarian case, this change had largely been instigated 
by a reformist elite initiating change from above.  In the case of the GDR, political change 
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came as a result of popular unrest, which brought softliners to power who agreed to a 
limited liberalization on the one hand, and who were simply no longer able to prevent it on 
the other. Here media liberalization only began in the final months of 1989. In Hungary, 
transition came a considerable time before it occurred in the GDR, the first reform 
measures – both politically and economically – dating back to the 1960s and receiving a 
stark boost in 1988. 
 
Nonetheless, the findings of this dissertation have portrayed that the outcomes of the role 
of the media during the immediate transition phases were very much the same. In both 
instances, following an easing of the political control willingness and/or ableness of the 
respective regimes, a vacuum was created that enabled the journalists to be “free to 
express themselves, to pursue their own interests, to tell the truth as they see it, or to 
propagandise for their idea of the future” (Sparks, 2001, pg 23) 
 
In order to analyse the role of the respective media in the democratization process, the 
research analysis had been divided into an “output” (journalists / media intent) and an 
“outcome“ (effect on the process) examination. This was done in order to analyse in a first 
step whether indeed the media and the journalists began to cover issues that supported 
the democratization process in principle, and then to evaluate to what extent this intent did 
in fact have a positive influence on the process. The intention was that both should shed 
light into the question of whether the media in Central and Eastern Europe led or followed 
the democratization processes.  
 
In a first step (the “output” analysis) the dissertation portrayed that in both countries as 
soon as the “liberalization” phase was initiated, the media quickly emerged as a witness to 
the events unfolding, making public the various transformations that were taking place in 
all aspects of society, as the old regime began to loose its grip on power. Additionally, the 
media (to varying degrees) assumed the role of an “agenda-setter”, beginning to become a 
forum for the addressing of previous taboos (either themselves or as a platform for 
opposition and softline regime members) as well as for issues relevant for society and the 
successful transformation process. Thus, an intent of the media to positively influence the 
developing democratization process could be identified.  
 
In a second step (the “outcome” analysis) this dissertation revealed that the media did 
indeed have a positive effect on the unfolding developments.  The media began providing 
different images and information on what was happening, again either through own 
commentaries or by becoming a platform for various people and groups. This had an 
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enormous mobilization effect, not only as it provided and made possible a more balanced 
public discussion, but also because with it the people were beginning to realize that further 
liberalization was both possible and within reach. With their reporting the media brought 
the opposition into “public existence” and made sure that the public was informed on what 
was to become the first democratic elections for most people in both countries. With this, 
the media did in effect assume an “agenda-setting” role, not only on defining issues 
relevant for the successful transition process or by making public the opposition groups, 
people and programmes. But they also began to address issues that were to dominate 
public discussion sometimes until today.  
 
It is important to note that this dissertation has portrayed that a difference existed between 
the role of the media as an institution and the role of the journalists. To return to the 
introductory sentence of this conclusion, the media’s role was predominately related to the 
question of the elites, their attitudes and their claims to power and exertion of effective 
rule. In this, the media made evident that changes were occurring before it had been clear 
to the rest of society; on the one hand they became the instruments of the softline regime 
members to make certain issues public, and on the other they suggested just how unable 
the regime still was to control the emergence of a critical media (thus in both the media 
signalled that changes were coming, that the regime was increasingly loosing its grip on 
power).  
 
The journalists began to support individual societal forces. In this, they made these forces 
public and began to cover issues that were also important to these. At the same time, they 
also made public issues important for the regime members; thus enabling the media to 
become a true forum for a societal dialogue representing a diverse range of views. It is 
important to highlight that although the journalists did allow the media to become a 
platform for both the regime and the opposition, they not merely settled with the role of 
making public the unfolding developments in the respective countries, but instead also 
began to actively voice their own ideas on how the future should look.  
 
So what does this tell us about the role of the media in the transformation processes of 
Central and Eastern Europe? The methodical approach had argued that as the 
dissertation analyses two countries of the region that were most different regarding both 
the media system and model of state socialism (therefore following Przeworski/Teune’s 
„Most different Systems Design“), if the media in both countries end up with a similar role 
during the immediate time of transition (the “liberalization” and “democratization” phases), 
then one can actually argue that the media in the entire region of research assumed a 
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similar role during the same phases. And as the findings of this dissertation have portrayed 
that during the immediate time of change the media system in both countries had indeed 
assumed similar roles, one can therefore presume that this was also the case for all 
countries of the region. This was further supported by the fact that in both countries of 
research both respective newspapers (one the largest “reform” orientated paper, the other 
the party organ, and both therefore also following the “Most different Systems Design”) 
began a positive role on the emerging process, albeit out of different reasons, on different 
topics and to varying degrees.  
 
The chapter on the level of research had identified four different positions in relation to the 
role of the media during the transformation process. It seems that the findings of this 
dissertation imply a mixture between position 1. The “Media-supremist position” as well as 
position 2. The “democracy-supremist” position. Only after the regime had already initiated 
liberalization measures, could the media emerge as an independent actor. Nonetheless, 
as this dissertation had portrayed, to argue that the media merely followed the 
democratization process would not be entirely fair either. Instead, one can conclude that 
during different phases, the media play different roles.  
 
It is important to emphasise the argument made at the beginning of this dissertation, 
namely that the initiation of each phase does not necessarily assure the transition to 
political democracy. Here, the findings of the dissertation point to the conclusion that 
although the media may not have played a dominant role in the initiation of the 
“liberalization” phase, after that it was a “motor of further change”; assuring the successful 
completion of the “liberalization” phase as well as initiation and completion of the 
“democratization” phase. Therefore, once it had become clear that the regime was 
initiating liberalization measures or was forced to do so (representing position 2), the 
media quickly exploited the thus resulting time of power vacuity, and indeed became a 
force for “further change” (representing position 1). The media therefore represented one 
factor in ensuring that the „liberalization“ and the „institutionalization“ of democracy were 
not reversed at some point, or that a new authoritarian regime was installed instead.  
 
Furthermore, the dissertation findings suggest that the respective role of the media was 
indeed influenced by other forces in society as also argued by position 2, particularly that 
of money. Here, one hypothesis of this dissertation seems to be confirmed, namely that a 
new economic working logic which the journalists and the entire media system had to 
increasingly adapt to while the single party state was still in power (albeit considerably 
weakened), came to dominate the topic choices of the respective media. As the party state 
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was no longer able to finance its media empire, making news became a commercial 
activity – a process the editorial offices had to adapt to. And indeed this appears to have 
happened in the GDR and Hungary.  In both countries one can conclude that the 
privatization measures as well as the need to adapt to the new economic working mode, 
heavily influenced the media’s output, making them more critical, bringing them to raise 
more relevant questions and largely fostering a transition towards a stronger investigative 
journalism. The new economic reality came to limit the leeway of the journalists to merely 
propagandise for their own ideas of the future (as stated above), but instead to offer a 
more balanced reporting, competing for the public’s confidence.  
 
There is no doubt that through the quantitative as well as qualitative spread of the internet 
as a dominant source of information, it has become increasingly more easy for 
underground samizdat information to spread. Be it in China or in Egypt, internet blogs 
have the capability of reaching millions of people quickly and efficiently. Nonetheless, the 
official print media still keep many of the roles as mentioned above. For a start, an 
increase in the regime critical “output” of the official media in any authoritarian regime – 
communist or capitalist – suggests some form of retreat on the side of the regime. 
Although this retreat may be of temporary nature, and the regime may yet reinstall its strict 
control, for a short moment it exposes just how unable the regime still is to control the 
media or to avoid the emergence and empowerment of a democratic media system. It 
suggests some form of regime divisions, usually as the softliners attempt to use the official 
media to initiate some form of change.  
 
As suggested by the findings of this dissertation, the softline members of the regime 
usually allow a media liberalization to foster their ideas and to sideline the hardline forces, 
believing that they can retain control over the subsequent events as well the media 
system. However, as soon as the door is swung open, this dissertation has portrayed that 
the subsequent process receives an own dynamic, where the media increasingly become 
an independent actor fostering further change. As the “liberalization” phase is usually 
accompanied by some form of economic “liberalization”, which results in a 
commercialization, the official media and the illegal and semi-illegal media begin a 
competition that usually positively affects the output quality of the official media. A similar 
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Appendix 1: Quantitative content analysis findings: GDR 
Neues Deutschland                                             
Neue Zeit                                             
Year / Period             1989                   1990           
  
1 half  
05 
2 half  
05 
1 half  
06 




2 half  
07 
1 half  
08 
2 half  
08 
1 half  
09 
2 half  
09 
1 half  
10 
2 half  
10 
1 half  
11 
2 half  
11 
1 half  
12 
2 half  
12 
1 half  
01 
2 half  
01 
1 half  
02 
2 half  
02 
1 half  
03 
2 half  
03 
Events                                             
Articles on the elections of May 1989 xx                                           
Articles dealing with the May 1989  
elections critically                         x x                 
Articles demanding new election laws                         x                   
Articles on the elections of March 1990                               x x x x xx x xx 
Positive articles on political  
transformations in Soviet bloc countries   x   x xx       x             x x x x       
Negative articles on political  
transformations in Soviet bloc countries   x   x           x                         
Articles dealing with the need of  
renewal of society / new realities /  
reforms / the need of dialogue              x x       xx xx xx x x x           
Articles supporting state view of refugee problem               xx x xx xx x x                   
Balanced reporting on refugee problem                         xx xx x x   x         
State view of demonstrations inside 
 the GDR                     x                       
Balanced or positive view of  
demonstrations                     x xx   x                 
Border closure between the GDR  
and Czechoslovakia                     xx                       
Articles attacking current work of the  
SED leadership                       x   x xx   x           
Articles dealing with mistakes of the past                       x x xx x x x           
Articles dealing with the leading  
role of the SED                         xx xx x               
Articles dealing with the leading  
role of the SED - criticising promised changes are in effect is 
not happening                                 x           
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Articles on Wandlitz                           xx xx               
Articles on the party exclusions of  
Honecker and Mielke                             xx   x           
Articles dealing with the storming of Stasi offices                             xx   x           
Stasi critical articles                             x   x           
Articles on the misuse of powers and  
corruption by prominent SED members                           xx x x x           
Calls for new elections                         x x xx               
Articles covering the round table  
negotiations in the GDR                           xx xx xx x           
Articles arguing for a "third way" instead  
of instant unification with the West                           x xx x x x x       
Articles on the SED- extraordinary  
party conference                         xx x xx x     x       
Articles calling to give a reformed SED a second chance                           x x           x   
Different voices for and about economic reforms / no ADN or 
government releases                       x x xx xx xx x xx x xx xx x 
Articles dealing with right-wing tendencies inside the GDR                         x   xx xx x       x   
Introduction of / platform for  
oppositional groups and parties                       x x x x x x x x x x   
Negative articles dealing with the  
possibility of unification with the FRG                               x x x x x     
Neutral articles dealing with the possibility of a  
unification with the FRG                                 x x x x x   
Positive articles dealing with the possibility of a unification 
with the FRG                                   x x x x   
Articles offering diverse discussion on  
how to proceed politically                                 xx x x       
Negative articles regarding the issue of  
a currency unification with the FRG                                   x x x x   
Neutral articles on the issue of a currency unification                                   x x x x   
Questions relating to the GDR's property  
expropriations and compensation for 






Appendix 2: Quantitative content analysis findings: Hungary 
Népszabadság                                                           
Magyar Nemzet                                                           



























































































Events                                                           
Statement by Imre Pozsgay / events of 
1956 xx xx       x x   x       x x xx           x                 
Elections of March 1990  
(calling of new elections)                             x       x x     x x   x x x xx 
Dunagate                                                  x         
Opening of archives                                         x   x x           
Oppositional round table                 x x x     x x                             
Round table negotiations in Hungary                 xx xx x       x   xx         x               
Referendum initiated by the opposition                                     xx xx xx                 
Articles criticial towards the past / 
reforms 
 had not worked, mistakes that 
happened     x         x                           x x             
The mentioning of formations and  
programmes of oppositional groups  
and parties     x xx   x       xx x x   xx x   x     x xx xx x x x         
Platform for oppositional groups: articles 
on  
them or articles by them   x   x x x x     x     x x xx xx xx x x x x x   xx xx 
x
x xx x xx 
Articles on the need of economic reforms xx   x   x x x xx x x x         x       x x xx x   x x       
Articles on the need to reform the 
socialist  
party state system x x       xx   x   x           x   x x xx x x x   x x       
Articles on the need of a constitutional  
reform in Hungary   x           xx                             x     x       
Articles on the need of public  
constitutional control       x     x                     x             x x       
Articles on the round table negotiations 
in Poland / changes  
and reforms in Poland   xx xx xx xx x x xx   x x xx xx x x x x x               x       
Articles on the March 15th celebration       xx                                                   
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Articles on the coming of the  
multi-party system x x x   xx   x     x         x       x x           x       
Articles dealing with the dismantling of 
the barbed wire  
border between Hungary and Austria           x   xx                                           
Opening of the border with Austria                    x   x     xx                           
GDR refugees in the FRG embassy  
in Budapest                 x         x xx                             
GDR refugees in the FRG embassy in  
Prague                               x x x                       
Soviet troops leaving Hungary (demand)                                                           
Soviet troops leaving Hungary  
(statement of fact)             xx           xx                     x x x       
Articles critical towards the party   x           x         x             x   x x             
Articles on Imre Nagy   x     x     x xx x x                                     
Articles on Parcel 301     x   x     x             x                             
Articles on the Water barrage  
"Bös-Nagymaros"       x x x   x xx   x   x       xx     xx xx x x             
Questions relating to party assets: both  
communist party assets as well as how  
the distribution of financial support for  
new parties should be regulated                                 x     x       x   x x   x 
Events / reforms inside the GDR         x                     x xx xx x xx x x xx   x 
x
x xx x x 
Renaming of communist party into the  
MSZP                                   x   xx                   
Articles discussing documents on the  
show court case of László Rajk   x x x x                                                 
 
 
 
 
